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Abstract
This thesis investigated the relationship between on-line inference generation and
reading comprehension in children. An initial investigation was conducted in order to
assess the degree of inferential ability required to meet the demands of standardised tests of
reading comprehension. While all of the tests required some degree of inference
generation, the tests varied in the extent to which they required inferences based in real-
world knowledge and those that required the use of cohesive devices. Moreover, the tests
also varied in the extent to which they required inferences that were necessary for
maintaining textual coherence. Children's ability to answer questions that required
inferences was related to their reading comprehension ability and those with less well
developed comprehension skills performed particularly poorly on inferences requiring the
application of real-world knowledge to the information provided in the text.
The remainder of this thesis described a series of studies that were conducted using
an on-line passage reading and sentence verification task in which children read a series of
passages presented on the screen. At the end of each passage, children were required to
judge whether a target sentence was true or false, using a key-press response on the
computer keyboard. Each target sentence related to specific information embedded in the
passage. Three types of test sentence were used; sentences that relayed information
explicitly stated in the text, sentences that represented the mediating idea underlying a
causal inference required for textual coherence, or sentences that represented a possible
elaboration from the text. Off-line comprehension questions relating to the experimental
passages and additional measures of cognitive ability were also used.
The results presented in Chapters 4,5,6, and 7 indicate that children generate
causal inferences but not elaborative inferences on-line during reading. In Chapter 4,
evidence is presented to suggest that the same pattern of inference generation is found in
texts of both a narrative and expository nature, and thus that text genre does not affect
inference generation. Similarly, the results presented in Chapters 5, 6, and 7 suggest that
children are able to generate inferences from texts containing information that is
inconsistent with real world knowledge. These results are discussed in terms of previous
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research into inference generation, the development of logical reasoning and the belief bias
effect.
Correlational analyses reveal a consistent relationship between inference generation
and reading comprehension throughout this thesis. Moreover, a developmental trend
revealed in Chapter 6 suggests that reading skill and not chronological age is important in
the development of inferential skills. However, in contrast to previous research, the results
presented in Chapter 7 reveal that children with specific comprehension difficulties were
able to generate causal inferences on-line. These results suggest that, while performance on
the inference generation task clearly depended on reading comprehension skill, other
factors also played a role. These results are discussed in terms of possible differences in
working memory capacity and levels of strategic processing.
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Introduction.
The motivation for this thesis evolved from an interest in the reasoning ability of
children with specific comprehension difficulties. The initial research question asked
whether children with specific comprehension difficulties could perform reasoning tasks as
well as children with normally developing reading skills. The point of departure for this
research was to define more clearly the kind of reasoning ability that was to be investigated.
An initial review of the literature revealed that while deductive reasoning ability had been
looked at extensively in children and adults, research into inference generation during
reading had largely been conducted with adult participants. Moreover, while a
comprehensive body of research into text-based inference generation did exist in the
developmental literature, it did not fully address the question of how inference generation
relates to reading comprehension. Arguably, the kind of reasoning tasks children will be
faced with on a regular basis are those embedded in their everyday reading experience i.e.
explaining the actions of a character or following a sequence of events using information
that is implied by, but not explicitly stated in the story. The ability of children to conduct
this kind of reasoning task and how that skill relates to reading comprehension is therefore
an interesting question. With this in mind, I chose to address the initial research question
within the context of inference generation during reading rather than deductive reasoning.
However, it became apparent that there were some unanswered questions that
needed to be considered before the original research question could be tackled. First, it was
important to establish a pattern of inference generation in children with normally
developing reading skills. Children are presented with written material in many different
forms. For example, as well as reading stories, children are also presented with text written
in a more informative, expository manner, as in a textbook. Also, the stories children read
might contain information that is not based in real world knowledge, as in fairy tales. It
was not clear from the developmental literature whether children show a consistent pattern
of inference generation across these different types of text or whether inference generation
is affected by the type of text a child is presented with. Moreover, much of the adult
literature demonstrates a well-established pattern of inference generation such that causal
inferences are generated on-line during reading and elaborative inferences are generated
off-line. This pattern of inference generation had not been fully established in children and
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it was not clear whether children would show this on-line/off-line distinction between
different inference types. These questions needed to be addressed before one could
compare the inference generation of normally developing readers with that of children with
specific comprehension ability.
To this end, the focus of this thesis moved from the original research question and
concentrated on establishing a consistent pattern of inference generation in normally
developing readers, thus adding to the developmental literature in this area. Furthermore,
this thesis aimed to expand the literature by using a systematic on-line measure of inference
generation, resulting in a clearer picture regarding the time-course of inference generation
in children. In line with the initial research question posed at the outset of this research, the
relationship between inference generation and reading comprehension is considered
throughout this thesis although it is not the main focus of the research. However, this
relationship is looked at in more detail in a final study comparing the inference generation
of children with normally developing reading skills to those with specific comprehension
difficulties. Thus, this thesis has two main aims; to establish a pattern of inference
generation in children with normally developing reading skills and to explore the
relationship between inference generation and reading comprehension.
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Chapter 1
An Introduction to Reading Comprehension and Inference Generation.
1.1 Reading Comprehension: Typical and Atypical Development
The ability to read is one of the most important skills for a child to develop.
Indeed, the importance of this skill is reflected in the emphasis the National Curriculum
currently gives to reading instruction. However, becoming a skilled reader requires the
development of a number of different skills. While the ability to decode words is
clearly important to reading, children must also be able to access the meanings of
words. Moreover, they must be able to integrate the individual word meanings in order
to understanding the meaning of the sentence or paragraph they are reading as a whole.
In other words, as well as developing basic decoding skills, children must also develop
skills that allow them to understand what they are reading. The exact nature and
complexity of these skills has been the subject of much research. While the aim of this
thesis is to investigate the importance of inference generation to the development of
reading comprehension skills, the following review provides an overview of a number
of other skills thought to be important to reading comprehension.
1.1.1 Components of Reading Comprehension
Reading comprehension has traditionally been considered a complex process
tapping a number of sub-components including decoding, listening comprehension,
working memory, vocabulary and suppression. This review considers each of these
individual components in turn.
a) Decoding
Decoding is defined by Hoover and Gough (1990) as "the ability to derive a
representation from printed input that allows access to the appropriate entry in the
mental lexicon, and thus, the retrieval of semantic information at the word level"
(Hoover & Gough, 1990, p 130). In other words, decoding is the ability to recognise
individual printed words and to retrieve their meanings from the mental lexicon.
Decoding has consistently been shown to be an important component of reading
comprehension. For example, in a recent study of96 American children, Zinar (2000)
investigated the relative contributions of word identification and comprehension
monitoring behaviour to reading comprehension using a series of standardised tests and
a comprehension monitoring task. Results of a zero-order correlation between all the
tasks used in the study showed that scores on a test of single word reading, in this case
the Word Identification subtest of the Woodcock-Johnson Psycho-Educational Battery-
Revised (Woodcock & Johnson, 1989, 1990), correlated more highly with reading
comprehension (r = 0.68, p<.OOI) than any of the other tasks used. De Jong and Van
der Leij (2002) extended these findings to a transparent orthography by administering a
series of tests to Dutch children in Grade 1 and then again at the end of Grade 3. The
battery of tests included measures of receptive and expressive vocabulary, phonological
awareness and word decoding, and listening and reading comprehension. Results of a
hierarchical regression analysis revealed that reading comprehension at Grade 3 was
significantly predicted by decoding skills at Grade 1 after reading comprehension
performance at Grade 1 was controlled. This finding supports previous research which
asserts that decoding is a reliable predictor of reading comprehension (Curtis, 1980;
Hoover & Gough, 1990; Stanovich, Cunningham, & Feeman, 1984; Stanovich, Nathan,
& Vala-Rossi, 1986)
However, research has also demonstrated that the importance of decoding to
reading comprehension alters over time (Curtis, 1980; Willson & Rupley, 1997). For
example, Willson and Rupley (1997) investigated the relationship between background
knowledge, strategy knowledge, phonemic knowledge and reading comprehension in
approximately 1200 children in grades 1 to 6. Background knowledge was defined as
familiarity with the specific topic of the text being read and strategy knowledge was
defined as knowledge of how to engage with a text. Using the structural equation
modelling technique, Willson and Rupley found that while decoding skill directly
affected reading comprehension performance at grades 2 and 3, its contribution to
reading comprehension was outweighed by that of strategy knowledge by grades 5 and
6. This suggests that, while decoding is important in the early stages of reading
comprehension development, more advanced reading comprehension is driven by top-
down strategic processes. In contrast, Stanovich et al. (1986) found that while decoding
skill was a reliable predictor of reading ability in fifth-grade children, reading ability in
the third-grade was related to vocabulary knowledge and word-recognition speed.
Thus, the change in the contribution of decoding skill to reading ability over time is not
clear.
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b) Listening Comprehension
Listening comprehension has consistently been identified as a reliable predictor
of reading comprehension (Curtis, 1980; de Jong & van der Leij, 2002; Sears & Keogh,
1993). For example, in the study by de Jong and Van der Leij (2002) described above,
listening comprehension at grade 1 was a significant predictor of reading
comprehension at grade 3 after reading comprehension at grade 1 was controlled.
Curtis (1980) gave a battery of standardised tests to 100 children in grades 2,3 and 4.
The tests included measures of reading and listening comprehension, memory span,
word matching and vocalization. In the word matching task, two words or pseudowords
were presented together and the children were required to press a 'yes' key if both items
were the same or a 'no' key if the items were different. Thus, this task involved the
recognition of orthographic patterns and as such can be considered a measure of
decoding. The vocalization task was administered to measure phonological decoding.
In this task, children were shown letters, words and pseudowords one at a time on a
computer screen. They were asked to say the name of the item out loud as soon as they
had identified it or, in a second condition, after a 3-second delay.
Correlational analysis showed that, while second-grader's reading
comprehension did not significantly correlate with listening comprehension, the
correlation between these two variables was highly significant for third and fifth graders
(third grade r = 0.66, p<.OOI; fifth grade r = 0.74, p<.OI). In addition, multiple
regression analyses showed that listening comprehension was a significant predictor of
reading comprehension in the third and fifth grades. 23% of the unique variance in
reading comprehension scores was accounted for by listening comprehension in third
grade children, a further 6% by word vocalization, 3% by letter matching and 6% by a
combination of other variables. 35% of the unique variance in reading comprehension
was accounted for by listening comprehension in the fifth grade, a further 3% by
pseudo word vocalization, and 5% by other variables. Listening comprehension did not
predict reading comprehension in the second grade children.
Curtis also looked at the relationship between these variables in three groups of
skilled and less-skilled readers. For less-skilled readers and the younger skilled readers,
listening comprehension accounted for only a small proportion of the variance in
reading comprehension (3% and 2% respectively). However, for older skilled readers,
listening comprehension accounted for 28% of the variance in reading comprehension
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ability. Stanovich, Cunningham and Feeman (1984) reported similar findings such that
for second grade children, listening comprehension made no significant contribution to
reading comprehension after general intelligence was controlled. In contrast, for third
and fifth grade children, listening comprehension accounted for 14% (p<.05) and 13%
(ns) respectively of the variance in reading comprehension after non-verbal ability had
been controlled. However, when decoding skill was controlled, the contribution of
listening comprehension to reading comprehension dramatically decreased. These
findings suggest that, while listening comprehension clearly makes a significant
contribution to reading comprehension, it is mediated by the development of basic
decoding skills.
c) Vocabulary
Previous research has found a consistent relationship between word-recognition
and reading comprehension. For example, Seignuriac, Ehrlich, Oakhill and Yuill
(2000) investigated the relative contribution of working memory, vocabulary
knowledge and decoding to reading comprehension in a sample of fourth grade children
using a series of regression analyses. In each of five simultaneous regression analyses,
vocabulary was shown to be the best predictor of reading comprehension. Further
evidence for the contribution of vocabulary knowledge to reading comprehension
comes from the finding that children with comprehension difficulties also demonstrate
poor vocabulary knowledge. For example, Nation and Snowling (1998a) measured the
receptive and expressive vocabulary knowledge of children with specific
comprehension difficulties using the Test of Word Knowledge (TOWK; Wiig & Secord,
1992). Children with comprehension difficulties showed poorer receptive and
expressive vocabulary than children with good comprehension who were matched for
decoding skill and non-verbal ability.
In addition to the evidence discussed above, the contribution of vocabulary to
reading comprehension has been shown by a number of instructional studies. For
example, Beck, Perfetti and McKeown (1982) implemented a long-term, in-depth
instructional programme aimed at improving the vocabulary knowledge of 27 children
aged approximately 9 years. Over a five-month period, the children taking part in the
instructional programme were given a variety of tasks including games and group
exercises during which they were taught 104 new words. Following training, the
children were given three tests of comprehension; a semantic decision task, a sentence
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verification task and a story recall task. Performance on all three tests of
comprehension was better for the instructional group than for a control group who were
given no vocabulary training.
This study was replicated and refined by McKeown, Beck, Omanson and
Perfetti ( 1982). In addition to the semantic decision and story recall tasks used in the
previous study, McKeown et a1. (1982) included a multiple-choice comprehension task
in which children were asked questions about a passage they had previously read.
Results showed that children who received long-term vocabulary instruction were more
accurate on the multi-choice task than the control group when the passages that the
questions related to contained examples of the newly learned vocabulary. Thus,
instruction aimed at improving vocabulary knowledge also enhanced reading
comprehension, supporting the assumption that vocabulary knowledge is an important
component of the reading comprehension process. Similar results have been found in
other studies implementing vocabulary instruction programmes (Kameenui, Carnine, &
Freschi, 1982). Taken together, these findings suggest that vocabulary knowledge is a
fundamental component of reading comprehension ability.
d) Suppression
A further component thought to be important to reading comprehension is the
suppression of irrelevant information. Gemsbacher and Faust (1991) suggest that
during comprehension, readers activate many potential meanings of the words they
encounter. They propose that the activation of these competing meanings is suppressed
or enhanced in accordance with the contextual, semantic and syntactic constraints of the
surrounding passage by means of a "structure building framework" in which modulation
of the different levels of activation eventually results in the sole activation of the
contextually appropriate meaning. They further propose that less-skilled
comprehenders may have less efficient suppression mechanisms, resulting in an
inability to reject the inappropriate meanings of words.
In support of this hypothesis, Gemsbacher and Faust (1991) conducted a series
of experiments investigating the ability of skilled and less-skilled comprehenders to
suppress linguistic and non-linguistic information. For example, participants were
presented with short sentences followed by a test word and were asked to state whether
the test word fitted the meaning of the sentence. On some of the trials, the final word of
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the sentence was a homophone, that is one of two or more words with the same
pronunciation but different meanings and written forms (e.g. 'patients' and 'patience').
On trials containing homophones, the test word presented after the sentence was related
to an alternative form of the sentence-final homophone e.g. following the sentence 'he
had lots of patients', the test word 'calm' would be presented. Gernsbacher and Faust
(1991) predicted that if the incorrect form of the homophone was activated, there would
be a large difference between the response latencies to test words following
homophones and those to test words following non-homophones. The time taken to
reject test words after reading sentences containing homophones was compared with
sentences containing non-homophones (e.g. he had lots of students). The results
demonstrated that when subjects were asked to respond immediately after the test word
was presented, both skilled and less-skilled comprehenders showed a large difference in
response times to homophone versus non-homophone conditions indicating that both
groups of readers had activated the incorrect form of the homophone. However, when
asked to respond after a delay of 100 msecs, the skilled comprehenders no longer
showed a difference in response times to homophone versus non-homophone conditions
indicating that they had successfully suppressed the irrelevant form of the homophone.
In contrast, less-skilled comprehenders continued to demonstrate slower response
latencies in the homophone condition, indicating that the incorrect form of the
homophone was still active after a l-second delay.
In another experiment, Gernsbacher and Faust (1991) investigated the abilities
of skilled and less-skilled comprehenders to suppress information across modalities.
They first presented participants with a series of context displays, each containing a
picture with a word superimposed onto it and participants were informed whether they
were being given a picture trial or a word trial. For the picture trials, participants were
asked to ignore the word and concentrate on the picture in the context display. In the
word trials, participants were asked to concentrate on the word while ignoring the
picture. Participants were then presented with a test display. In the picture trials,
participants were shown another picture and were asked to state whether the picture in
the test display was related to the picture in the context display. Conversely, for the
word trials, participants were shown another word and were asked to state whether the
word in the test display was related to the word seen in the context display. On some of
the trials of each type, the test display was related to the item they were instructed to
ignore in the context display. Less-skilled comprehenders were slower to reject test
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items on these trials than skilled comprehenders, adding further support to the
hypothesis that less-skilled comprehenders have less efficient suppression mechanisms.
Similar results were found when subjects were asked to reject named objects
typical of, but not present in, previously presented arrays of objects. For example,
participants were presented with pictures of objects typical of a farm scene. They were
then presented with the word 'tractor', an object commonly found in a farm scene but
one that was not present in the previously presented array. Gemsbacher and Faust
(1991) found that, after a delay of 100 msecs, less-skilled comprehenders were slower
than skilled comprehenders to reject objects that were typical of but absent from
previous presented arrays of objects. Once again, this finding provides support for the
hypothesis of a less efficient suppression mechanism in less-skilled comprehenders.
However, Gemsbacher and Faust showed that less-skilled comprehenders were equally
as aware as skilled comprehenders of what was contextually appropriate. For example,
on some of the trials in experiment 2, the test object presented was typical of and
present in the previous array (e.g. a tractor presented with an array of objects from a
farm scene), while on other trials, the test object was atypical of but present in the
previous array (e.g. a tractor presented with an array of objects from a kitchen scene).
On these trials, both skilled and less-skilled comprehenders were quicker to accept the
test word as being present in the previous array of objects if it was typical of the scene
suggested by those objects. Therefore, the problems demonstrated by less-skilled
comprehenders in rejecting inappropriate information could not be attributed to a lack
of awareness of what is contextually appropriate and as such were more likely the result
of a less-efficient suppression mechanism.
These findings are supported by an earlier study by Merrill, Sperber and
McCauley (1981) in which the performance of good and poor comprehenders was
measured on a stroop task. Merrill et al. presented participants with target words
presented in coloured ink that were immediately preceded by a sentence context.
Participants were asked to name the colour of the target as quickly as possible. The
target words varied in their relatedness to the preceding context. For example,
following the sentence 'the girl fought the cat', a related target word would be 'claw',
while an unrelated word would be 'fur'. However, both target words were semantic
properties of the object in the preceding sentence (e.g. cat).
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Analysis of response latencies showed that, for good comprehenders, response
latencies were faster when the target word was related to the preceding sentence
context, than when it was unrelated. However, poor comprehenders showed no
difference in response times to related or unrelated target words. This finding suggests
that good comprehenders had activated only those semantic properties of the object that
were consistent with the context of the sentence. In contrast, the poor comprehenders
did not suppress the semantic properties of the object that were irrelevant to the
sentence context, thus experiencing an equal amount of interference from related and
unrelated target words.
Recent work by De Beni and Palladino (2000) analysed the recall errors made
by skilled and less-skilled comprehenders on a version of the listening span test
(Daneman & Carpenter, 1980) in which they were asked to listen to sequences of two,
three, four and five sentences and make true/false judgements about them. They were
also asked to remember the sentence-final word in each sentence. Less-skilled
comprehenders made more 'intrusion' errors than skilled comprehenders. That is to say,
less-skilled comprehenders were more likely to recall a word that was present in the
previous sequence of sentences but not in the final position. Thus, less-skilled
comprehenders were less able to suppress the irrelevant information in the sentences in
order to recall the sentence-final word. Furthermore, regression analysis revealed that
number of intrusion errors significantly predicted reading comprehension performance
one year later, explaining 43% of the variance. In a second task, when asked to read
through a passage and identify idea units related to the title, skilled comprehenders
identified more relevant sentences than poor comprehenders. When asked to recall the
passage, skilled comprehenders recalled more relevant parts of the passage than poor
comprehenders. Furthermore, although both groups of children recalled an equal
amount of irrelevant information, poor comprehenders recalled more irrelevant than
relevant information.
Palladino, Comoldi, De Beni and Pazzaglia ( 200 I) presented skilled and less-
skilled comprehenders with an updating task inwhich children heard sequences of 4, 6,
8 or 10 words and were instructed to remember the last four words in the sequence.
They were not told prior to the presentation of each sequence how many words they
would hear. Thus, they had to update their memory representation of the sequence with
the presentation of each new word. They predicted that less-skilled comprehenders
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would find this task more difficult than skilled comprehenders because of their reported
difficulties with suppression. In contrast to this prediction, both groups of children
performed at a comparable level on this task.
In a second experiment, Palladino et al. (2001) presented children with lists of
twelve words, half of which were "sizeable" concrete words (e.g. names of objects or
animals that were measurable by size) and half of which were abstract words.
Participants were instructed to listen to the words and remember the three smallest
objects or animals presented in the list. For example, participants presented with the
following list 'meeting, sense, woodpecker, passion, law, cow, happiness, amount,
caterpillar, lamb, feast and frog' would have to recall the words 'woodpecker, frog and
caterpillar'. Analysis of the recall errors made by the less-skilled comprehenders
showed that they made more intrusion errors than skilled comprehenders.
In a third experiment, Palladino et al. manipulated the suppression element of
the task by including more concrete and less abstract words in the list, thereby enlarging
the pool of relevant information from which the target words had to be extracted.
Analysis of the recall errors again showed that less-skilled comprehenders made more
intrusion errors than skilled comprehenders. Furthermore, while the number of
intrusion errors made by skilled comprehenders was not affected by the increased
suppression load, less-skilled comprehenders made twice as many intrusion errors when
a higher degree of suppression was required. Together with the findings of Gemsbacher
and Faust (1991), Merrill et al. (1981), and De Beni and Palladino (2000), these results
suggest that the suppression of irrelevant information is an important component of
comprehension.
e) Working Memory
Working memory is thought be a fundamental component of reading
comprehension because of the need to store information during reading and integrate
that stored information with incoming information (Daneman & Carpenter, 1980).
Daneman and Carpenter (1980) devised a reading span task in which subjects read
aloud a list of sentences and then recalled the last word of each sentence. Thus, the task
comprised both a processing and a storage component and was therefore considered a
reliable measure of working memory. Having administered this task to a group of
college students, Daneman and Carpenter (1980) found that performance on the reading
9
span task correlated with three separate measures of reading comprehension. Moreover,
performance on a simple recall task in which participants had to recall lists of single
words did not correlate significantly with any of the reading comprehension tests
administered. These results suggest that reading comprehension is strongly mediated by
working memory.
Yuill, Oakhill & Parkin (1989) compared the performance of skilled and less-
skilled comprehenders on a task in which they were asked to read lists of groups of
three digits aloud and then recall the last digit in each of the groups. Children were
given lists of two, three and four groups of digits. Results indicated that for lists
containing two groups of digits, there was no significant difference between groups in
mean number of final digits recalled. However, the less-skilled comprehender group
performed significantly worse on tasks requiring recall of three or four digits.
Yuill et al. also gave participants a text-based task requiring the resolution of
text anomalies using information placed elsewhere in the passage. For example, the
anomaly of a child being praised for not sharing his sweets with his brother was
resolved by the information that his brother was very fat and was on a diet. In the
passages presented to participants, the anomaly and resolution information was either
contained in adjacent sentences or separated by additional sentences, thus increasing the
working memory load. Following the presentation of each passage, the children were
asked a number of comprehension questions. The results of this task indicated that
when the anomaly and resolution information were separated in the text, less-skilled
comprehenders performed significantly worse on the comprehension questions than
skilled comprehenders. Taken together the findings of Yuill et al. suggest that
children's text comprehension is at least partially reliant on efficient working memory.
More recently, Leather and Henry (1994) administered a battery of 11 tests to 71
children with a mean age of 7 years 5 months. The battery included measures of
receptive vocabulary, arithmetic skill, reading accuracy and comprehension, memory
span and phonological awareness. Four memory span measures were used; two simple
span tasks and two complex span tasks. In both of the simple span tasks, children were
required to listen to lists of words and repeat them back in the correct order. The words
were either rhyming words (phonemic span task) or non-rhyming words (control span
task). Thus, these tasks can be considered to test storage capacity. In contrast, the
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complex span tasks included a processing component as well as a storage component
and thus can be considered measures of working memory. In the complex counting
span task, children were presented with a series of cards on which were a number of
dots to count. After all the cards in the series had been counted, the children were asked
to recall the number of dots on each card in the order in which they were presented. In
the complex listening memory span test, children were required to listen to a series of
sentences and fill in the missing final word in each sentence. Having listened to a group
of two or more sentences, the children were asked to recall the sentence-final words in
the correct order.
Correlational analyses revealed a significant relationship between reading
comprehension and both complex span tasks (counting span r = 0.36, p<.OI; listening
span r = 0.61, p<.OI) which was not reflected in the relationship between reading
comprehension and the simple span tasks (phonemic span r = -.05, ns; control span r =
0.30, ns). Moreover, a series of fixed order regression analyses revealed that complex
listening span scores accounted for between 9% and 33% of the variance in reading
comprehension performance (p<.01). In contrast, complex counting span accounted for
a maximum of II % of the variance in reading comprehension (p<.0 I) and was only a
significant predictor if listening span and phonemic awareness were not controlled.
These results suggest that verbal working memory is a significant predictor of reading
comprehension, a finding replicated in more recent research (Seigneuric et al., 2000).
In addition to this, Nation, Adams, Bowyer-Crane & Snowling (1999) found that
children with poor comprehension had normal working memory for spatial tasks, but
their verbal working memory was impaired, findings similar to an earlier study by
Swanson and Berninger (1995). These findings are supported by Cataldo and Oakhill
(2000) who demonstrated that a test of spatial memory did not differentiate between
groups of good and poor comprehenders.
In the study by De Beni and Palladino (2000) described previously, skilled and
less-skilled comprehenders were given two tests of verbal short-term memory; recall of
digits forwards and recall of digits backwards. Neither of these memory tests
differentiated between the two groups of children. However, a significant difference
was found in the performance of good and poor comprehenders on a listening span test.
Good comprehenders performed better than poor comprehenders when presented with
four sentences, although their performance did not differ when given two, three and five
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sentences. Similarly, on the tasks presented by Palladino et al. (200 I), less-skilled
comprehenders recalled fewer target words overall than skilled comprehenders, even
when the memory load was increased to recall of the five smallest items in the list
instead of the original three. Furthermore, at the end of experiments 2 and 3,
participants were asked to recall all the words heard in each list. Results from these
final recall tasks showed that skilled comprehenders consistently recalled more of the
target items than less-skilled comprehenders. The results of experiment 2 also showed
that both groups of children recalled a similar number of non-target concrete items,
although this finding was not replicated in experiment 3. These results suggest that,
while the two groups differed in terms of working memory, their memory span was
similar in other respects. This finding reflects that of De Beni and Palladino (2000).
Taken together the findings described above suggest that verbal working memory is a
vital element of reading comprehension.
The preceding discussion highlights some of the typical processes thought to be
important to reading comprehension. Moreover, it is clear from this discussion that
previous research has failed to highlight the relative contribution of each of these
components to the reading comprehension process, with researchers focusing on
specific numbers of components in each study. However, Hoover and Gough's (1990)
Simple View of Reading aims to overcome this difficulty and provide a comprehensive
framework for considering the many different processes involved in reading
comprehension. It is to this model of reading that we now turn.
1.1.2 The Simple View of Reading
The Simple View of Reading (Hoover & Gough, 1990) states that reading
comprehension is reliant on the co-operation of two components; decoding and
linguistic comprehension, and that the use of one component in the absence of the other
does not constitute reading. Decoding can be defmed simply as the ability to recognise
words while linguistic comprehension can be defined as the ability to form higher level
discourse representations using the information derived from word level decoding. In
Hoover and Gough's model (1990), linguistic comprehension incorporates vocabulary
knowledge and listening comprehension at the sentence, paragraph and text levels.
Importantly, the model also states that the contribution of each of these components to
efficient reading comprehension is equal, both skills being necessary for reading but
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neither being sufficient alone. Importantly, the simple view of reading does not deny
the importance of factors such as working memory or suppression to reading
comprehension. Indeed, an important assumption of the simple view is that, while
decoding and linguistic comprehension are the only components of reading
comprehension that are specific to reading, other non-specific components may be
utilised during reading comprehension. For example, Gemsbacher and Faust (1991)
state that suppression is not specific to language processing but is a general cognitive
mechanism. Therefore, in accordance with the simple view of reading, suppression and
working memory would still playa role in reading comprehension.
The model further states that decoding and linguistic comprehension are
separable components. This view is supported by a number of investigations looking at
the relationship between linguistic comprehension and decoding in the typically
developing reader. Such studies have revealed significant independent contributions of
both decoding and linguistic comprehension to reading comprehension (Curtis, 1980; de
Jong & van der Leij, 2002; Singer & Crouse, 1981; Stanovich et al., 1984). Indeed,
Singer and Crouse (1981) used a measure of vocabulary as their linguistic
comprehension measure thus adding support to the notion of a multi-faceted linguistic
comprehension component. The separability of these two components is also evidenced
by their dissociation in people with specific reading difficulties. For example, children
with dyslexia have typically been demonstrated to have poor decoding skills in
conjunction with intact comprehension ability. Conversely, a large percentage of
children have comprehension skills which are impaired relative to both their
chronological age and their reading age while their decoding skills are in line with, or
even ahead of those expected for their age (Nation & Snowling, 1997; Yuill & Oakhill,
1991). Research has shown that this deficit in comprehension is not restricted to reading
comprehension but is also evident in listening comprehension (Stothard, 1992), a
finding consistent with the simple view of reading (Hoover & Gough, 1990).
The evidence cited above lends support to the simple view of reading and indeed
to the notion that decoding and linguistic comprehension are separable constructs.
However, for children with specific comprehension deficits, there is debate about the
underlying cause of their difficulties. By investigating the comprehension deficits of
such children in more detail, we can learn more about the multi-faceted nature of the
linguistic comprehension component suggested by Hoover and Gough (1991).
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1.1.3 Children with Specific Comprehension Difficulties
a) General Cognitive Ability
Children with specific comprehension difficulties in reading have been shown to
have difficulties with a number of different tasks. In terms of general cognitive
capabilities, an extensive study by Stothard (1992) revealed a distinct profile of
cognitive skills in children with comprehension difficulties. Stothard compared a group
of children with specific comprehension difficulties to two control groups; one matched
for chronological age and one for comprehension age. Comparison of the performance
of these groups on a standard IQ assessment battery revealed a specific deficit in verbal
skills for the poor comprehender group. On two sub-tests of verbal IQ, both the
chronological-age match control group and the comprehension-age match control group
demonstrated age-appropriate verbal skills. However, the poor comprehender group
performed at a level comparable to the younger comprehension-age match group,
exhibiting weaker verbal skills than expected for their age. In contrast, on measures of
performance IQ, all three groups of children performed at a level commensurate with
their age. Moreover, unlike the two control groups, the poor comprehenders showed a
significant discrepancy between verbal IQ and performance IQ. In contrast to the
findings of Nation and Snowling (1998a) the less skilled comprehenders had normal
receptive vocabulary indicating that they could access the meanings of words. However
their expressive vocabulary was impaired suggesting that while they could find the
correct meaning for a word they could not use that meaning in a wider context. Reading
speed was comparable to that of chronological age-match controls indicating that their
comprehension difficulties could not be due to inefficient decoding. Nor could their
problems be attributed to phonological deficits since phonology was intact in the poor
comprehender group, a finding since replicated in a study by Cain, Oakhill and Bryant
(2000). Finally, it was established that the deficits seen in this group could not be
attributed to problems with working memory since their working memory skills were
normal.
In a recent study, Nation, Clarke and Snowling (in press) administered the
British Ability Scales II (Elliot, Smith, & McUlloch, 1996) to 25 poor comprehenders
and found a similar cognitive profile to that described by Stothard (1992) in the
majority of children tested. 20 of the 25 children who participated in the study
exhibited general cognitive ability (GCA) in the normal range (mean GCA 98.5).
However, verbal IQ was impaired compared to non-verbal and spatial IQ (mean
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standard scores 91, 101.1, & 104.5 respectively). Performance on the achievement
scales administered revealed single word reading and number skills higher than
expected on the basis of GCA. Furthermore, reading accuracy as measured by the
NARA II was in line with their GCA while NARA II reading comprehension
performance was significantly below that predicted by their GCA.
Taken together the findings of Stothard (1992) and Nation et al. (in press)
indicate that the problems poor comprehenders experience may be due to generally
weak verbal skills rather than specific comprehension skills. However, Nation et al. (in
press) also discovered a sub-group of children with a different cognitive profile to the
average poor comprehender. Five of the 20 children seen in this study showed
generally low GCA (mean 7604) with below average performance on verbal, non-verbal
and spatial scales (mean standard scores 8004, 74.8, & 85.8 respectively). Achievement
scale performance showed single word reading and number skills markedly higher than
GCA. Furthermore, in contrast to the majority of poor comprehenders, reading
comprehension performance measured by the NARA II was in line with GCA while
reading accuracy was significantly higher than expected on the basis of GCA. These
findings suggest that caution needs to be taken when identifying poor comprehenders
since they clearly form a heterogeneous group. While most poor comprehenders appear
to be identified due to surprisingly low comprehension skills, a small sub-group may be
erroneously classified as poor comprehenders because of unexpectedly high reading
accuracy.
b) Inferential Skills in Poor Comprehenders
Poor comprehenders have been consistently shown to have weak inferential
skills. Early work by Oakhill (1982) indicated that less-skilled comprehenders do not
engage in active constructive processing in the same way as skilled comprehenders.
Oakhill presented children with short 'stories' followed by a recognition test in which
children were read two original sentences from the story, a valid inference foil which
contained information inferred from the passage, or an invalid inference foil, containing
information that could not be inferred by the passage. The task of the children was to
say 'yes' if they had heard exactly the same sentence before, and 'no' if they had not.
Skilled comprehenders made fewer errors than less-skilled comprehenders when
presented with the original sentences and the invalid inference foils. However, skilled
comprehenders erroneously recognised more valid inference foils as sentences they had
IS
heard before than less-skilled comprehenders, indicating that skilled comprehenders
were actively integrating information across sentences while less-skilled comprehenders
were not.
In a later study, Oakhill (1983) presented skilled and less-skilled comprehenders
with a series of 16 simple sentences. The children were then given a cued recall task in
which they were presented with a 'clue' word and asked to recall the sentence that the
word reminded them of. The 'clue' word was either an original noun taken from the
sentence or an instantiation of that noun. For example, following the sentence 'the
animal chased the mouse', the original cue word would be 'animal' and the instantiated
cue word would be 'cat'. The results of the study showed that for skilled
comprehenders, the use of an instantiated 'clue' word as a cue to recall was more
effective than using the original noun. Recall in the instantiated condition was 71.9%
while recall in the original condition was 45.8% for skilled comprehenders. In contrast,
less-skilled comprehenders recalled significantly fewer sentences overall, their
performance being poorest when given instantiated cue words: 35.4% in the
instantiated condition and 38.5% in the original condition. In addition, less-skilled
comprehenders were slower to respond to instantiated cue words than to original cue
words, while skilled comprehenders showed no difference in response time to either cue
type. Finally, when asked to choose two possible specific meanings of a noun, less-
skilled comprehenders performed at a level comparable with the skilled comprehenders,
indicating that their difficulties were not related to poorer general knowledge. For
example, when the sentence 'the animal chased the mouse' was re-read, and participants
were asked whether the animal in the sentence was more likely to be a cat or a rabbit,
less-skilled comprehenders were just as likely to correctly choose the word 'cat' as
skilled comprehenders. These results reflect the notion that, unlike skilled
comprehenders, less-skilled comprehenders do not actively construct a mental
representation of the text as they are reading.
In a study designed to look more closely at the inferential and memory skills of
poor comprehenders, Oakhill (1984) presented skilled and less-skilled comprehenders
with short stories to read, and subsequently asked them a series of questions about each
story. Some of the questions tapped information that was explicitly stated in the story,
while other questions required some degree of inference to provide a correct answer.
When required to answer the questions from memory, the results showed that less-
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skilled comprehenders were worse than skilled comprehenders on literal and inference
questions. However, when the text was available to refer to, the advantage of the
skilled comprehenders was only maintained for the inference questions.
Cain and Oakhill (1999) conducted a similar study and found that even when the
stories were removed from sight before asking the questions, less-skilled
comprehenders performed at a comparable level to chronological age-match peers on
questions tapping literal information. However, their ability to answer questions
tapping text-connecting inferences was inferior to children in both a chronological age-
match group and a comprehension age-match group. Furthermore, the less-skilled
comprehenders were significantly worse at answering questions that required a gap-
filling inference than the chronological age-match group, although their performance
was comparable to the comprehension age-match group. Interestingly, when prompted
to refer to the text, the performance of the less-skilled comprehenders improved for the
text-connecting inferences to a level comparable with both control groups. However,
they continued to have difficulty with the gap-filling inferences, performing at a level
comparable to the comprehension age-match controls.
Garnham, Oakhill and Johnson-Laird (1982 experiment 2) investigated the
effect of referential continuity on text comprehension of skilled and less-skilled
comprehenders aged between 7 and 8 years. Children were given examples of three
types of text; the original version, a random version and a revised random version. In
the original version of the story, the main character and object were referred to by name
in the first sentence. In the second and third sentence, pronouns were used to refer to
both character and object. The object and character were then referred to by name once
more in the fourth and fifth sentence respectively. For example, the following is the
original version of one of the passages presented:
'David was playing with his big, coloured ball in the garden. He bounced it so
hard that it went right over the fence. The people next door were out so he climbed over
to get it. He found his ball and threw it back. David carried on with his game.'
In the random version, the sentences of the text occurred in random order. In
the revised random version, the sentences were presented in random order but some of
the noun phrases were changed to re-establish referential continuity. For example, the
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sentence 'he found his ball and threw it back' was changed to 'David found his big
coloured ball and threw it back'. The children were asked to read and recall two stories
in each of the three versions. The results showed that overall, skilled comprehenders
recalled more of the stories from all three versions than poor comprehenders. However.
both groups of children recalled more of the stories presented in the original version
than in either the randomised or revised random version. Moreover, the skilled
comprehenders showed a marked recall advantage for the revised random over the
random stories while the less-skilled comprehenders showed no such advantage. Recall
for the less-skilled comprehenders was comparable for both the revised and the revised
random stories indicating that the additional referential continuity present in the revised
random version did not benefit less-skilled comprehenders. Garnham et al. (1982)
interpreted this finding as evidence for weak inferential skills in poor comprehenders.
Yuill and Oakhill (1986) looked at pronoun resolution in skilled and less-skilled
comprehenders. Their results showed that poor comprehenders were less able to use
gender cues to resolve pronouns than skilled comprehenders. In a later study, Yuill and
Oakhill (1988a) examined poor comprehender's understanding of anaphoric relations in
more detail. They looked at four particular types of anaphor; reference, ellipsis,
substitution and lexical. Reference items were items where a pronoun referred to a
previously mentioned object e.g. 'I have bought some sandwiches' Bill said, 'I hope you
remembered yours', where yours refers to the aforementioned sandwiches. Ellipsis and
substitution both refer to items were one thing is substituted for another. However, in
the case of substitution, the replacement is explicit e.g. 'Who gave you your new fishing
rod?' she asked. 'Mum did' said Bill', where did replaces gave me the fishing rod. In
contrast, in the case of ellipsis, the replacement is implicit e.g. 'Are you going fishing?',
'Yes, I am', where am should be followed by going fishing, Finally, lexical items were
items where an inference should be made to maintain cohesion e.g. 'The Captain was
busy loading up his fishing boat. He fixed the motor in place ...' where motor refers to
the motor of the fishing boat.
Yuill and Oakhill (1988a) gave skilled and less-skilled comprehenders pre-
training in these four types of anaphor. They then presented the children with a story
containing examples of each of these anaphors. In some cases the anaphor and its
referent were contained in adjacent sentences, while in other cases a number of
intervening sentences separated the anaphor from its referent. The experimenter read
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the story to the child twice, and on the second occasion, whenever an anaphor was
encountered, the experimenter asked the child what each anaphor stood for or referred
to. During the second reading, the text was available for the child to refer to. The
results showed that for both groups of children, increasing the distance between anaphor
and referent adversely affected performance on the task. However, for all four anaphor
types, less-skilled comprehenders performed significantly worse than skilled
comprehenders at one or all distance manipulations. These results indicate that less-
skilled comprehenders are poorer at using lexical cues to maintain textual cohesion than
skilled comprehenders, a finding later replicated by Yuill and Oakhill (1991).
Taken together, the studies described above indicate that children with specific
comprehension difficulties have difficulty with inference processing. However, Cain
and Oakhill (1999) found that less-skilled comprehenders could answer literal questions
about a text equally as well as skilled comprehenders even when the text was covered,
indicating that the problem is not one of memory for text. Similarly, the finding that the
performance of less-skilled comprehenders improved for text-connecting inferences
when prompted to refer to the text, indicates that it is not the case that poor
comprehenders cannot make inferences. Rather, it would seem that the difference in
performance between skilled and less-skilled comprehenders lies in the strategies used
during reading and in particular, in the ability to use general knowledge to interpret a
text.
This finding is supported by a training study conducted by Yuill and Oakhill
(1988b) in which skilled and less-skilled comprehenders took part in three independent
training programmes; inference training, comprehension exercises and rapid decoding
training. The inference training programme comprised activities designed to encourage
inference generation. For example, children were given a sentence such as 'Sleepy Tom
was late for school again'. They then had to pick a word from the sentence and work
out what information that word gave them about the sentence i.e. the name 'Tom'
implies that subject of the sentence is male. Children were also encouraged to generate
questions about sentences and use the clues in the stories to predict the content of
hidden sentences. The comprehension exercises involved the experimenter reading the
children a story and asking a variety of literal and inferential comprehension questions.
Finally, the rapid decoding training involved the children being given a list of words
taken from a story and were asked to practice reading them out loud accurately. The
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children were then given the story to read. After reading the story the children were
asked to re-read the list of words and the experimenter timed them with a stopwatch. At
the beginning of the next session, the children re-read the previous word list again and
the experimenter recorded the time.
Results demonstrated that the skilled comprehenders did not significantly benefit
from any of the training programmes, showing little improvement in their
comprehension skills. In contrast, children with comprehension difficulties who were
given inference training showed a mean improvement in their comprehension age of
17.38 months over the course of the training programme. Similarly, less-skilled
comprehenders given comprehension exercises showed a mean increase in their
comprehension age of 13.71 months. However, less-skilled comprehenders given rapid
decoding training showed little improvement in their comprehension skills at the end of
the training programme.
c) Semantic Skills in Poor Comprehenders
Nation and colleagues (Nation, Marshall, & Snowling, 2001; Nation &
Snowling, 1998a, 1999) investigated the semantic processing abilities of children with
reading comprehension difficulties. Nation and Snowling (1998a) matched 16 poor
comprehenders aged approximately 9 years with 16 normal readers of the same
chronological age. Performance of the two groups of children was compared on tasks
requiring access to semantic information e.g. synonym judgement and semantic fluency,
and tasks requiring phonological awareness e.g. rhyme judgement and rhyme fluency.
The results from these tasks showed that poor comprehenders performed at a level
comparable to the normal readers on phonological tasks but were significantly poorer
than normal readers on both synonym judgement and semantic fluency. The children
were also given a word recognition task in which they were presented with a series of
individual words and were asked to read each word as quickly as possible. The words
presented varied in terms of regularity (i.e. regular and irregular spellings) and
frequency (i.e. high or low frequency words). Results from the word recognition task
showed that poor comprehenders performed as well as normal readers for regular and
high frequency words. However, for low frequency and exception words, poor
comprehenders performed significantly worse than normal readers suggesting that when
word recognition requires semantic support, children with comprehension difficulties
are at a disadvantage. Furthermore, the poor comprehender group exhibited lower
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expressive and receptive vocabulary on a standardised vocabulary test than the normal
readers. These findings indicate that the poor comprehenders in this study had good
phonological awareness but poor semantic processing skills.
Similarly, Nation and Snowling (1999) compared the performance of 16 poor
comprehenders aged approximately 10 years with 16 normal readers of the same
chronological age on a semantic priming task. Children were presented with pairs of
words constituting a prime and a target word and were asked to make a lexical decision
to both the prime and the target. The words were presented one at a time on a computer
screen. The experimental items were comprised of semantically related pairs (e.g.
DOG-CAT) or functionally related pairs (e.g. BEACH-SAND). Furthermore, the items
in each pair were either highly associated (e.g. BROTHER-SISTER; BOW-ARROW)
or non-associated (COW-GOAT; FRIDGE-CHEESE) according to word association
frequency norms. The words in each pair were also presented with an unrelated prime
(e.g. DOG-BROTHER; BOW-CHEESE). The results showed that children with normal
reading skills demonstrated strong priming effects for both semantically and
functionally related words. Furthermore, while normal readers showed enhanced
priming effects for semantically related words when they were highly associated,
priming was still present for non-associated words in both the functionally and
semantically related conditions. In other words, normal readers made faster lexical
decisions about the second word of each pair when the preceding word was related to it
than when it was not. Similarly, poor comprehenders showed priming effects for pairs
of words that were functionally related, whether highly associated or non-associated.
However, for semantically related items, children with comprehension difficulties
showed no evidence of priming for non-associated words. Priming effects were only
present for highly associated words in this condition suggesting that poor
comprehenders are able to access concrete semantic relations but have difficulty with
more abstract semantic processing. Finally, Nation, Marshall and Snowling (200 I)
found that poor comprehenders were slower and less accurate than chronological age-
match controls at naming pictures, a task requiring access to semantic information,
particularly when the pictures had low frequency names. Taken together the results of
these three studies suggest that children with specific comprehension difficulties have
problems with semantic processing.
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d) General Language SkiDs in Poor Comprehenders
Other areas of language processing have been investigated in children with
specific comprehension difficulties. Donaldson (1986) investigated knowledge of
causal connectives in normally developing children. Children were presented with two
tasks; a question answering task and a sentence completion task. In the question
answering task, participants were shown a pair of pictures depicting a series of events
that were described by the experimenter e.g. 'Mary gets soaked. Mary is sneezing.'
Participants were then asked a question to ensure that they had understood the state of
the protagonist in the picture sequence e.g. 'Mary has got a cold, hasn't she?' They were
then asked the experimental question, which took one of two forms; an empirical form
or a deductive form. Empirical items were defmed as those which required the
participant to show some knowledge of cause and effect e.g. to answer the question
'Why does Mary have a cold?', the participant would have to infer that Mary had a cold
because she got soaked. In contrast, the deductive items required participants to provide
some evidence for their previous conclusion e.g. in order to answer the question 'How
do you know Mary has a cold?', participants would have to provide evidence that Mary
exhibited the symptoms of a cold - she was sneezing. Results indicated that children
aged between 5 and 10 years of age found the deductive version of this task more
difficult than the empirical version and tended to answer deductive questions with an
empirical answer, although this tendency decreased with age.
In a sentence completion task, participants were again presented with the
pictures and accompanying description of events. They were then presented with an
incomplete sentence in either the empirical or deductive form e.g. Mary has a cold
because (empirical), or We can tell Mary has a cold because _
(deductive) and they were asked to complete the sentence. As in the question answering
task, the younger children found the empirical sentence completion task easier than
deductive sentence completion, and tended to provide empirical completions e.g. 'she
got soaked' for both types of sentence (Donaldson, 1986).
Overall, the findings of Donaldson (1986) showed that young children failed to
understand that the word 'because' can introduce not only the cause of an event in an
empirical sense but also the evidence for a conclusion in the deductive sense. However,
Donaldson also found evidence of individual differences such that some children in
each age group tested performed well on both types of task, indicating that the lack of
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knowledge about the use of the causal connective 'because' cannot be attributed solely
to age.
Oakhill, Yuill and Donaldson (1990) extended these findings by presenting
skilled and less-skilled comprehenders with the tasks described above. They found that
both groups of children performed equally well on the empirical items in both the
question answering and sentence completion tasks. However, while both groups of
children performed at a lower level on the deductive items in both tasks than on the
empirical items, the difference in performance was more extreme for the less-skilled
comprehenders. The less-skilled comprehenders achieved a significantly lower score on
the deductive items than the skilled comprehenders. Thus, it would seem that it is
comprehension skill, and not age, that is related to the understanding of causal
connectives. Furthermore, the results showed that less-skilled comprehenders have a
less well-developed understanding of 'because', although only when asked to use it in
the deductive mode. Thus, they appear to be able to make simple cause and effect links
but find complex deductive reasoning processes more difficult. However, it is
important to note that, when prompted to attend to the information in the pictures, the
performance of both groups improved on the deductive reasoning items in both tasks.
Therefore, as in the previous studies described above (Cain and Oakhill, 1999; Yuill and
Oakhill, 1988a), it would seem that the problems of less-skilled comprehenders lie in
their use of strategies rather than their ability to perform the more complex operations
per se. This hypothesis is supported by a recent study from Cataldo and Oakhill (2000)
investigating strategy use in less-skilled and skilled comprehenders. Cataldo and
Oakhill (2000) found that when children needed to search for specific pieces of
information in a coherent text, either for recall or to answer questions about the text,
skilled comprehenders consistently used more efficient search strategies than less-
skilled comprehenders.
Research has shown that children with comprehension difficulties are less able
to use context to aid in word recognition (Nation & Snowling, 1998b). Nation and
Snowling (1998b) demonstrated that children with comprehension difficulties do not
benefit from context as much as normal readers or dyslexic children. Children were
asked to read target words which were either presented individually or were preceded
by a contextually appropriate sentence prime (e.g. I went shopping with my mother and
my .... aunt). Results indicated that dyslexic children gained the most benefit from the
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sentence context, exhibiting greater improvements in both response time and accuracy
than either normal readers or poor comprehenders when presented with words preceded
by a sentence prime. In contrast, poor comprehenders gained the least benefit from
sentence context. This group showed less improvement in response accuracy than
normal readers when presented with words preceded by a sentence prime, although the
two groups did not differ in terms of response times in the context condition. Thus it
would seem that poor comprehenders are less efficient in their use of context to guide
their reading.
Nation and Snowling (2000) showed that the language difficulties of less skilled
comprehenders also included poor syntactic awareness. Normal readers and poor
comprehenders were presented with sentences in which the word order had been
scrambled. The children were asked to recall the sentences, putting the words in the
correct order. The results of the first experiment showed that both groups of children
were adversely affected by sentences of increasing difficulty such that overall,
performance was better for active than for passive sentences, with groups performing
near ceiling for active sentences. However, poor comprehenders performed
significantly worse than normal readers on both active and passive sentences. The
results of a second experiment showed that the performance of both groups of children
suffered as a result of increasing ambiguity. However, poor comprehenders performed
at a significantly lower level than normal readers at all three levels of semantic
ambiguity included in this study while skilled comprehenders only had problems with
the most ambiguous sentences. To summarise, the results of both experiments indicate
that poor comprehenders have weak syntactic awareness skills.
Finally, Cain and Oakhill (1996) investigated the ability of less-skilled
comprehenders to tell a story. They tested three groups of children; a less-skilled
comprehender group (mean age 7 years 9 months), a chronological age-match skilled
comprehender group (mean age 7 years 8 months) and a comprehension age-match
control group (CAM; mean age 6 years 10 months). They provided all three groups of
children with two types of prompt; a title prompt and a picture prompt. In the title
prompt condition, children were given five titles from which they had to choose three to
plan their stories around. In the picture prompt condition, children were presented with
three picture sequences representing the events of a story. The sequence included the
setting of the story, the main event and the resolution of the story. The child's task in
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both conditions was to tell a story out loud to the experimenter based on the prompt
presented to them. Children were given practice items in both conditions and were
allowed time to plan their stories before responding. The stories were scored in terms
of the presence of a number of story conventions; beginnings and endings, and scene
and character setting information. They were also scored for story structure, word
length and use of connectives.
The results of the study showed that all groups produced shorter stories in the
picture condition than in the title condition, although this reduction in story length was
most marked for the less-skilled comprehender and CAM groups. There was no
difference between groups in the use of beginnings and endings, or character and scene
setting information, indicating that less-skilled comprehenders had a comparable degree
of knowledge about the conventions of a story as both control groups. Given the
findings of Yuill and Oakhill (1991, 1990) described above one might have predicted
that the less-skilled comprehenders would use fewer connectives in their stories than
either of the other two groups. Surprisingly no such difference was found indicating
that all three groups were equally able to use linguistic devices to express their ideas. It
should be noted, however, the connectives used in these stories were simple connectives
e.g. and/then, temporal connectives e.g. the next day, and causal connectives such as the
empirical form of 'because', with which less-skilled comprehenders are familiar
(Oakhill, Yuill & Donaldson, 1990). The use of more complex connectives may have
differentiated between groups.
In terms of story structure, the less-skilled comprehenders told poorer stories in
the title condition than either the chronological age-match or comprehension age-match
control groups. However, the less-skilled comprehenders also received more benefit
from the picture prompt condition than the other two groups. In the picture prompt
condition the less-skilled comprehenders produced stories that were significantly poorer
in story structure than the skilled comprehender group but comparable in story structure
to the CAM group. The performance of the skilled comprehender and CAM groups did
not differ from each other in either condition. The poor structure of the stories produced
by the less-skilled comprehender group in the title prompt condition cannot be a result
of their comprehension ability as the comprehension age-match controls produced
stories superior in structure. Furthermore, the fact that the picture prompt condition
proved to be of more benefit t9 the It(ss-skilled comprehenders than to either of the other
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two groups indicates that this condition provided information that the less-skilled
comprehenders could not provide themselves about the structure of events. To
summarise, the results of this study suggest that children with less-well developed
comprehension skills have a poorer knowledge of story structure which may be causally
related to their comprehension difficulties and which seems to be related to a difficulty
in building up a sequence of events rather than a general lack of knowledge about
stories.
1.1.4 Summary
Clearly, children with reading comprehension difficulties have difficulties that
extend into other areas of language processing. However, the underlying cause of these
difficulties is unclear. The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the importance of
inferential skills to reading comprehension in general and to examine the inferential
skills of poor comprehenders in more detail. While the work of Oakhill and colleagues
discussed above (Cain & Oakhill, 1999; Oakhill, 1982, 1984; Yuill & Oakhill, 1988a)
has indicated that poor comprehenders have difficulty making inferences, a number of
questions have yet to be addressed. For example, in many of the aforementioned
studies, it is not always clear what types of inferences are being examined and it is
therefore not clear whether poor comprehenders have difficulties with all classes of
inference, or whether their difficulties are limited to inferences requiring attention to
certain types of information. Furthermore, the question answering procedure used by
Oakhill (1984) and Cain and Oakhill (1999) does not allow for any conclusions to be
drawn concerning the time-course of inference generation in poor comprehenders.
Primarily, the focus of this investigation will be to establish a pattern of on-line
inference generation in children with normally developing reading skills. In addition to
this, a study will be conducted looking specifically at inferential processing in children
with comprehension difficulties.
1.2 Inference Types and Models of Inference Processing.
The work discussed in section 1.1 suggests that comprehension of text or speech
involves much more than a simple understanding of the individual words presented and
their meaning in any given sentence. Essential to comprehension is the ability to form a
representation of the information presented as a whole. This involves integrating
information across sentences and formulating representations that are only implicitly
mentioned in the text being read. In other words, successful comprehension is highly
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related to the ability to draw inferences. This relationship has been consistently shown
in studies that have investigated the representation of discourse in memory. For
example, Bransford, Barclay and Franks (1972) found that people tend to recall
discourse in terms of the general overall meaning rather than as a verbatim account of
the input. Furthermore, they presented subjects with a number of sentence frames and
consequently with a recognition task whereby subjects read test sentences that were
either inferred from the original sentence frame, included in the original sentence frame
or not inferred from the original sentence frame. Their results demonstrated that people
erroneously recognised as familiar a sentence that was inferred by a sentence frame
while correctly recognising as novel a sentence that was not inferred by the original
input. Anderson et al. (1976) found that a word inferred by a sentence could be as good
a cue for recall as a word actually present in the original sentence. For example,
subjects presented with the phrase 'the fish attacked the swimmer' found the word 'shark'
was a better cue for recall of the sentence than the general term 'fish' that was used in
the original sentence. Similar results have been found in number of other studies
(Anderson & Ortony, 1975; Paris & Lindauer, 1976). Thus it would appear that
people's representation of discourse in memory contains a high proportion of
information obtained by the drawing of inferences.
Van Dijk and Kintsch (1983) propose that there are three levels to the discourse
representation constructed during reading; the surface code, the textbase, and the
situation model. The surface code represents the precise wording and syntax of each
clause. The textbase is a representation of the explicit propositions in the text in terms
of their meaning rather than their surface code. The situation model is a representation
of the actions, events, characters and meaning of the text as a whole. The situation
model is thought to be constructed by relating the explicit information in the passage
with ideas left implicit or to be inferred. Thus it is in the construction of the situation
model that inference generation is thought to be most important. However, there are
many different types of inferences that could potentially be generated when constructing
a situation model. In the following discussion I will first consider the different
inference types that have been commonly identified in studies of discourse processes,
and secondly I will consider two of the leading models of inference generation.
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1.2.1 Types of Inference
Two superordinate categories of inferences that have been consistently identified
in the literature are coherence inferences and elaborative inferences. Coherence
inferences are those that are necessary to form a consistent and intelligible mental
representation of a text and can be classified either as those that use cohesive devices or
as those that are knowledge-based.
Cohesive devices are commonly used to maintain textual integrity. Such
devices include anaphora and pronoun resolution. For example, consider the following
text:
"The ship left the harbour in a storm. The vessel lurched as a wave hit the bow."
In order to form a meaningful and conjoined representation of the two sentences
the reader would need to infer that 'the ship' referred to in the first sentence was the
same object as 'the vessel' referred to in the second sentence. As such, anaphora is used
to aid in the construction of a situation model. Similarly, for the following sentence:
"John asked Pam if he could borrow some money." the reader would need to determine
that the pronoun 'he' refers to "John" in order to realise a complete representation of the
sentence. Thus, cohesive devices can be used to resolve incongruities or ambiguities in
a text, helping to construct a coherent representation and therefore can be viewed as
inferences. However, some researchers are undecided as to whether this use of cohesive
devices can be classed as a type of inference generation (McKoon & Ratcliff, 1992;
Singer, Harkness, & Stewart, 1997). Indeed, the distinction between coherence and
cohesion is not entirely clear (Fulcher, 1989), and Graesser, Trabasso & Singer (1994)
suggest the two concepts overlap such that cohesion is simply a form of coherence and
as such the use of cohesive devices to form textual links can be viewed as a type of
inference generation. More importantly, researchers are generally agreed that these
inferences are encoded into the textbase representation of a passage during reading
(Garnham, Oakhill, & Cain, 1997; Graesser et al., 1994; McKoon & Ratcliff, 1992;
Swinney & Osterhout, 1990). Therefore, the remainder of this discussion will focus on
the distinction between knowledge-based coherence inferences and elaborative
inferences.
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Knowledge-based inferences are commonly used to bridge a gap in the discourse
by applying real-world knowledge to the explicit information in the text in order to form
a link between the ideas that are clearly stated and those that are left implicit. They are
also frequently termed bridging inferences. The most commonly studied bridging
inference is that which is generated to explain the cause of an event. For example,
consider the following text:
"The campfire started to bum uncontrollably. Tom grabbed a bucket of water."
In order to understand why "Tom grabbed a bucket of water". it is necessary to
relate the second sentence to the first. (liThe campfire started to bum uncontrollably. "),
by generating the inference that Tom was trying to put the campfire out. To do this you
must first activate the mediating idea that 'water puts out fire' from your own real-world
knowledge. Without generating this inference the two sentences remain disjointed and
do not form a coherent whole. In this example. therefore, knowledge of the real world
is used to forge a link between the two explicit sentences by generating an explanation
of Tom's actions; an explanation that is left implicit in the text itself.
Bridging inferences are not only causal however. Arguably, actions and events
in a text can also be explained in terms of temporal information. the motivations and
intentions of the characters and the spatial location of the objects and agents involved.
The relative importance of each of these inference types to the situation model has not
been clearly established and causal bridges remain the most widely recognised type of
knowledge-based inference consistently included in a reader's discourse representation.
Elaborative inferences are those that do not add anything to the coherence of a
passage but serve to enrich its mental representation They are therefore not necessary
for textual coherence. Like bridging inferences, elaborative inferences are generally
knowledge-based. For example, inferences about the consequences of an action,
predictions about forthcoming events, speculations regarding the instrument used to
perform a task, or suppositions about the physical properties of textual characters and
objects are all elaborative inferences. By way of illustration, consider the following
passage:
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"The knight lunged towards the dragon and pierced his shining scales. The dragon
turned towards the knight and let out a fiery roar."
It is possible to make many elaborations from this short passage. It could be
inferred that the knight attacked the dragon with a sword because that is the usual tool
of the knight and is inferred by the verb 'pierced'. However, it is not necessarily the
case since the knight could have been using any other sharp object had he not been in
possession of his sword. Furthermore, it could be assumed that the knight was wounded
by the dragon's fiery breath. However, it may be the case that the knight was able to
avoid the dragon's attack. As interesting and text-enriching as these elaborations may
be, none of them are necessary in order to form a full and intelligible representation of
the original text. As such, a clear distinction can be drawn between these and the more
necessary inferences required for coherence.
While the preceding discussion was intended to give an indication of the
different types of inferences available from text, it is important to note that these
examples are by no means exhaustive. There are many potential inferences available in
text and taxonomies of inference types have proved controversial in the past. For the
most-part, the distinction between knowledge-based coherence and elaborative
inferences outlined above will be adopted by this thesis.
1.2.2 Two Accounts of Inference Generation.
It is clear that many inferences could conceivably be generated while reading in
order to construct a rich discourse representation. However, the generation of all of
these inferences while reading would result in an overwhelming drain on cognitive
resources. One of the most controversial areas of inference research focuses on
establishing which inference types are automatically integrated into the situation model
during encoding of the text and which require more strategic processing.
It is important at this point to define what is meant by the term 'automatically'.
Automatic processes can be defmed as those which are fast, unintentional, require little
conscious effort, interfere minimally with other tasks and do not make many demands
on attentional resources (Thurlow & van den Brook, 1997). The notion that inferences
can be drawn in accordance with this definition seems incongruous with the act of
comprehension which, as discussed in the previous section of this chapter, is a complex
task requiring the co-operation of a number of different cognitive processes. However,
30
it is important to consider that automaticity is relative, not absolute; that is to say, a task
performed automatically will be performed faster and with less conscious effort than if
it were to be performed consciously (Thurlow & Van den Broek, 1997). Thus, it may
be that certain types of inference generation during comprehension can be deemed
automatic in that they require no more effort than would normally be necessary for
reading comprehension. Conversely, strategic processing is that which requires
intentional effort. With this in mind it is plausible that some inferences can be made
automatically while others require more conscious effort and are usually drawn when
the reader has a specific reading goal.
A number of theoretical models of inference generation have been proposed in
recent years including the Prediction-Substantiation Model (Bower, Black, & Turner,
1979; Dejong, 1979; Dyer, 1983; Schank & Abelson, 1977), the Causal Inference
Maker Model (van den Broek, 1994; van den Broek, 1990), the Event Indexing Model
(Zwann, 1999), the Structure Building Framework (Gernsbacher, 1997) and the
computational Landscape Model (van den Broek, Young, Tzeng, & Linderholm, 1999).
However, two models in particular have been influential in providing a framework for
many of the contemporary studies of inference generation; the constructionist theory
(Graesser & Kreuz, 1993; Graesser et al., 1994) and the minimalist hypothesis (McKoon
& Ratcliff, 1992). Both models agree that any of the potential inferences can be drawn
if a reader has a particular goal and is therefore employing a particular reading strategy.
For example, Van den Broek, Lorch, Linderholm and Gustafson (2001) recently
demonstrated that readers who read for enjoyment were less concerned with the
coherence of a text than people reading for study. Consequently, readers with a study
goal engaged in more coherence-building inferential activity and showed a higher level
of recall for text than readers with an entertainment goal. The difference between the
constructionist theory and the minimalist hypothesis lies in the types of inferences the
two models believe to be drawn automatically. This difference centres on the issue of
whether the reader strives to achieve global or local coherence. Global coherence
occurs if a reader can integrate an incoming statement with the overall structure of the
text they have previously read. Conversely, local coherence involves connecting the
incoming information with that in the preceding one or two sentences. Therefore, if a
reader attempts to achieve both global and local coherence, it is conceivable that many
more inferences will be required for comprehension than if the reader is simply striving
for local coherence.
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1.2.3 The Constructionist Theory
The constructionist theory (Graesser et al., 1993, 1994) is based on three critical
assumptions which distinguish it from other theories of inference generation; the
assumption that the reader will construct a mental representation that fulfils their
reading goal; the assumption that the reader attempts to achieve both local and global
coherence; and the assumption that the reader looks for explanations of events, actions
and states that occur in the text. These assumptions are referred to as the reader goal
assumption, the coherence assumption and the explanation assumption. In terms of
automatic inference generation, it is the latter two assumptions that are the most
important since the reader goal assumption allows any and all inferences to be generated
if they fulfil the reader's reading goal and is thus related more to strategic than
automatic inference generation.
Based on the explanation assumption and coherence assumption, certain
predictions can be made by the constructionist theory regarding the classes of inferences
automatically drawn during encoding. In terms of the inference categories identified
above, Graesser et al. (1993, 1994) predict that only those inference categories required
for text coherence or to explain events, actions and states, will be drawn on-line. Thus,
text-connecting, or cohesive inferences and knowledge-based, or bridging inferences
will be generated. Both classes of inference can be said to aid local coherence as
illustrated in the short passages in section 1.2.1. Cohesive inferences achieve local
coherence by resolving text-based ambiguities as in the case of pronoun resolution or
anaphora. Furthermore, Graesser et al. (1993, 1994) include case-structure role
assignment in this category whereby a noun phrase is assigned to the role of agent,
recipient, object, location or time. For example, in the sentence 'the elephant gave his
bananas to the monkey', the monkey will be assigned the role of recipient, the elephant
will be identified as the agent and the bananas as the object. Knowledge-based
inferences however, achieve local coherence by providing explanations for the actions
and events described in the text as in the "Tom versus the campfire" example given
above.
Knowledge-based inferences can also facilitate global coherence. Graesser et al.
(1993, 1994) identify three classes of knowledge-based inference that contribute to
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global coherence: superordinate goal, thematic and character emotional reaction.
Superordinate goal inferences refer to a goal that motivates the actions of a character;
thematic inferences refer to the overall theme or moral of the text; and character
emotional reaction inferences refer to the reactions of a character to the actions or
events that occur in the text. These inferences can be deemed knowledge-based since in
order to generate them it is necessary to apply knowledge of the world to the
information presented in the text. They can be identified as global because the
information required to generate these inferences will be integrated across the passage
as whole rather than across one or two sentences. Graesser et al. (1994) propose that in
order to achieve a complete situation model of the discourse, these global inferences are
necessary.
In contrast to coherence inferences, the constructionist theory predicts that
elaborative inferences will not be drawn on-line due to the "computational explosion"
(Graesser, Millis, & Zwann, 1997) that would occur if all possible alternative
elaborative inferences were to be generated. Specifically, Graesser et al. (1994) identify
five such inference classes; causal consequence, instantiation of noun category,
instrument; subordinate goal-action, and state.
• A causal consequence inference refers to hypothetical predictions
regarding characters' actions and future events based on preceding discourse
context. The constructionist theory proposes that the only predictions that will be
made automatically are those that are made when drawing coherence inferences
such as characters' reactions and what they aimed to do.
• Instantiation of a noun category involves elaborating a specific exemplar
from a more generic noun. For example, given the sentence, 'in the explosion the
man was thrown clear of the blazing vehicle', one may infer that the 'vehicle' in
question was a car. However, it could conceivably have been a motorcycle, a bus,
or any other exemplar of the category vehicle. The construction theory predicts that
such instantiation will not take place on-line.
• An instrument inference involves inferring a particular object used by an
agent to complete an action; for instance, inferring that the knight used a sword to
pierce the dragons scales in the example in section 1.2.1. As with the instantiation
of a noun category, it is often the case that there are many plausible instruments that
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an agent may have used. Thus, this inference class is not thought to be generated
on-line.
• A sub-ordinate goal action inference is one in which the reader may infer
how an agent achieved a goal not crucial to the over-riding plot of the story. For
example, given the sentence, 'John was drinking his coffee', you could infer that
John raised the coffee cup to his lips in order to fulfil the act of drinking. However,
this inference is not essential to the understanding of the text as a whole, and indeed,
however likely this inference may seem there are many alternative ways in which
John could commit the act of drinking e.g. through a straw, from a flask etc.
• State inferences refer to static properties that are not causally related to
the plot of the text. For example, properties of objects, traits of characters etc.
While these properties may serve to enrich the representation of a text they are not
thought to be essential for local or global coherence and as such are not drawn on-
line according to the constructionist standpoint.
It is important to note, however, that these predictions are not absolute. The
constructionist model does allow for variance in the classes of inferences to be drawn
on-line, but only when certain criteria are met. For example if the reader has a specific
reading goal, they may generate particular classes of inference not normally drawn.
Similarly, if the context of the discourse is sufficiently constraining such that few
alternative consequences are available, certain elaborative inferences may be drawn.
However, the predictions outlined above are valid if the reader has no specific reading
goal or if the discourse is not constrained. Furthermore, the constructionist theory
primarily confines its predictions to narrative text. However, narrative texts are not the
only written medium to which people are exposed. Expository texts are also a common,
and sometimes more appropriate way of presenting information. Graesser and Wiemer-
Hastings (1999) state that they are "confident that most of the predictions would also
hold up in investigations of expository texts on history and even scientific mechanisms"
but this issue requires further investigation. The effect of text format on inference
generation will be considered in more detail in chapter 4. The inference types discussed
in this and the following section, and the predictions of each model regarding the
generation of these inferences, are presented in Table 1.1
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1.2.4 The Minimalist Hypothesis
In contrast to the constructionist theory, the minimalist hypothesis (McKoon &
Ratcliff, 1992) asserts that, when a specific reading goal is absent, local coherence is the
over-riding goal of the reader. Thus, the minimalist hypothesis asserts that the only
inferences to be drawn automatically during encoding are those required for local
coherence; that is those necessary to relate incoming information with that in the
preceding sentence. The main difference, therefore, between the two models is that the
constructionist theory predicts the automatic generation of global coherence inferences
while the minimalist hypothesis does not. In terms of local coherence inferences, the
two theories appear to be in agreement. However, on closer examination clear
differences emerge between the two theories in terms of what each classifies as a local
coherence inference. In line with the constructionist theory, the minimalist hypothesis
classes the use of cohesive devices as an example of generating a local coherence
inference. However, in terms of knowledge-based inferences the stance of the
minimalist hypothesis is not so clear.
The minimalist hypothesis proposes that knowledge-based inferences will be
drawn automatically during reading if they are a) necessary for local coherence and/or
b) based on readily available information. Readily available information is defined as
that available from explicit text-based information, from short-term memory and from
long-term memory and therefore, the source from which the relevant information can be
obtained is not constrained in any way. As a result of these criteria, the minimalist
hypothesis allows for knowledge based inferences to be drawn on-line whether
necessary for local coherence or not. Furthermore, unlike the constructionist theory, the
minimalist hypothesis does not make any specific predictions regarding the classes of
knowledge-based inferences that will be made on-line.
The minimalist hypothesis is also less consistent than the constructionist theory
in predictions regarding global inferences. For example, while McKoon & Ratcliff
(1992) purport to deny the automatic generation of global inferences, they do not rule
out global inferences completely. If local coherence is not achieved by relating
incoming information to the preceding sentence held in working memory, global
inference information can be utilised to achieve local coherence. Moreover, while
McKoon and Ratcliff (1992; experiment 3) demonstrate that one particular class of
global inference, subordinate goal or action, is not drawn automatically, their findings
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cannot be interpreted as evidence against the constructionist theory since Graesser et al.
(1994) make the same prediction.
In terms of elaborative inferences, the minimalist hypothesis makes the same
prediction as for local coherence inferences; that is elaborative inferences will be drawn
if they are necessary for local coherence. However, it further suggests that elaborative
inferences may be drawn if they are based on readily available information. Thus, the
prediction is similar to that of the constructionist theory that elaborative inferences will
not be drawn automatically since elaborative inferences are by their nature not required
for local coherence, nor are they usually based on easily available information.
However, the model also proposes that elaborative inferences can be encoded to greater
or lesser extent (McKoon & Ratcliff, 1986) allowing for any unexpected occurrences of
elaborative inference generation.
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1.2.5 Evidence for the Censtructionist Theory and the Minimalist
Hypothesis
Empirical evidence supports the claims of both the constructionist theory and the
minimalist hypothesis that coherence inferences are drawn on-line to support local
coherence. Such inferences include the cause of an event (Fincher-Kiefer, 1996;
Magliano, Baggett, Johnson, & Graesser, 1993; Potts, Keenan, & Golding, 1988;
Valencia-Laver & Light, 2000), the assignment of roles such as agent, object etc
(Swinney & Osterhout, 1990), and the encoding of the link between anaphor and
referent (e.g. Garnham, Oakhill & Cain, 1997). However, in opposition to the minimal
hypothesis, there is evidence to suggest that some inferences which facilitate global
coherence are also generated (Long, Oppy, & Seely, 1997; Trabasso & Magliano,
1996), including the over-riding goal of the character (Long & Golding, 1993) and
character emotional reactions (Gernsbacher, Hallada, & Robertson, 1998).
Furthermore, McKoon and Ratcliff (1992) cite an earlier study (McKoon & Ratcliff,
1980) as evidence that anaphoric inferences are drawn on-line to maintain local
coherence. However, while they state that:
"local coherence is defined for those propositions of a text that are in working
memory at the same time; in other words, propositions that are no farther apart in the
text than one or two sentences." (McKoon & Ratcliff, 1992, p441)
the materials used by McKoon and Ratcliff (1980) require anaphoric relations to
be drawn between the first and last sentence of four sentence texts. Therefore,
considering the definition of local coherence given by McKoon and Ratcliff (1992), it
could be argued that in this case the anaphoric inference was being drawn to maintain
global, not local, coherence since it involves the relation of information from non-
adjacent sentences. Thus, in terms of local and global coherence inferences, the
empirical data supports the constructionist theory to a greater extent than the minimalist
hypothesis.
Empirical evidence concerning elaborative inferences is not so clear-cut.
Traditionally research suggests that elaborative inferences are not made until the
processing of the incoming information is complete and then, only if the inference is
specifically probed (Graesser et al., 1994; Magliano et al., 1993; Potts et al., 1988;
Singer & Ferreira, 1983; Valencia-Laver & Light, 2000). This view is consistent with
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the constructionist theory of inference generation. However, some research has
suggested that elaborative inferences are made automatically during processing but only
to a minimal extent (McKoon & Ratcliff, 1986), a finding in line with the minimalist
hypothesis. One of the reasons for this lack of encoding of elaborative inferences is
purported to be the unconstrained nature of these inferences. In other words, too many
plausible alternative inferences would be generated and this would exceed processing
limitations. However, researchers do concede that given certain circumstances, e.g.
highly accessible knowledge, high contextual constraints, few alternative consequences,
or adequate processing time, elaborative inferences could be drawn (Calvo, 2000; Calvo
& Castillo, 1996; Calvo, Castillo, & Estevez, 1999; Fincher-Kiefer, 1996; Graesser et
al., 1994; McKoon & Ratcliff, 1992; Murray, Klin, & Myers, 1993). Thus, the empirical
evidence for elaborative inference generation does not distinguish between the two
theories of inference generation considered in this review. Instead the evidence serves
to strengthen the assumption made by both theories that elaborative inferences are not
made automatically but require strategic processing.
A number of methodological problems can be raised concerning the studies used
as empirical evidence for theories of inference generation. First, because the
constructionist theory concentrates primarily on narrative texts, studies supporting a
constructionist approach have tended to use only narrative materials. Similarly, while
the minimalist hypothesis does not explicitly state that it is confined to narrative texts,
researchers tend concentrate on this text type. However, there are many different types
of text from which to draw inferences. Texts are not always presented in a narrative
format and expositions are a more appropriate medium for some forms of textual
discourse. In order for a model of inference generation to fully account for all instances
where an inference might be made, it needs to incorporate expository text (Millis,
Morgan, & Graesser, 1990; Noordman, Vonk, & Kempff, 1992; Singer et al., 1997).
Second, many studies have concentrated on only two categories of inference; causal
bridging inferences and causal consequences. By limiting the materials in this way, it is
not clear how far such studies can be generalised to include other inference categories.
1.2.6 Summary
To summarise, it is not clear whether the constructionist theory or the minimalist
hypothesis provides the best account of inference generation. Arguably, the application
of a particular model varies depending on the reader's goal and background knowledge.
39
However, the minimalist hypothesis has attracted much criticism (Glenberg & Mathew,
1992; Singer, Graesser, & Trabasso, 1994; Trabasso & Magliano, 1996). Of most
importance is the criticism levelled by Singer et al. (1994) that the minimalist
hypothesis is difficult to falsify. Indeed, the outline of the minimalist hypothesis given
above illustrates that it contains many exceptions and provisos, which allow it to
encompass a broad range of empirical findings. It may be that the simplicity and
straightforwardness of the constructionist theory provides the clearest framework for
predicting inference generation. Further, contemporary models of inference generation
have used the constructionist theory as a foundation. For example, the Scaffold Model
proposed by Revlin and Hegarty (1999) views text-based inferences as a form of
deductive reasoning akin to solving syllogisms. While this approach is very different
from the more traditional models of inference generation described above, Revlin and
Hegarty (1999) demonstrate that the constructionist theory provides the basis for their
model while the minimalist hypothesis cannot account for their findings. This lends
further support to the validity of the constructionist theory as a model of inference
generation. It is this theory which the present thesis will adopt when making
predictions regarding the generation of inferences.
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Chapter 2
Methodological Considerations In The Study Of Inference Generation.
2.1 Introduction
Research into inference generation typically involves the presentation of a series
of short passages that have been designed to induce the generation of specific
inferences. Experimenters then seek to assess which types of inferences were generated
from the experimental passages, and the time course of those inferences i.e. when the
inferences were made. Many different methods have been used in the study of
inference generation. However, it is still not clear which method yields the most
reliable results. The following discussion considers the types of methodology that have
been used in the study of inferences and the problems associated with them.
2.2 Off-line Measures of Inference Generation
Early research employed off-line tasks to measure inference generation. For
example, many studies used simple question answering tasks as a means to assess the
generation of inferences. Participants taking part in studies using this paradigm are
usually presented with short passages to read and are asked a series of questions about
each passage. The questions can be presented after the passage is completed. or at
strategic points during the reading of the passage. Typically a variety of questions are
asked; some require attention to the explicit information given in the passage. and
others require some form of inference generation. The degree to which inferences are
made is measured by the accuracy with which readers answer each type of question.
The use of memory measures such as cued recall, free recall and recognition as
measures of inference generation is also reported in the early literature. In a cued recall
task, the inference concept being tested is used as a cue for recall (e.g. Anderson et al.
1976; Anderson & Ortony, 1975; Black & Bern, 1981; Paris & Lindauer, 1976). For
example, in one such study, the word 'shark' was used as a cue for recall of the sentence
'the fish attacked the swimmer' since the sentence was thought to encourage the
inference that the 'fish' in question was likely to be a 'shark' (Anderson et aI., 1976).
Similarly, in a free recall task, readers are typically asked to read a passage and then to
recall it after a short delay (e.g. Black & Bern, 1981). The recalled stories are then
analysed for the number of target sentences correctly recalled (e.g. Black & Bern, 1981)
or the number of sentences included in the recalled story that must have been inferred
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from the original text. In a recognition task, readers are presented with short stories and
are then shown a series of test sentences. Some of the test sentences contain
information that was explicitly stated in the text while others contain information that
was only inferred from the text. The task for the reader is to decide whether or not each
of the sentences appeared in the original passage. The logic behind this paradigm is
that, if an inference is generated during reading, readers should erroneously recognise as
familiar those sentences that were simply inferred by the text. This prediction has been
upheld by a number of studies (e.g. Bransford, Barclay and Franks, 1972; Oakhill,
1982).
However, while recognition and other off-line tasks give some indication of the
types of inferences readers can generate from text, they provide no information
regarding the time-course of inference generation. That is to say, neither the question
answering task nor the free and cued recall tasks can distinguish between those
inferences that are made automatically during encoding of the text, and those that are
made later when the reader is required to answer questions or complete the recall task.
Similarly, in the recognition task, readers could be engaging in some kind of
reconstructive process when presented with the recognition cue, checking the
compatibility of the test sentence with the prior context. In order to address this
possibility, a speeded recognition task has been used in which readers are presented
with short passages followed by the presentation of test words (McKoon & Ratcliff,
1986; 1989). The task of the reader is to determine within 300-milliseconds whether the
test word appeared in the passage. The imposition of the 300-millisecond deadline is
thought to prohibit the reader from engaging in reconstructive processes. Therefore,
any erroneous recognition of inferred test words must be due to on-line inference
generation. However, research suggests that 300-milliseconds may not restrict the
reader from engaging in context-checking and therefore the speeded recognition task
may still be subject to the same criticism as the original task (Keenan, Golding, Potts,
Jennings, & Aman, 1990; Potts, Keenan, & Golding, 1988). The methods described
above are now rarely used in isolation from the more sensitive on-line measures of
inference generation because of the problems involved.
2.3 On-line Measures of Inference Generation
On-line measures of inference generation attempt to distinguish inferences that
are made during reading i.e. on-line, from those made at a later point in time. There are
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a variety of on-line measures used in research into inference generation. Outlined
below are some of the more frequently used on-line measures.
2.3.1 Reading Time
Some researchers have used reading time as a measure of inference generation.
The rationale behind this method is that the reading time for sentences will increase if
the generation of an inference is required for coherence. For example, in a study
designed to investigate global coherence, Albrecht and O'Brien (1993) presented
participants with short passages divided into five sections; introduction, elaboration,
filler information, critical sentences, and conclusion. The introduction section
introduced the character and setting of the story and was immediately followed by one
of three elaboration conditions; consistent, inconsistent or neutral. The information
contained in these sections related to the actions or events conveyed by the critical
sentences and was either consistent with, inconsistent with or bore no relation to
(neutral) action or event. The elaboration sections were immediately followed by filler
information and then the critical sentences were presented. The critical sentences
related a sequence of events involving the protagonist. The passages were presented
using a self-paced reading paradigm and the time taken to read each sentence was
recorded. The results of the study showed that reading times for the critical sentences
were slower in the inconsistent condition than in either the consistent or neutral
condition which did not differ from each other. These findings were interpreted as
evidence that readers strive for global coherence during reading, such that when
information was presented that was inconsistent with that previously encountered,
readers engaged in inferential processing in order to re-establish global coherence.
Other studies have included measures of reading time in their design (Bloom,
Fletcher, van den Broek, Reitz, & Shapiro, 1990; Millis, Golding, & Barker, 1995;
Myers, Shinjo, & Duffy, 1987). However, reading times can be confounded by a
number of other factors. For example, long reading times may reflect difficulties with
efficient decoding rather than with inference generation. Similarly, the test sentences
may vary in difficulty, comprising different syntactic structures, differing levels of
ambiguity and varying familiarity of vocabulary. Finally, it may be that some of the
words contained in a passage are either repeated in the corresponding test sentence or
are highly related semantically to words in the test sentence. Thus, reading times for
test sentences may be a result of word-based priming, an issue that will be discussed
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further during consideration of activation measures. To summarise, the use of sentence
reading times is not a wholly reliable method for investigating the generation of
inferences.
2.3.2 Activation Measures
Activation measures enable researchers to assess the level of activation of an
inference concept at various points during the comprehension process. The appeal of
these methods is that they lend themselves to a number of experimental manipulations.
For example, researchers can vary the point at which the level of activation is measured
by inserting the target probe at different points in the stimulus sentence. The time
constraints placed on inference generation can also be varied by manipulating the
Stimulus Onset Asynchrony (SOA) of a target probe. The activation measures typically
used in the study of inference generation are Naming Speed and Lexical Decision.
a) Lexical Decision: In a lexical decision task, participants are presented with a
letter string and have to decide whether or not that string is a real word. In the case of
research into inference generation, the letter string is usually presented after a short
story and the words presented in the lexical decision task are representative of a concept
evoked by having made an inference from the preceding passage. Making a lexical
decision does not require a comparison between the target item and the preceding
passage, since the participant is required only to decode the letter string. Thus, the
lexical decision task is thought to overcome the context checking confound of the
recognition procedure. However, despite the fact that such comparisons are
unnecessary, research suggests that the degree of relatedness between the target word
and the text prime does affect lexical decision speed and therefore backward context
checking does take place (Keenan et al., 1990). In a comparison of lexical decision and
naming speed tasks, Keenan et al. (1990) and Potts et al. (1988) report that the results of
the lexical decision task owe more to post-comprehension processes than on-line
inference generation. Decision latencies to target words were faster and more accurate
when the word was related to a causal inference embedded in the preceding text than
when it was an unrelated control word. These findings agree with previous research
suggesting that causal coherence inferences are generated on-line. However, decision
latencies were also faster and more accurate to target words related to predictive
inferences than to unrelated control words, suggesting that predictive inferences are also
generated on-line, a fmding that contrasts with the majority of previous research. This
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pattern of results was not replicated in the data from the naming task. Keenan et a1.
(1990) and Potts et a1. (1988) interpret these findings as evidence of backward context
checking during presentation of the target word in the lexical decision task. This
finding suggests that lexical decision tasks are not free from the confound of post-
comprehension processes and are therefore not a reliable measure of on-line inference
generation.
b) Naming Speed: Several researchers have used naming speed as a means of
assessing inference generation on-line (Murray, Klin, & Myers, 1993; Potts et aI.,
1988). In a naming speed task, participants are presented with short stories followed by
a probe word that they are required to name as quickly as possible. The probe word is
usually representative of an inference implied by the passage. Naming latencies are
recorded as a measure of inference generation, the hypothesis being that if an inference
is generated on-line, the corresponding probe word for that inference will be named
faster than a probe word corresponding to an off-line inference. Naming latencies are
made up of a combination of lexical access time and articulation speed. It has been
suggested that this articulation speed component cannot be affected by the relatedness
of the target word with the preceding text prime. Thus, unlike lexical decision, the
naming speed task is thought to be free from the effects of context checking and studies
have shown that naming speed is not affected by the relatedness of prime and target (see
Keenan et al. 1990 for a review). Results from a comparison of lexical decision and
naming speed tasks (Keenan et al., 1990; Potts et al., 1988) showed that naming
responses were faster for target words relating to a coherence inference than to control
words, reinforcing the generally accepted idea that causal coherence inferences are
generated on-line. Moreover, in contrast to the lexical decision results described above,
there was no difference in the naming latencies for target words relating to predictive
inferences and control words. This finding is in line with previous research suggesting
that elaborative inferences are not generated on-line.
However, despite the fact that the naming speed task is not subject to the
confound of post-comprehension processes, it does carry with it some possible
complications. For example, the speed and relative ease of the task may make it
insensitive to the detection of inferences during comprehension. Furthermore, it has
been proposed that the modularity theory of language processing (Fodor, 1983)
undermines the validity of the naming speed task (Keenan et al., 1990; Magliano &
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Graesser, 1991). The modularity theory suggests that reading involves a number of
different modules (i.e. lexical, semantic and syntactic). These modules are thought to
operate independently of each other and as such, the higher level syntactic and semantic
modules should have no effect on the lower level lexicon. Therefore, the naming speed
task may activate the lexical module at the point at which the target word is presented
and furthermore, the lexicon would be activated in isolation from any of the other
higher level modules. Thus, the task may actually be assessing a person's ability to
activate entries in the mental lexicon rather than higher-level inference processes.
However, the naming speed task has been shown to differentiate between target words
that relate to inference concepts and those that do not, indicating that the task taps more
than just the lower level lexical module (Potts et aI., 1988; Keenan et aI., 1990). Thus,
the naming speed task may still be a more appropriate measure of text-based inference
generation than other on-line tasks such as the lexical decision task.
In addition to the problems discussed above, naming speed and lexical decision
share a number of common problems. First, both procedures are intrusive and interrupt
the normal flow of reading. Thus, they may interfere with normal comprehension
processes. Second, both measures involve the representation of an inference concept
using one word. This constrains the kinds of inferences that can be tested since it would
be difficult to express a complex inference concept using a single word. Finally, both
measures share the problem of text-based versus word-based priming. Text-based
priming can be defined as the priming that occurs when a previously activated inference
concept is tapped by a target probe. This type of priming is based on the integration of
the text with the readers' own knowledge of the situation described by the text.
However, it may be the case that previous research has confounded text-based priming
with word-based priming. Word-based priming occurs when a word contained in the
priming stimulus is highly associated with the target probe. Therefore, any increase in
the activation of the inference concept measured by the speed with which the target
probe is responded to may be due to the association between the target word and the
previously presented information rather than to the generation of the inference itself
(see Keenan et al. 1990).
Clearly, it is important to overcome this confound in order to gain a true picture
of inference generation and there are a number of ways to do this. First, when
constructing the experimental materials, it is important to ensure that none of the target
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words are semantically related to the words used in the preceding passage or sentence
prime. However, elimination of all semantic associations is impossible (Keenan et al.,
1990). A second alternative is to control for the effect of word-based priming by
creating a control version of the inference priming materials containing exactly the
same words but with no inference required. For example, the phrase 'Dick cleared the
snow from the driveway' may prime responses to the word 'shovel' because of the
association between the words 'snow' and 'shovel' rather than because of the activation
of the inference concept that a shovel is a likely instrument for clearing snow. A control
version of this phrase would be 'The sky cleared as Dick drove through the snow on the
driveway." If this control version primed responses to 'shovel' to the same degree as the
inference version, one could assume it was due to word-based priming i.e. the
association between snow and shovel, since the control version does not imply the use
of a shovel. However, if responses to the inference version showed more priming than
to the control version, one could attribute this effect to inference generation.
Unfortunately, there are problems associated with the generation of these materials such
that the control sentences can often sound contrived in an attempt to include all relevant
content words. Thus, any differences seen in response times to control sentences
compared to inference sentences may be due to a lack of coherence in the control
sentences making them difficult to interpret (Magliano & Graesser, 1991). However,
when using tasks which may succumb to word-based priming, incorporating a control
version of the materials may help to overcome this confound.
c) Sentence Verification: An alternative to the lexical decision or naming
procedure is the sentence verification task, and it is this task which has been adopted for
the experiments reported in this thesis. In this procedure, participants are presented
with short stories with inference-inducing sentences embedded within them. Following
the presentation of a story, the participant is presented with a Yes/No question or
TruelFalse statement representing the inference concept being tested. The task of the
participant is to answer the question or, where a statement is presented, to determine
whether the statement is true or false. The logic behind this paradigm is that if the
inference concept has been generated on-line, response times for the target questions or
statements will be significantly faster than if the inference has not been generated on-
line. Thus, like lexical decision and naming speed, sentence verification provides an
1 Example taken from Keenan et al. (1990).
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on-line measure of inference generation. The advantage of sentence verification is that,
because the target probes contain more than one word, the inference concepts being
tested can vary in complexity. Furthermore, it is unlikely that word-based priming due
to the association between a word in the priming stimulus and a word in the target
statement will affect the response time since the target statements consist of full
sentences, not single words. Thus, the likelihood that one of the words in the target
statement will be more or less semantically associated with a word in the priming
stimulus is greatly reduced. Finally, unlike naming speed, sentence verification
involves more than the simple activation of the lexicon and therefore is not undermined
by the modularity theory of language processing.
However, the sentence verification procedure does present a problem in that the
response time to any given target statement is comprised of the time it takes to produce
the correct answer or make a judgement and the time it takes to make the response. It is
difficult to separate the decision making process involved in answering a question or
making a true or false judgement, from the actual time taken to make the response.
Thus, it may be that the required inference concept is accessed off-line during the
decision making process as opposed to being generated during comprehension.
However, if responses were solely mediated by the decision making process, one might
expect that responses made to statements representing inferences thought to be
generated on-line would be no different from those made to off-line inference
statements or control statements. Using the true/false target statement version of this
task, McKoon and Ratcliff (1988) demonstrated that responses were faster and more
accurate to test sentences representing concepts that were contextually relevant to
previously mentioned target objects and thus necessary for textual coherence than to
contextually irrelevant concepts. Moreover, research using the question answering
version of this paradigm has shown a response time advantage for causal coherence
inferences (Le. Singer et al., 1992, 1997). In short, while responding to a question or
target statement in this way clearly involves making a decision, decisions to questions
or target statements pertaining to on-line inferences are made faster than those to off-
line inferences because the inference concept has already been accessed on-line.
To summarise, on-line activation measures are clearly preferable to the use of
off-line measures when investigating inference generation but they are not entirely
devoid of problems. In order to gain a comprehensive measure of inference generation,
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it is vital to be aware of these difficulties and attempt to control for them wherever
possible. However, one problem that is not easily overcome is the degree to which
these measures can be regarded as purely on-line. As outlined above, all the tasks have
a metacognitive component and incorporate processing requirements over and above
making the required response. The effect of these added processing requirements on
response times is unclear. One methodology proposed as an alternative to these
behavioural on-line measures is the measurement of eye-movements during reading.
2.3.4 Eye-Movements
Reading is an active process during which we make a series of fixations,
saccades and regressions as our eyes move across the text. Fixations are the periods of
time in which our eyes rest on a specific location in the text. Saccades are the rapid
eye-movements separating the fixations during which our eyes jump from one location
in the text to another. Regressions are backward eye-movements during which we
revisit the text that has already been processed. Variability in eye-movements have
been shown to give a clear indication of cognitive processes during reading. For
example, when reading a difficult text, readers tend to fixate longer on specific locations
in a text, show shorter saccades and make more regressions, Le. revisit the text more
frequently. By monitoring the eye-movements of readers during comprehension of
inference-inducing passages, one can record the levels of fixations, saccades and
regressions at particular points in the passage and thus pinpoint the time at which
inference generation occurs (see Rayner, Raney & Pollatsek, 1995 for a detailed
discussion). Eye-movement procedures have been used to study cohesive devices (e.g.
Ehrlich & Rayner, 1983; Duffy & Rayner, 1990; Myers, Cook, Kambe, Mason and
O'Brien, 2000) and elaborative inferences (e.g. Calvo, 2001; Calvo, Meseguer &
Carreiras,2001). While the collection of eye-movement data is clearly a desirable way
in which to measure on-line inference generation, it is a labour-intensive procedure and
is therefore not at present feasible for all research.
2.4 The Three-Pronged Approach
A parsimonious method for use in the study of inference generation is the three-
pronged approach (Magliano & Graesser, 1991). This approach combines the use of
behavioural measures, such as those outlined above, with verbal protocols and theories
of discourse processing. To summarise this approach, verbal protocols such as question
generation or think aloud procedures are used initially to reveal potential inferences
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within a text. Theories of discourse processing are then applied to predict which of
these potential inferences will be generated during comprehension. Finally, behavioural
measures are used to assess whether these predictions are upheld. This approach has
been used successfully by a number of researchers (e.g. Suh & Trabasso, 1993; see
Magliano & Graesser, 1991 for a review).
However, there are a number of potential problems with this approach. Firstly,
including all three-stages proposed by the three-pronged approach is time-consuming.
Second, while many verbal protocols have been collected from adult participants and
have been used to create behavioural measures for use with adults, it is not clear
whether these adult verbal protocols would lend themselves to the creation of children's
behavioural measures. Itmay be that the types of inferences adults generate during the
collection of these verbal protocols vary greatly from those that children might generate.
There are two methods for revealing inferences through verbal protocols; question
answering and think-aloud. The question-answering procedure requires the participant
to read a passage and answer questions pertaining to specific sentences or parts of that
passage. The questions are designed to reveal the inference concepts those parts of the
passage might induce. While a relatively simple task, the generation of questions
requires some a priori assumptions regarding the types of inferences that might be
generated from the text.
In contrast, the think-aloud method makes no such a priori assumptions and as
such can be viewed as a less contaminated way of revealing inferences. However, to
complete this task readers are asked to read a passage sentence by sentence and tell the
experimenter whatever comes to mind at the end of each sentence. As such, the task is
demanding and requires a certain degree of meta-cognitive skill. Therefore, the
collection of verbal protocols from young children using this method would prove
difficult and may render the results unreliable. Trabasso, Suh, Payton and Jain (1995)
report the results of a series of studies with adults and children, in which participants
were asked to think-aloud during reading. The results from the verbal protocols were
similar for adults and children. However, while the adults were asked to produce think-
aloud data for eight stories, the children were only given two stories to read. The
comparison between adult and child verbal protocols is therefore limited to just two
stories and does not fully address the reliability of the think-aloud method for use with
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children. Thus, the use of the three-pronged method for investigating inference
generation is not employed in this thesis.
2.5 Conclusions
Many procedures have been employed in the study of inference generation.
Research has progressed from the use of off-line measures to more valid on-line
measures such as lexical decision and naming speed. Moreover, the development of
eye-movement procedures provides an unequivocal on-line measure of the processes
that occur during comprehension, thus overcoming some of the problems inherent in the
behavioural on-line measures. Finally, the three-pronged approach appears to be the
most comprehensive means by which to measure inference generation, combining
verbal protocols with theoretical predictions and behavioural measures. While this
method has been used extensively in the adult literature, its suitability for use with
children has yet to be thoroughly investigated. In short while many procedures have
been used in the study of inference generation, no procedure is entirely free of
problems. The appropriateness of anyone procedure will depend on the needs of the
individual research project.
In this thesis, the sentence verification task has been used to assess inference
generation in children. This task was chosen for a number of reasons. First, as outlined
in the discussion above, an on-line measure of inference generation is clearly preferable
to the use of off-line measures. Resource limitations prohibited the use of eye-tracking
as a means of assessment and it was therefore necessary to use an on-line behavioural
measure. Sentence verification was chosen over lexical decision and naming latency
measures to make it possible to use counterfactual materials in which the inference
concepts to be tapped would be too complex to express in a single word. In addition to
this, it was felt that using this task would reduce the risk of word-based priming effects.
Taken together, these considerations led to the sentence verification task being the most
appropriate for use in this thesis.
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Chapter 3
An Investigation into The Relationship between Reading
Comprehension and Mathematical Reasoning.
3.1 Introduction
The evidence described in chapter 1.1 clearly suggests that poor comprehenders
have difficulty making inferences at both the word and text levels. However, as
discussed in chapter 1.2 there are many potential inferences to be made in text
comprehension and it is not clear from previous research whether poor comprehenders
have generally poor inferential skills, or whether their difficulties are more pronounced
for particular types of inferences. Furthermore, the pervasiveness of these inferential
skill deficits has not been established. For example, it is not clear whether these
difficulties extend to tasks other than reading and listening comprehension and whether
poor comprehenders are equally as poor at making inferences in all types of text
formats. One way of addressing these issues is to compare the performance of poor
comprehenders with a variety of tests that require some degree of inferential ability. For
example, mathematical reasoning problems typically require inferences to be made in
order to solve them. Thus, looking at the mathematical reasoning ability of poor
comprehenders may help to assess the pervasiveness of their inferential skills deficits.
However, in terms of different types of inferences, it is unclear whether all of the
inferences required to complete mathematical reasoning problems are also important to
reading comprehension. Mathematical reasoning may rely more on deductive inferences
based on formal logic while reading comprehension may require more inductive, flexible
inference generation. Therefore, it is important to establish the types of inferences that
are of primary importance to each of these tasks. Furthermore, before we can assess the
relative performance of poor comprehenders on tests of mathematical reasoning and
reading comprehension, we first need to look at the relationship between these variables
in children with normal comprehension skills.
Aim of the present study: The present study was designed to establish the
normal pattern of inference generation in children with unimpaired comprehension on a
variety of tasks. Furthermore it was intended to establish the overlap between the
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inferential skills needed to complete mathematical reasoning and reading comprehension
tasks.
3.2 Experiment 1
3.2.1 Method
a) Participants: 38 children from a local primary school were recruited for the
study. 8 children from each of years 2, 4, 5 and 6, and 6 children from year 3 were
tested. The children were randomly selected from each class by their teacher with the
only criterion being that they were judged as having average reading ability. Details of
the participants can be found in Table 3.1.
Year Group Number of Children Mean Age (mths) Standard Deviation
2 8 81.96 3.48
3 6 97.32 4.92
4 8 106.32 4.56
5 8 118.68 4.44
6 8 130.92 2.64
Table 3.J Mean chronological age of children in each year group
b) Design: This study was a within-subjects correlational design with each child
completing each of five standardised tests in the same order.
c) Materials: A battery of standardised reading and mathematical ability tests
were administered to the children. Three of these tests were also rated according to a set
of inference criteria described below.
Standardised Measures of Reading and Language Ability
1. The Neale Analysis of Reading Ability (NARA II; Form 1; Neale, 1989) was
administered to assess reading accuracy and reading comprehension. The NARA II is a
story-based test. The child is presented with a booklet of short stories which they are
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required to read aloud to the experimenter. The stories get progressively harder and
longer as the child works his way through the book. In order to obtain a reading
accuracy score, the experimenter simply records the number of reading errors the child
makes during each individual story. These separate error scores are then totalled to give
the cumulative reading accuracy score. Reading comprehension is measured in the
following way. Following the completion of each story as described above, the child is
required to answer a number of questions which assess their understanding of what they
have just read. The questions are presented orally by the experimenter and the child is
allowed to refer back to the text in order to answer the questions. An overall
comprehension score is obtained by summing the total number of comprehension
questions answered correctly throughout the test as a whole.
2. The Wechsler Objective Reading Dimensions (WORD; Wechsler, 1990)
reading comprehension sub-scale was administered as a second test of reading
comprehension. Rather than being a story based task, the WORD can be described as a
general text comprehension task since the passages used do not all conform to a narrative
format. Some items are merely single sentence statements while others are paragraphs
that are more analogous to expositions, or commentaries, than to narratives. In this test
children are required to read the items in silence and do not receive any assistance with
reading accuracy. When they have read the passage the experimenter asks them a single
question based on what they have read. The overall score is the total number of
questions correct for the whole test.
In both tests of reading comprehension the text was available for reference by the
children during questioning.
3. The Wechsler Objective Numerical Dimensions (WOND; Wechsler, 1996)
was administered to assess mathematical skills. In the Mathematical Reasoning sub-
test, children are presented with word problems to which they have to provide an oral
response. The problems are presented in printed form but the experimenter also reads
the problem aloud. The children are given a pencil and paper which they are permitted
to use for "workings out".
S4
The Numerical Operations test is a pencil and paper test in which participants
are given a worksheet containing arithmetical problems of increasing complexity.
Problems range from simple addition to more complex operations using fractions and
algebra.
4. The Graded Non-Word Reading Test (GNWRT; Snowling, Stothard, &
McLean, 1996) was administered as a test of decoding ability. This test requires
children to read a number of printed non-words (i.e. fot, gug, chamgalp) aloud. They are
instructed to simply read the non-words using the pronunciation they think is
appropriate. The stimuli range from one to two syllables in length. The test is scored
by calculating the absolute number of non-words the child pronounces correctly.
Assessment of Inferential Skill
The questions that comprise the two comprehension measures and the
mathematical reasoning test were examined by the author. The questions posed in each
test were placed into one of the following 7 categories indicating the type of information
required to answer the question correctly.
Categories for the classification of test questions
I. Elaborative Inferences: Elaborative inferences are those that are not necessary
for comprehension of the text presented but would enrich the mental representation of
that text. Such inferences typically require text to be interpreted in terms of the reader's
real world knowledge. For example, predicting a possible outcome from a description of
events would not be necessary for understanding the text but would be an elaboration of
the information given in the text.
2. Cohesive Inferences: These inferences rely on linguistic cues present in the
text e.g. anaphora, pronoun resolution. For example, in order to form a coherent
representation of the sentence 'Tom hit Janet with his tennis racket.' the reader would
need to infer that the tennis racket belonged to Tom. This type of inference is aided by
the fact that the two people referred to in the sentence are of different gender types and
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that the 'tennis racket' is preceded by the pronoun 'his' indicating that the tennis racket
belongs to someone of the male gender. Since Tom is the only male mentioned in the
sentence the inference that the tennis racket belongs to Tom can be made.
3. Knowledge Based Inferences: These inferences rely on the application of the
reader's real world knowledge to the text. They difTer from elaborative inferences in that
they are necessary for textual coherence. The information needed is not always explicit
in the text but the inference is necessary in order to form a coherent representation of
the text.
4. Evaluative Inforences: This type of inference relates to the emotional
outcomes of events; the consequences of actions etc. They are also necessary to the
understanding of the text and, like knowledge based inferences, rely on the readers use of
real world knowledge in interpreting textual information. For example, if you read the
passage 'Helen fell ofTher bike and broke her arm. She started to cry.' the reader could
infer that Helen was likely to be crying because she was in pain. Based on the
information presented in the text no other interpretation would make sense.
5. Transitive Inferences: This is a type of deductive inference involving the
relating of a group of objects! numbers! people etc. to each other in terms of a specific
feature. For example, when reading that 'John was older than Mary but Mary was older
than Peter.' you would infer that John was also older than Peter.
6. Literal Information: This category was used for those questions which
required no inference since the answer was literally written in the text. For example, if
the sentence 'Sally wrote to her Grandma' was followed by the question 'Who did Sally
write to?' this question would be categorised as requiring attention to literal information
only since it is clearly stated in the text that Sally wrote to her Grandma.
7. Vocabulary Dependent: Items were rated as vocabulary dependent if the
respondent considered that the most important factor in providing the correct answer
was understanding a key word i.e. if the vocabulary used was particularly difficult. For
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example, if having read the sentence 'Mary is a myope' the reader was asked 'Does Mary
have good eyesight?' they would need to have some knowledge of the term 'myope' in
order to answer the question.
Following this initial classification phase, seven adult raters assessed each test on
the basis of the classifications identified by the author. Raters were given details of the
seven categories which were identified as classifying the different types of information
needed to answer the questions in each of the tests. They were told to remember that
these inference types are not mutually exclusive. That is to say, one piece of text may
provide a large number of potential inferences. However, the point here was to classify
each specific question in terms of the specific type of information needed to provide a
correct answer.
d) Procedure: In session 1 the NARA II, WORD, GNWRT and WOND
Mathematical Reasoning task were administered to each child individually and were
completed according to the instructions laid out in each test manual. At session 2, the
WOND test of numerical operations was administered as a group test, the 8 participants
from each year group being tested together. The children were told to complete the test
in silence and not to discuss the answers with their neighbours. They were instructed to
simply complete as much of the workbook as they could, missing out any questions
they could not do and stopping when they felt they could go no further. They were not
given a time limit but all children completed the test within twenty minutes. When
administered individually, this test has a discontinue criteria of four consecutive scores
of zero. When scoring these tests, any scores achieved after the discontinue criteria was
met were ignored.
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3.2.2 Results
The mean standard scores achieved on each test by each age group are shown in
Table 3.2. The individual raw scores were entered into a zero-order correlation in order
to assess the relationship between each of the variables.
Measure Year2 Year3 Year4 Year5 Year6 Total
(n=8) (n=6) (n=8) (n=8) (n=8) (n=38)
WORD Mean 99.5 95.67 99.40 99.50 103.25 99.66
(7.41) (7.97) (8.8) (10.99) (8.96) (8.78)
Range 84 -106 84 -105 90 -117 80 - 117 90 - 115 80 - 117
NARA II Mean 104.38 102 98.38 100.25 115.63 104.24
Ace (6.76) (8.94) (6.93) (6.07) (10.29) (9.76)
Range 91 - 111 89 -111 90 - 112 93 -109 94 -130 89 - 130
NARA II Mean 101.25 91.67 93.25 96.25 108.63 98.50
Comp (7.01) (7.31) (8.96) (15.65) (12.98) (11.68)
Range 90 - 109 84 - 100 88-99 81 - 128 91 - 124 81 - 128
GNWRT Mean 112.75 113.67 94.13 102.75 107.88 105.84
(13.99) (11.67) (12.96) (10.61) (7.40) (13.10)
Range 98 - 130 90 - 120 77 - 115 90 - 117 98 - 115 77 - 130
WOND MRMean 102.13 105.33 104.13 102.38 115.40 105.89
(7.88) (8.04) (11.04) (10.82) (13.10) (11.14)
Range 88 - 113 96-116 93 -129 90 - 107 94 -128 88 - 129
WONDNO Mean 103.50 106.33 102.38 104.50 114.50 106.24
(9.90) (14.46) (11.59) (4.87) (9.41) (10.66)
Range 95 - 123 90 - 125 86 - 118 96 - III 97 - 123 86 - 125
Table 3.2 Overall mean scores of each year group on each standardised test (MR =
Mathematical Reasoning; NO = Numerical Operations; standard deviations in
parentheses; all tests have an average score of 100 and a standard deviation of 15).
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a) Zero Order and Partial Correlations: The zero order correlations can be
seen above the diagonal in Table 3.3. As expected, there were significant correlations
between the NARA II accuracy and comprehension measures, between both NARA II
measures and the WORD comprehension measure, and between the measures of
mathematical reasoning and numerical operations. However, the significant positive
correlations between the comprehension measures and the tests of mathematical ability
were not expected and were therefore looked at in more detail.
Reading comprehension is often confounded by reading accuracy such that good
reading skills are usually accompanied by good comprehension skills while poor reading
skills typically appear alongside poor comprehension skills. Indeed, in the present study,
the correlation between NARA II reading accuracy and NARA II comprehension skills
reflected this relationship (r = 0.56, p<.Ol). This fact may have influenced the correlation
between the comprehension and mathematical measures seen here such that good word
level skills may have contributed to the performance on all tests. Therefore, a partial
correlation was performed controlling for word level reading skills by partialling out
NARA II accuracy and GNWRT scores. Age was also controlled for. The results of this
partial correlation are shown below the diagonal in Table 3.3.
GNWRT NARA II NARA II WORD Mathematical Numerical
ChronAge
GNWRT
Ace Comp
.42*** .S3*** .69***
.56*** .32**
Narall Ace
Narall Comp
WORD Comp
Math Reasoning
Num Ops
.70***
.35··
.30·
.27
Comp Reasoning Operations
.S5·· .SS·** .93···
.36*" .30 .31··
.SO·" .75·" .SO···
.74*·* .71*** .72···
.79··· .91···
.14
.20 .47···
Table 3.3 Zero order and partial correlations (below diagonal) between raw scores on
standardised tests (Chron age = chronological age; NARA II Acc =NARA II Accuracy;
NARA II Comp = NARA II Comprehension; WORD Comp =WORD Comprehension;
Math Reasoning = Mathematical Reasoning; Num Ops = Numerical Operations). Partial
Correlations in italics controlling for chronological age and word-level reading skills
(NARA II accuracy and GNWRT). *p<.1O,**p<.05, ***p<.OI
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Table 3.3 shows that controlling for word level reading skills and age
significantly reduces the correlation between the comprehension measures and the
mathematical measures. However, the correlation between NARA comprehension and
mathematical reasoning remains statistically significant. This relationship was not
reflected in that between WORD comprehension and WOND mathematical reasoning
and cannot be explained in terms of word-level reading skills.
b) Concurrent predictors of reading comprehension: The results of the zero-
order and partial correlations described above suggest that there is a relationship
between performance on the NARA II comprehension measure and the WOND test of
mathematical reasoning. However, the nature of this relationship is unclear. For
example, it may be the case that performance on one of these factors underlies
performance on the other, or alternatively that performance on both of these tests is
reliant on a third underlying factor. In order to examine this relationship in more detail,
multiple regression analyses were conducted to assess the concurrent relationship
between reading comprehension and mathematical reasoning skills.
With NARA II comprehension ability as the dependent variable, chronological
age accounted for 47% of the variance when entered on the first step. NARA II
accuracy and GNWRT together accounted for 6% of the variance in reading
comprehension when entered on the second step which is not significant. WOND
mathematical reasoning scores were entered on step 3 and accounted for 4% of the
variance, which was not significant. The WORD comprehension scores accounted for a
further 5% of the variance when entered on step 4, which approached significance.
Thus, when the variance due to word level skills was accounted for, mathematical
reasoning did not account for a significant amount of the variance in NARA II
comprehension skills. When entered on step 3, WORD comprehension skill
significantly accounted for a significant 6% of the variance. However, when entered on
step 4, mathematical reasoning accounted for just 3% of the variance, which is not
significant. These results can be seen in Table 3.4 and indicate that mathematical
60
reasoning ability is not a strong predictor of performance on the NARA II
comprehension measure.
Step Variable R2change P
Chron Age .47 .00
2 Nara II Ace .06 .13
GNWRT
3 Math Reasoning .04 .08
4 WORDComp .05 .06
3 WORDComp .06 .04
4 Math Reasoning .03 .12
Table 3.4 Multiple regression with NARA II Comprehension as the dependent variable
and Chronological Age, NARA II Ace, GNWRT, Mathematical Reasoning and WORD
Comprehension as the predictor variables.
c) Concurrent predictors of mathematical reasoning: The results of the
multiple regression analyses described above suggest that mathematical reasoning is not
a significant predictor of reading comprehension. However. the relationship between the
two variables may be inverse, with reading comprehension predicting mathematical
reasoning. A second set of multiple regression analyses was conducted to investigate
this possibility. With mathematical reasoning as the dependent variable, controlling for
chronological age on step 1 accounted for 78% of the variance. Controlling for numerical
operations on step 2 accounted for a significant 5% of the variance. However, when
entered on steps 3 and 4, neither the NARA II comprehension nor the WORD
comprehension measures accounted for a significant proportion of the variance,
irrespective of the order in which they were entered. These results indicate that reading
comprehension skill is not a significant predictor of mathematical reasoning skill.
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Step Variable R2change P
1 ChronAge .78 .00
2 Numerical Operations .05 .00
3 WORD Comp .00 .78
4 NARA II Comp .01 .28
3 NARA II Comp .01 .26
4 WORD Comp .00 .89
Table 3.5 Multiple regression with Mathematical Reasoning as the dependent variable
and Chronological Age, Numerical Operations, NARA II Comprehension and WORD
Comprehension as the predictor variables.
d) Inter-rater reliability for qualitative analysis of test questions.
The results of the qualitative analysis of comprehension questions can be seen in
Table 3.6, which clearly illustrates that all three tests require a high proportion of
inferences to be made in order to correctly answer the questions posed. However, this
is particularly true in the case of the NARA II comprehension measure for which the
percentage of inference type questions is far higher than in either of the other two tests.
The WORD requires a far greater proportion of questions to be answered using literal
information than either the WOND or the NARA II. Also illustrated in Table 3.6 are
the inter-rater reliability results for each test following classifications by seven
independent adult raters.
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WORD NARA II WOND
Total Questions 38 44 50
Literal Questions 31.59 13.63 12
Vocabulary Dependent 7.89 13.64 20
Cohesive 18.42 34.10 28
Knowledge-Based 13.16 29.55 28
Elaborative 26.32 4.55 0
Evaluative 2.63 4.55 0
Transitive 0 0 12
Inter-Rater Reliability (mean) 0.84 0.80 0.76
Inter-Rater Reliability (range) 0.44 - 0.80 0.37 -0.76 0.02 - 0.63
Table 3.6 Percentage of each category of question identified in each standardised test.
e) The relationship between inferential skill and comprehension ability:
In order to examine the relationship between inferential skill and comprehension ability,
a skilled and less-skilled comprehension group were selected from the original sample,
and their performance on both tests of reading comprehension was compared. The 10
children with the highest NARA II comprehension standard scores were classified as
skilled comprehenders and the 10 children with the lowest NARA II comprehension
standard scores made up the less-skilled group (see Table 3.7). Performance on both
tests of reading comprehension were then compared using a 2x2 ANOV A with the
within-subjects factor Test (NARA II and WORD) and the between-subjects factor
Group (Skilled and Less-skilled).
Skilled Group
Less-skilled Group
NARA II Comprehension
113.90 (8.66)
86.70 (3.56)
WORD Comprehension
107.00 (7.09)
97.40 (7.53)
Table 3.7 Mean standard scores of Skilled and Less-skilled Comprehenders on NARA II
and WORD tests of reading comprehension (standard deviations in parentheses).
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A significant main effect of group revealed that the skilled group performed
better on both tests of reading comprehension than the less-skilled group (F(I,18) =
55.74, p<.OI). However, there was also a significant Group by Test interaction
(F(l,18) = 21.38, p<.Ol). Post-hoc Tukeys HSD showed that the less-skilled group
performed better on the WORD than on the NARA II test of comprehension with
scores on the WORD being in the average range (HSD p<.05). Conversely, the skilled
group performed better on the NARA II test of comprehension than on the WORD
comprehension sub-test (HSD p<.05). These results are shown in Table 3.7.
In order to establish whether children who differ in comprehension skill also
differ in inferential ability, and whether this difference is specific to a particular type of
inference, a detailed analysis was performed on the children's responses to the different
question types identified in each test. Performance on the evaluative, vocabulary based
and transitive categories were not analysed as none of these categories were highly
represented in any of the tests. Performance on the remaining 4 question types (Literal,
Cohesive, Knowledge-based and Elaborative) was examined in the following way. In
order to control for the fact that not all participants answered the same number of
questions in each test, the total number of questions that each individual was presented
with in each of the tests of reading comprehension was calculated. For each individual,
the number of correct responses to each question in each test was then expressed as a
percentage of the number of questions asked. Finally, the average percent correct for
each question type across both tests of reading comprehension was calculated (see
Figure 3.1).
These data were then analysed using a 2x2 repeated measures ANOV A with the
between-subjects factor group and the within-subjects factor Inference Type. The main
effect of Group (F(I,18) = 8.51, p<.OI) was significant such that the skilled
comprehenders performed significantly better than the less-skilled comprehenders. The
main effect oflnference Type (F(3,S4) = 16.21, p<.OS) was also significant such that
there were more correct responses given to literal information and cohesive questions
than to any knowledge based and elaborative questions (HSD p<.OJ). Furthermore, the
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percentage of correct responses given to literal information questions was significantly.
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Figure 3.1 Performance of skilled and less-skilled comprehenders on each
question type identified in the standardised measures
greater than that given to cohesive questions, while knowledge based and elaborative
questions did not differ from each other. A significant Group by Inference Type
interaction was also found (F(3,S4) =2.89, p<.OS). Post-Hoc Tukeys HSD (p<.Ol)
revealed that within the less-skilled group, performance on the literal questions was
better than on any of the other question types. However, performance on the cohesive
questions was better than on the knowledge-based or elaborative questions which did
not differ from each other. Within the skilled group, performance on the literal
questions was better than performance on the knowledge-based questions. None of the
other question types differed from each other. Finally between groups, the less-skilled
group's performance on the knowledge-based and elaborative questions was significantly
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poorer than the performance of the skilled group on all 4 question types. However, on
literal and cohesive questions, the less-skilled group's performance was not significantly
different from that of the skilled group on each of the corresponding question types.
3.2.3 Discussion
The results of the multiple regression analysis showed that mathematical
reasoning is not a strong predictor of reading comprehension when age and word-level
reading skills are taken into account. Similarly, NARA II reading comprehension does
not significantly predict mathematical reasoning ability when age and simple number
skills are first accounted for. Therefore, there does not seem to be a significant
relationship between reading comprehension and mathematical reasoning ability over and
above that mediated by basic level skills. No further consideration will be given to
mathematical reasoning ability in the remainder of this thesis.
The results of the comparison between skilled and less-skilled comprehenders
performance on both the story-based NARA II test of reading comprehension and the
more general WORD test of reading comprehension showed that the less-skilled
comprehenders performed in the normal range on the WORD while their NARA II
comprehension scores were below average. However, while the skilled comprehenders
performed above average on both tests of reading comprehension, their performance was
significantly better for the NARA II than for the WORD comprehension test. This
finding suggests that the varied nature of the WORD test of reading comprehension
differs from the story-based NARA II test of reading comprehension in such a way as
to facilitate the comprehension of the less-skilled group but inhibit that of the skilled
group.
Examination of the qualitative analysis of each of the standardised test measures
suggests that the tests of reading comprehension used here vary greatly in their reliance
on different inference types. For example, a large proportion of questions in the WORD
reading comprehension test rely on attending to the literal information in the text while
the NARA II questions rely more on cohesive and knowledge-based inferences than any
other question type. If the less-skilled comprehension group are capable of answering
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literal questions but have a difficulty specific to inferential questions, this could explain
the discrepancy in their performance on the two tests.
In order to examine the inferential skills of the two comprehension groups in
more detail, the performance of each comprehension group on 4 of the question types
identified in the qualitative analysis was examined. The findings suggested that the less-
skilled comprehenders were perfectly capable of answering questions based in literal
information or questions requiring a cohesive inference. Their performance on each of
these questions types was comparable to that of the skilled comprehension group, and
significantly better than the performance of either group on knowledge-based and
elaborative inference questions. Furthermore, the skilled group performed significantly
worse on the knowledge-based questions than on the literal questions.
These findings indicate that both groups of children found inferences that
required the use of real-world knowledge more difficult than literal and cohesive
questions. This difficulty was more pronounced for the less-skilled comprehenders and
may explain the difference in performance on the two tests of reading comprehension
used in this study. This discrepancy in performance can be explained by the finding
that less-skilled comprehenders perform at a normal level on tests of verbatim memory
(Yuill & Oakhill, 1991). If one considers that literal information questions could be
answered by remembering specific propositions in the text and that cohesive inferences
can be made using explicit cues from the text, it is not surprising that the less-skilled
comprehenders are able to answer these questions correctly.
Taken together the findings of study 1 suggest that the specific reading
comprehension difficulties experienced by some children may be mediated by a
difficulty with specific inference types. This conclusion is based on the finding that,
while the performance of the less-skilled comprehension group on the NARA II was
well below average, the performance of this group on the WORD test of reading
comprehension was within the normal range. However, the NARA II and the WORD
test of reading comprehension also differ in terms of the types of passages included in
each test. The majority of the passages in the NARA II are ofa narrative structure
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while the WORD contains passages of a variety of different text types ranging from
single sentences to informative commentary type texts. Research has not yet
established whether the pattern of inference generation is the same in texts of different
formats. Therefore, a further possible reason for the discrepancy in performance of
less-skilled comprehenders on the two tests of reading comprehension used here is that
they find the comprehension of commentary style texts easier than that of narrative
texts because a lesser degree of inferential skill is required in commentary style texts. In
order to address this question, study 2 will examine the on-line inferences of children
with normal comprehension skills during the reading of narrative and expository, or
commentary style, texts.
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Chapter4
The Effect of Text Format on Inference Generation.
4.1 Introduction
A narrative can be defined as a spoken or written account of a series of connected
events in the order in which they occur. In other words, a narrative tells a story.
Conversely, an exposition is broadly defined as an explanatory statement or commentary
and can take many different forms. Olson, Mack and Duffy (1981) identified two common
forms of exposition; the inductive argument where the author aims to convince the reader
of a particular proposition, or a comparative essay where the author compares and contrasts
two objects, arguments, or phenomena. However, there are many other types of exposition.
As discussed in chapter I, research has shown that certain types of inferences are important
to narrative comprehension. However, it is not clear whether there are significant
differences in the type of inference processing required in the comprehension of narrative
as opposed to expository text. In order to fully consider this question it is necessary first to
discuss the basic differences between these text types.
4.1.1 Structural Differences: It is generally agreed that a narrative text follows a
specific structure and contains certain fundamental elements that differentiate it from an
expository text. Narrative text is considered to be active in that it is centred around a series
of actions and events, and is constantly changing and developing. Olson et al. (1981)
proposed that a narrative text centres around a pattern of complication and resolution such
that a complication or conflict occurs which is resolved by the actions of the central
character or characters. This pattern is not thought to be relevant to expository text, which
typically does not contain characters, actions or events and can therefore be thought of as
having a more passive format. Furthermore, narrative text is generally divided into a series
of segments which are temporally or spatially discrete, but which must be causally
connected. Conversely, expositions do not have these structural constraints. Given the
causal structure of narrative texts, one might expect that the generation of coherence
inferences is necessary in order to maintain a clear representation of the text. This
assumption however, does not necessarily apply to expositions since they are not
constrained in the same way.
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4.1.2 Familiarity of content: It has been suggested that one of the major
differences between narrative and expository text is that people are usually familiar with
the content of narratives whereas the content of expositions is often novel. The familiarity
of narrative content is thought to stem from the expectation of the reader that the content
will be consistent with real world knowledge such that it will deal with concepts, actions
and events which occur in every day life (Olson et al., 1981). Expositions on the other
hand are expected to contain information of a more abstract and novel nature. A recent
study by Narvaez et al. (Narvaez, van den Broek, & Barron-Ruiz, 1999) found that subjects
reported more knowledge-based coherence breaks when reading expository text than when
reading narrative text. They classified knowledge-based coherence-breaks as breaks in the
coherence of the text due to the reader's lack of knowledge or experience. Thus, it would
appear that lack of knowledge is more likely to cause a problem for readers of expositions
than readers of narratives. However, this distinction does not seem to account for the fact
that some narrative texts can be based entirely in fictional worlds with no real
correspondence to everyday life. Nor does it account for the fact that expositions do not
always contain unfamiliar content. Britton and Gulgoz (1991; experiment 2) studied
expository text comprehension using texts containing information about the Vietnam War.
While the subject of the Vietnam War may be unfamiliar to some people, the participants in
the experiment were U.S. Air Force recruits and presumably had some knowledge of the
content of the passages. Britton and Gulgoz devised a paradigm which revealed
participants mental representation of a previously presented passage. They presented
participants with a passage describing some of the events of the Vietnam War. They then
compared the mental representations of the U.S. Air Force recruits with expert military
historians and the passage author's own representation. The results showed that when an
expository text was modified such that no inference processing was required during
reading, the representation of the U.S. Air Force recruits more closely resembled both the
military experts and the author's own representations than when inference processing was
required. Therefore, familiarity with the content of an expository text does not necessarily
aid in inference generation.
4.1.3 Reader's Purpose: Narrative and expository text are thought to differ in terms
of purpose such that a narrative text is generally written to entertain (Olson et al., 1981)
while an exposition usually has some informative value (Graesser, Singer, & Trabasso,
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1994). Indeed, this difference in reading purpose has been shown to produce differences in
inference generation. For example, Narvaez et al. (1999) divided subjects into two groups;
a study group who were instructed to read for learning, and an entertainment group who
were instructed to read for pleasure. Using a 'think aloud protocol', a test of delayed free-
recall and a straightforward question and answer comprehension measure they assessed the
effects of reading purpose on inference generation. Overall, they found that those readers
told to read for study purposes engaged in less inference generation than those instructed to
read for pleasure. Thus, it would appear that reading purpose does affect the generation of
inferences.
4.2. Research into the Effect of Text Format on Inference Generation.
It is clear from the research described above that there are differences between
narrative and expository text formats. The question of whether inference generation is
differentially affected by the format of the text is therefore an important one. However,
research into this question has provided inconsistent results. As summarised in chapter 1,
most researchers agree that bridging inferences are reliably drawn during narrative text
comprehension (Fincher-Kiefer, 1996; Magliano, Baggett, Johnson, & Graesser, 1993;
Potts, Keenan, & Golding, 1988; Singer, 1983) and some researchers propose that
elaborative inferences can also be drawn in narrative comprehension (Fincher-Kiefer, 1996;
Graesser et aI., 1994; Murray, Klin, &Myers, 1993). However, the issue of inference
generation during the reading of expository text is unclear.
4.2.1 Inference Generation in Expository Text: Millis, Morgan and Graesser
(1990) conducted a study which incorporated a comparison between causal bridging
inferences and predictive inferences in expository text. Specifically, they calculated the
number of inferences that could be generated by each sentence in passages with scientific
or technological subject matter. They then related the reading time of each passage to this
"inference volume score" (Millis et al., 1990). They found that overall, the number of
possible inferences that could be generated by each passage significantly predicted the
reading time of that passage, such that more inferences resulted in increased reading times.
Furthermore, when they looked at specific inference types, they found that this relationship
was the same for both causal bridging inferences and predictive inferences. Their results
suggested that both causal bridging and predictive inferences were drawn on-line in
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expository texts of this nature. This finding was surprising considering that only causal
antecedent inferences have been reliably shown to be drawn on-line in narrative text
comprehension (e.g. Potts, Keenan & Golding, 1988). However, a subsequent study
produced somewhat different results (Millis & Graesser, 1994). Participants were
presented with short scientific texts in both a word-by-word rapid serial visual presentation
procedure and a word-by-word self-paced reading paradigm with only the sentence-final
word being of fixed duration. They were then required to make lexical decision
judgements about inference words and unrelated words. The inference words were related
to either a causal antecedent inference present in the text or a causal consequence inference
that could potentially be generated from the text. Lexical decision judgements were faster
for causal antecedent inference words than for unrelated words. However, lexical decision
latencies for causal consequence inference words were comparable with those for unrelated
words. The results suggested that only causal antecedent inferences were drawn on-line.
Despite the discrepancy with the earlier study, these findings seem to be more in-line with
previous research on narrative comprehension.
In contrast, Noordman, Vonk and KempfT (1992) found that people did not draw
causal bridging inferences on-line during expository text comprehension. Instead they
found that causal bridging inferences were only drawn when subjects were specifically
asked to do so. In their first experiment, Noordman et al. (1992) presented participants
with short expository passages that they read sentence by sentence using a self-paced
reading procedure. There were two versions of each passage; an explicit and an implicit
version. A causal inference could be invoked in each version of the passage. However, in
the explicit version, the mediating idea that needed to be generated in order to draw the
inference was explicitly included before the sentence containing the target inference
sentence. Thus, in the explicit condition, no actual inference needed to be made since all
the relevant information was available. The mediating sentence was omitted in the implicit
version. For example, consider the following passage:
72
"(1) Spray cans usually contain a gas as a propellant. (2) Propellants serve to
disperse the product in the spray can, e.g. paint. (3) Propellants must not combine
with the product in the spray can. (4) Chlorine compounds make good propellants,
because they react with almost no other substances." (adapted from Noordman et
al., 1992, table 1)
Sentence 3 is the explicit information sentence, while sentence 4 is the target
inference sentence. In the explicit version of the passage both sentence 3 and 4 were
present. However in the implicit version, sentence 3 was not included in the passage. In
the absence of sentence 3, the information that "propellants must not combine with the
products in the spray can" must be inferred from the information in sentence 4.
If the causal inference was made on-line, the reading time for target sentences in the
implicit condition was predicted to be longer than that for target sentences in the explicit
condition since more processing time would be required. However, when the reading times
for target sentences in each passage were compared, no significant difference was found
between versions. Following presentation of each passage, subjects were presented with
verification statements which they had to judge to be either true or false. One of these
statements described the causal inference that had been included in the text. It was
predicted that if the inference had been drawn on-line, the verification times would be the
same in both the implicit and the explicit conditions. However, it was found that
verification time was longer for sentences in the implicit condition implying that the causal
inference was drawn when verifying the statement and not when reading the passage.
These findings were replicated in a second experiment conducted to address some
methodological issues in experiment 1.
In a third experiment, readers were presented with the same passages but the
mediating idea sentences in the explicit condition were altered so that they were no longer
consistent with the target inference sentences. For instance, sentence 3 in the example
above would be replaced by the sentence "propellants must combine with the products in
the spray can." All readers were told to read the passages with the objective of making
suggestions for improvement. Furthermore, half of the participants were warned that the
passages might contain inconsistencies. It was found that a large proportion of readers in
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the no-warning group did not detect the inconsistency between the mediating sentence and
the inference sentence, indicating that they did not integrate information across the
sentences and thus did not make the inference. Moreover, while a significantly larger
proportion of the warning group did detect the inconsistencies, 45% still failed to make the
inference.
Finally, Noordman et aI. (1992) conducted two further experiments in which they
manipulated the task demands of the study. In short they found that, when given a specific
task to which the making of the inference was relevant, readers did draw the causal
inferences on-line. To summarise, the findings ofNoordman et al. (1992) suggest that
readers do not make causal inferences in expository text, although given a specific purpose
they can be encouraged to do so. While clearly in conflict with the findings of Millis et al.
(1990, 1994), these findings are supported by other studies of inference generation during
the reading of expositions.
Britton and Gulgoz (1991; experiment 1) modified an expository text such that the
gaps in the text that required an inference to be made were explicitly filled so that no
inferences were necessary. They presented participants with either this modified version or
the original version of the text. In a free recall task, readers of the modified version recalled
far more than readers of the original version. Furthermore, participants were given a
multiple-choice task that tested whether the information provided by the drawing of an
inference in the original version could be accessed. Results showed that participants who
were given the modified version of the text where all the inferences had been explicitly
drawn, performed far better on this test than readers of the original version of the text
although the groups did not differ in their memory for the factual information included in
the passages. Thus, these results support the assumption that inferences are not made on-
line in expository text.
4.2.2 Comparisons of Inference Generation inNarrative and Expository Text:
All of the studies described above (Britton & Gulgoz, 1991; Millis et al., 1990, 1994;
Noordman et aI., 1992) focus solely on expository text. None of the studies include a direct
comparison between expository and narrative text. In order for a clear distinction to be
drawn between the two text types, they must be directly compared.
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Olson et a1. (1981) performed such a comparison between essays and narrative texts
using a similar paradigm to that used by Millis et a1. (1990). They gave examples of each
of these text types to one group of subjects and recorded their reading times. They also
gave these passages to a second group of subjects and asked them to talk aloud while
reading the texts. For example, they encouraged subjects to comment on the text and their
comprehension of it, on connections they might see between sentences in the text, on
predictions they felt they could make on the basis of what they had read, and on any
inferences they could draw from the text. From this 'talk-aloud' data they could record the
comments people made while reading each type of passage. They compared the talk-aloud
data with the reading time data, the assumption being that the more inferences a sentence
could generate, the longer the associated reading time for that sentence would be, since
generating the inferences would require extended processing time. They found that this
relationship was true for the narrative texts. However, for the expository texts, the number
of inferences included in a sentence was unrelated to the reading time of that sentence,
suggesting that the inferences were not drawn in expository texts.
The findings of Olson et a1. (1981) are supported by the more recent study of
Narvaez et a1. (1999) described above. As well as dividing their subjects into groups with
different reading purposes, they presented each group of subjects with both an expository
and a narrative text. They found that, irrespective of study purpose, expository text evoked
more study-type behaviours than narrative text. In terms of inference generation, this
meant that readers of expository text were more likely to repeat words or phrases, evaluate
the content of the text or indicate coherence breaks due to a lack of knowledge than were
readers of narrative text. Thus, they did not seem to engage in a great deal of inference
generation. Readers of narrative text however, were more likely to engage in predictions
and to explain the content of the text in terms of background knowledge and text-based
inferences than readers of expository text. They therefore seemed to engage in more active
inference generation.
4.2.3 Other Factors Affeding Inference Generation: Other research has indicated
that text type has no effect on the generation of inferences. Indeed in the Narvaez et a1.
(1999) study, readers of the expositions did produce a number of associations between the
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content of the text and both background and text-based information, indicating that they did
engage in some form of integrating activity such that they were relating the information
presented to prior knowledge. Research by Singer and colleagues (Singer, Harkness, &
Stewart, 1997) has suggested that, at least in the case of causal bridging inferences, text
format is not an important factor in inference generation. For example, Singer et at. (1997;
experiment 1) looked at the expository texts used by Noordman et at. (1992) and the
narrative texts used by Singer, Halldorson, Lear and Andrusiak (1992). Participants were
presented with the passages using a sentence by sentence self-paced reading paradigm.
Following presentation of the passage, they were given two yes/no questions. One of these
questions tapped the reader's memory of the specific detail of the passage. The second
question tapped the idea that was needed to draw the causal link between the clauses in the
target sentences. Using this paradigm, Singer et at. (1992) had previously demonstrated
that causal bridging inferences were drawn on-line in narrative texts since the causal link
question was answered more quickly than a similar temporal link question. The results of
experiment 1 confirmed the findings of Singer et al. (1992). They also supported the
findings ofNoordman et al. (1992) such that causal bridging inferences were not made in
expository text.
However, in a series of subsequent experiments, Singer et al. (1997; experiments 2
- 4) designed a further set of expository texts and compared them with Noordman et al.'s
(1992) materials. They found that while the 'Noordman' materials consistently produced the
same results, causal bridging inferences could be generated using the new 'Singer'
materials. They proposed a number of reasons to explain this discrepancy. For example,
Singer et al. (Singer, 1993; Singer et al., 1992; Singer et al., 1997) found that causal
bridging inferences are reliably made when they can be validated against real world
knowledge. However, if expository texts contain unfamiliar content (Olson et al., 1981)
then the validation hypothesis cannot apply. Instead, it is proposed that the difficulty of the
text will influence whether or not inferences are drawn. In support of this, the 'Singer'
materials were shown to be less difficult than the 'Noordman' materials such that the target
sentences took less time to read despite being equated for length. Furthermore, the error
rates for the 'Noordman' materials were higher than for the 'Singer' materials. In addition to
text difficulty, Singer et at. (1997) manipulated factors such as discourse cues, reading time
and wording of the questions, and found that all of these factors had an inhibitory effect on
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inference processing. As such, it was concluded that while causal bridging inferences may
be hindered by expository text, they are not completely prevented. Given a relatively easy
text containing clear discourse cues and unambiguous wording, and given unlimited
reading time, causal bridging inferences can be drawn on line in expository text.
Perrig and Kintsch (1985) presented participants with a text describing the spatial
layout of an imaginary town. Two versions of the text were constructed; a route text and a
survey text. The route text could be compared to a narrative text because it contained a
large number of causal connectives. Conversely, the survey text was written in a less
coherent fashion, containing no causal connectives and was therefore more analogous to an
expository text. This distinction is supported by the finding that in a free recall task the
route text was recalled better than the survey text. Having read the passages, participants
completed a sentence verification task in which they were asked to judge whether a
sentence was true or false. One category of sentences required participants to judge the
accuracy of an inferred spatial location. For example, the following is a section of the route
version of the experimental passage:
"To get there drive east along the East-West Highway to the Green River which
rushes out of some low hills to your left. Among the hills, before you come to the
river, you see the high school which is connected to the highway by a small road."
(taken from Perrig & Kintsch, 1985; experiment 2, table 5.)
An inference verification sentence could take the following form:
(1) "To reach the high school, tum left off the highway."
In order for participants to judge this sentence as being correct they would have had
to infer from the passage that the high school was to the left of the highway, a piece of
information not explicitly given.
Sentences were presented in both the route text style and the survey text style so
that, irrespective of which style of passage they were given, participants received a mixed
selection of verification sentences. Perrig and Kintsch (experiment 2) found that responses
to an inference sentence were more accurate if the sentence was written in the style of the
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text that the participant had read. However, the type of passage originally presented to
participants did not affect their ability to draw inferences. Whether they had read a route or
a survey text, they were still able to respond accurately to the inference verification
sentence provided it was written in the same style as the text itself. What was important
was the level of difficulty of the text. When presented with complex versions of the text in
either the route or the survey style, performance on the inference verification task showed
large floor effects (experiment 1). Thus, these results suggest that inferences can be made
equally well in both text formats.
Surprisingly these results were only true for female participants. Male participants
showed a preference towards the survey format such that, irrespective of the original
passage read, they were more accurate on the inference verification sentences if they were
presented in the survey style. Itwould appear therefore, that the male participants
constructed a particular mental representation of the passage based on the spatial
information regardless of the style in which that information was presented. They did not
seem to attend to the coherence cues present in the route text and thus performed poorly
when presented with inference verification sentences written in this style. This gender
difference may be related to the difference in spatial ability consistently found across sexes
(Halpern & Le May, 2000). However, it does serve to cast some doubt on these materials
as a suitable means of assessing the construction of a discourse model.
4.3 Material Appropriate Processing
The research described above demonstrates the inconsistency that has characterised
the question of inference processing in expository text. However, the findings of Singer et
al. (1997) that causal bridging inferences are inhibited by expository text but not wholly
prevented does not seem entirely incongruous with Noordman et a1.'s (1992) findings that
causal bridges can be encouraged in expository text comprehension. Furthermore, these
findings are in line with the findings of McDaniel and colleagues regarding 'material
appropriate processing' (Einstein, McDaniel, Owen, & Cote, 1990; McDaniel & Einstein,
1989; McDaniel, Einstein, Dunay, & Cobb, 1986). McDaniel et al. propose that certain
types of materials will induce particular processing strategies to aid recall. In particular
they propose that expository text will induce individual-item processing while narrative text
will induce relational-item processing.
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Individual item processing refers to the processing of each individual component of
the text into the mental representation of that text. Relational-item processing refers to the
relating of these components to one another. Relational-item processing therefore is clearly
analogous to drawing inferences. As such, the common finding that inferences are reliably
drawn during narrative text comprehension but not during expository text comprehension is
clearly in line with the theory of material appropriate processing. Contrary to this view,
McDaniel and colleagues further propose that for a complete representation of a text to be
formed, relational-item processing and individual-item processing need to interact. For
example, in order to facilitate construction of a complete representation of a narrative,
individual item processing needs to be artificially induced; that is, encouraged by the
performance of specific task. Conversely, in the case of expository text where individual
item processing is naturally invited, relational item processing needs to be encouraged as a
study strategy.
Studies have shown that recall of a text is enhanced by artificially inducing the
processing strategy that is not naturally induced by the text format. However, if the
naturally induced processing type is further encouraged, no improvement in recall is
observed. Einstein et al. (1990; experiment 1) presented subjects with short descriptive
texts and short narrative texts. While reading the passages, subjects engaged in one of four
extra processing tasks; letter deletion, embedded questions, sentence reordering and
outlining. Participants in the letter deletion condition received their passages with a
number of letters omitted and had to fill these in as they read through the text. In the
embedded questions condition, the paragraphs of the text were interspersed with questions
regarding the explicit information in the text. These two tasks were thought to encourage
individual-item processing. The sentence reordering group received their passages with
each sentence printed on a separate slip of paper. Their task was to arrange the slips of
paper in the correct order. Finally, in the outlining condition, subjects were encouraged to
summarise the text as they read. These final two tasks were intended to invoke relational-
item processing.
Following completion of these tasks, subjects were given a free-recall task in which
they had to recall as much information as they could about the passage. The results of this
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recall task demonstrated that the individual item processing tasks improved recall for the
narrative texts but not for the expository texts, while the relational item tasks showed the
opposite pattern of results. Further experiments demonstrated that the benefit of a
complementary processing task is maintained even when recall is delayed (Einstein et aI.
1990; experiment 2 and 3). It was concluded that complementary processing aids
construction of a full representation of the discourse, while supplementary processing does
not. The important point to note here though, is that despite being unnatural to an
expository text, relational item-processing was achieved. This finding clearly supports the
findings of some researchers that inference making can be observed in expository text
given the correct conditions and motivation (Noordman et aI., 1992; Perrig and Kintsch,
1985; Singer et a1. 1997). In summary, research into the effects of text type on inference
generation has produced inconsistent results. While it is clear that narrative texts are
conducive to drawing inferences, the extent to which expository texts can encourage this
type of processing is unclear.
4.4 Methodological Considerations Surrounding Research Into The Effects Of
Text Format On Inference Generation.
a) Indirect comparisons of narrative and expository texts: In order to develop a
fuller understanding of the difference between narrative and expository texts, it is necessary
to directly compare participant's performance on the two types of test passage. As shown in
the previous discussion, this has seldom been done in practice and while some attempts
have been made, the passages that have been used have differed in terms of content as well
as structure. For example, Narvaez et al. (1999) compared narrative texts that relayed
fictional stories with expository texts that conveyed information about scientific
phenomena. Thus, the subject matter of the two text types was vastly different and
therefore the extent to which the passages could be compared is questionable. In order to
fully examine the effects of text type on inference generation, it would be more desirable to
control for content and simply create two versions of the same text.
b) Empirical truth of passage content: The content of the passages used in studies
of inference generation generally agrees with real world knowledge. The inferences to be
drawn from the passages are therefore also in agreement with real world knowledge.
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However, narratives often contain fictional information that is based on facts that are true
only in the context of the story. Research has shown that drawing inferences from false
premises can be difficult even with narrative context as an aid (e.g. Franks, 1996). Thus, in
order to gain a clearer picture of the difference between narrative and expository effects on
inference generation it would be interesting to include passages based on false premises and
assess the relative difficulty of inference generation across the two text types in this
condition.
c) Differences in the inferential processes of children and adults: Much of the
research into the effect of text type on inference generation has employed adult participants.
It is not clear whether similar results would be obtained if the question were pursued from a
developmental perspective. Research has identified differences in the inferential processes
of children and adults. Paris, Lindauer and Cox (1977) for example found a developmental
trend in the ability to use implied consequences as a cue for recall. They found that 7- to
8-year olds were significantly poorer at using such cues than 11- to 12-year olds, who in
turn were poorer than undergraduate university students. Furthermore, Inman and
Dickerson (1995) replicated the findings common to adult research, that causal bridges
were made more frequently in narrative text than predictive inferences. However, unlike
much of the adult research into the time-course of inferences (e.g. Potts et al., 1988), Inman
and Dickerson found that both types of inference were made by children during recall
rather than during encoding of the text.
Aim of the present study: As a result of the bias towards the use of narrative text
materials in investigations into inference generation, it is impossible to assess how well the
main theories of inference generation can be generalised across text formats. Unless the
differential effect of text type on inferential processing has been established, studies into
inference generation should include materials created in both narrative and expository text.
Based on the paradigm used by Singer et at. (1992), the current experiment was designed to
investigate whether children draw coherence and elaborative inferences in narrative and
expository text when materials are matched for content.
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4.5 Experiment 2
4.5.1 Method
a) Participants: 22 Year 5 children from a York primary school participated in this
experiment. They were recruited on the basis of their performance on the Suffolk Reading
Scale (SRS; Level2, Form A; Hagley, 1986) administered as a screening device prior to the
commencement of the experimental procedures. The SRS is a test of single sentence
reading. To complete this test, the participant is presented with a booklet consisting of 75
sentences (4 practice and 71 test sentences), each with one word missing. Following each
sentence is a list of five possible words that could fill that blank space. The child's task is
to choose the word he or she thinks most suitably completes the sentence. This screening
device was used to ensure that all the children were of an adequate reading age to complete
the experimental tasks. The entire class of Year 5 children was tested but only those
children who obtained a score within two standard deviations of the mean were selected to
participate in the study. The final sample included 22 children with a mean age of 114.90
months (standard deviation 3.68 mths) and a mean SRS standard score of 100.77 (standard
deviation 6.77). The children were randomly split into two groups in order that each group
could receive a different experimental list. There was no difference between the two
groups in terms of reading ability or chronological age (Table 4.1).
Chronological age (mths)
SRS standard score a
Group 1
114.72 (4.08)
101.73 (7.5)
Group 2
116.40 (3.96)
99.82 (6.16)
Table 4. J Mean chronological age and Suffolk Reading Scale (SRS) standard score for each
of the two participant groups (standard deviations in parentheses; a = average 100, standard
deviation 15).
b) Design: This was a 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 design employing two within and two between
subjects factors each with two levels. The two between subjects factors were Form and
Text Format. The factor Form had two levels; Form 1 and Form 2, which referred to the
two lists of experimental stimuli. The factor Text Format had two levels; Exposition and
Narrative referring to the text format in which the experimental passages were written. The
two within subjects factors were Test Statement and Content. Test Statement consisted of
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two levels; TSI and TS2 referring to the type of test statements following each passage e.g.
a causal inference test statement (TS 1) and an elaborative inference test statement (TS2).
Finally, the factor Content consisted of the levels True and False referring to the empirical
truth of the test statement. There were eight experimental conditions; Exposition TS I True;
Exposition TS 1 False; Exposition TS2 True; Exposition TS2 False; Narrative TS 1 True;
Narrative TS 1 False; Narrative TS2 True; Narrative TS2 False. Each child completed eight
trials in each experimental condition and the trials were presented in random order.
In addition, a battery of standardised tests was used in order that performance on the
experimental tasks could be related to individual differences in reading accuracy and
reading comprehension.
c) Materials: 32 short passages were written, each containing two sentences that
had to be joined by a causal bridging inference in order to maintain coherence. The content
of these bridging inferences was based in simple real world knowledge in order to control
for knowledge accessibility. An expository version and a narrative version of each passage
were produced. Thus, 64 passages were written in all. The causal bridging inference
required was the same in both versions of the passage. The passages were divided into two
lists, A and B, such that each list contained one version of each passage. Neither list
contained both the narrative and expository version of anyone passage and each list
contained an equal number of narrative and expository texts.
Thirty-two causal inference target sentences and 32 elaborative inference target
sentences were produced. The causal inference sentences stated the mediating idea that
needed to be formulated in order to draw the causal bridge whereas the elaborative
inference target sentences contained information that could have been elaborated from the
passage but was not necessary to maintain coherence. Half of the sentences of each
inference type contained information that was consistent with real world knowledge while
in half, the information was inconsistent with real world knowledge. Presentation of each
passage was followed by the presentation of both inference target sentences in succession,
which the child was required to rate as true or false.
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Each passage contained six sentences. Within each pair of passages (i.e. each
narrative passage and its expository counterpart), sentences occupying the same position
contained the same number of words i.e. sentence 2 in the exposition contained the same
number of words as sentence 2 in the narrative. The same target inference sentences were
used for each version of a passage and the causal target sentence was matched with the
elaborative target sentence in terms of number of words. Finally, the two sentences within
the passage which required the causal bridging inference were always found in the 4th and
5th sentence positions and were followed by one final 'rounding off sentence. An example
of the type of stimulus used in the experiment can be seen in Table 4.2.
Thirty-two filler passages of the same length as the target passages were produced.
These did not require either coherence or elaborative inferences to be made. The target
statements following these passages were simple general knowledge statements related to
the passage. An example of a filler passage and its corresponding test statements is given
below:
"A banana is a popular fruit. It is shaped like a crescent moon. When it is ripe it is
yellow in colour. Bananas have soft, creamy flesh. They are sweet and tasty. Bananas are
very good for you."
TS 1: Bananas are orange.
TS2: Bananas are a favourite food of monkeys.
Both experimental lists contained the same 32 filler passages. Thus, each list
contained 64 passages, 32 target and 32 filler passages. Within the lists, the order of
presentation of each passage was randomised. Children assigned to group 1 received Form
1 while children assigned to group 2 received Form 2.
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Sentence
Sentence 1
Sentence 2
Sentence 3
Sentence 4
Sentence 5
Sentence 6
Question
Target 1
Target 2
Passage Format
Narrative
Once there was woman who lived
with her family in the forest.
She decided to bake her children
some cakes.
She lived in a pretty little wooden
house.
To bake the cakes she lit afire in the
kitchen.
The woman 's little wooden house
was totally destroyed
The lady was very cross with herself.
How did the woman's house burn
down?
fire will burn wood.
Exposition
Builders build houses for people
that are made to last a long time.
They use bricks to make the walls
solid.
Some people used to build houses
from wood.
They used to do all their cooking
on big open fires. .
Many of the wooden houses were
totally destroyed
Bricks are a very useful invention.
Why did people start to build
houses with bricks?
fire keeps you warm.
Table 4.2 Example of expository and narrative test passages, target sentences and
comprehension questions (Sentences in italics require a causal bridging inference).
In addition to the test passages, a list of comprehension questions was generated in
order to assess the effects of general knowledge on the ability to complete the sentence
judgement task. One comprehension question was devised for each test and filler passage.
For the filler passages, the question was simply based on the explicit information in the
passage. However, the questions derived from the test passages were designed to assess
whether the child possessed the general knowledge needed to make the coherence
inference. An example of a comprehension question accompanying a test passage is
included in Table 4.2. A full list of the passages and corresponding comprehension
questions is available in appendix I.
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Standardised Tests of Reading and Language Ability.
The Neale Analysis of Reading Ability (NARA II; Form 1; Neale, 1989) was
administered to assess reading accuracy and reading comprehension. The Wechsler
Intelligence Scale for Children (WISC III, UK; Wechsler, 1992) vocabulary sub-test was
administered as a test of vocabulary knowledge. In this sub-test, the experimenter presents
a list of words verbally, one at a time, and asks the child to provide a definition of each
word.
d) Procedure: Each child was seen individually over a series of three sessions.
Each session lasted approximately 30 minutes. Due to the length of the test materials, the
inference processing task was given over the course of the first two sessions. The task was
administered using a Psyscope programme run on a Mac Powerbook 180. The first session
was constructed as follows. The child saw the word 'READY' in the centre of the computer
screen. On seeing this 'READY' prompt the child was required to press the space bar.
They were then presented with the first sentence of the passage. To see each subsequent
sentence of the passage the child pressed the space bar when they had finished reading the
sentence on the screen. They were therefore in control of the pace of their reading. The
end of the passage was signalled by the appearance of a small asterix in the centre of the
screen after the child pressed the space bar at the end of the final sentence of the passage.
Magliano, Baggett, Johnson and Graesser (1993) demonstrated that a delay of 400msec
between the offset of a stimulus and the onset of a target (Stimulus Onset Asynchrony;
SOA) was sufficient to allow for the generation of a causal coherence inference. Thus, the
asterix remained on the screen for 500ms in order to facilitate inference generation. The
asterix was immediately followed by the presentation of target sentence I. The child had to
press the button labelled 'T' if they thought the statement was true or 'F' if they thought it
was false. On making the judgement, a second asterix would appear in the centre of the
screen, again for 500ms, immediately followed by target statement 2. Again the child had
to choose either 'T' or 'F' in response to this statement. Following this second sentence
judgement, the child would once again see the READY prompt and would then be asked a
comprehension question. In this way the child worked through all 64 test passages, 32 in
each session, plus 4 practice passages included at the start of session 1 and 2 practice
passages at the start of session 2. All text was presented in the centre of the screen in size
18 Comic Sans font.
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In session one, the children were seated in front of the computer screen and given
the following instructions:
" This task is going to be completed on the computer. You will be asked to read
some short passages on the computer screen. Following each passage you will be given
two short sentences on the screen. Your task is simply to judge whether these sentences are
true or false by pressing a button on the keyboard. On the screen you will see the word
'READY'. This word indicates the start of a new passage. On the keyboard you can see a
button with the word 'READY' written on it. When you see the word 'READY' on the
screen I want you to press the 'READY' button on the keyboard. The passages will be
presented one sentence at a time. When you press the 'READY' button you will see the
first sentence of the passage appear on the screen. I want you to read that sentence to
yourself. To get the next sentence you need to press the 'READY button again. Then I
want you to read that sentence to yourself. Each time you have finished a sentence and are
ready to move on to the next one, I want you to press the 'READY' button. When you have
read all the sentences in the passage the computer will put a little star up on the screen.
Then you will see another sentence. You have to say whether this sentence is true or false.
To do this you have to press the 'T button if you think it is true, or the 'F' button if you
think it is false. You have to do this as quickly as you can. When you have pressed one of
those buttons you will see another star on the screen and then another sentence. Again you
have to say whether this sentence is true or false by pressing the 'T or the 'F' button as
quickly as you can. I will then ask you a question about the passage you have just read.
Then you will see the word 'READY' again and have to start again with the next passage."
The experimenter worked through one example with the child. The child was then
given three practice trials with support and feedback from the experimenter. Following the
completion of these trials, the first 32 experimental trials began. No further help was given
by the experimenter.
In session two, the children were first reminded of the experimental procedure.
They were then given three practice trials before completing the remaining 32 experimental
trials in the exactly the same way as in session 1. In session three, children were presented
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with the NARA II and the WISC III Vocabulary sub-scale according to the instructions laid
out in the manuals.
4.5.2 Results.
a) Response times and error rates to test sentences following experimental
passages: Initial comparisons of response time data using the between subjects factor of
Form indicated that there was no significant difference in response times between groups
who received different forms of the test. Thus, for the remaining analyses of test sentence
response time, the data were collapsed across groups. Subject's responses were divided by
each of the eight experimental conditions (TS 1 True Exposition, TS 1 False Exposition etc)
and outliers were identified as any response time 2.5 standard deviations from the subject
mean in each condition. Outliers were replaced with the subject mean for that condition.
3.8% of response times were adjusted in this way. Only response times to items answered
correctly were included in the analysis.
The mean response times and number of correct responses for each test sentence
was calculated and the resulting data were analysed using a 2x2x2 mixed design ANOVA
with Text Format (NarrativelExposition) as the between subjects factor and Test Sentence
(Causal/Elaborative) and Content (TruelFalse) as within subjects factors. The means of the
combined data can be seen in Table 4.3. The mean number of correct responses to
sentences in each condition is also shown in Table 4.3. Significant main effects of Test
Sentence (F1(1,42)=26.35, p<.OOl; F2(1,14)=8.35, p<.05) and Content (Ft(I,42)=55.06,
p<.001; F2(1,14)= 15.77, p<. 001) were revealed. Tukeys HSD revealed that response times
to TSI (Causal) were significantly faster than to TS2 (Elaborative; F, p<.OOI; F2 <.01) and
that response times to test sentences containing true content were faster than those
containing false content (F, p<.OOI; F2 p<.OOI). No other main effects or interactions were
significant.
Table 4.3 shows that error rates were low in all conditions. These data were
analysed using a 2x2x2 ANOVA (factors as above) on the number of correct responses to
sentences in each condition. A significant main effect of Format was revealed
(Fl(1,42)=7.97, p<.OI; F2(1,14) = 7.71, p<.05) such that more correct responses were given
to narrative test sentences than to exposition test sentences. This effect was qualified by a
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Content by Format interaction by subjects but not by items (FJ(1,42) = 5.20, p<.05,
F2(1,14) = 3.43, ns). Post hoc Tukeys HSO revealed that responses to False test sentences
in the Exposition condition were significantly less accurate than to any other test sentences.
However, these results need to be interpreted with caution since participants were
performing at ceiling on the task. No other main effects or interactions were significant.
Mean no correct
responses (max = 8)
TSITrue TSI False TS2 True TS2 False
3772.37 4354.05 3889.18 4693.50
(1033.16) (1343.61) (1239.49) (1444.88)
7.82 (0.39) 7.59 (0.67) 7.91 (0.29) 7.64 (0.95)
3673.99 4287.13 4064.33 4747.61
(906.69) (1386.30) (1178.60) (1346.34)
8.00 (0) 7.91 (0.29) 7.86 (0.47) 8.00 (0)
Format
Exposition Mean RT (SO)
Mean no correct
responses (max = 8)
Narrative Mean RT (SO)
Table 4.3 Mean Response Time and number of correct responses for each Test Sentence by
Content condition at each Format level. (Standard deviations are given in parentheses.
TS 1= test sentence 1, TS2= test sentence 2. )
b) Performance on Experimental Comprehension Questions
Following each experimental trial, children were asked a comprehension question to
ensure that they had understood the passage and that they possessed the general knowledge
needed to make the embedded bridging inference. A correct response was given 1 mark
and an incorrect response scored as zero. Performance on the experimental comprehension
questions was high confirming that children were in possession of the general knowledge
needed to make the bridging inference embedded in the passage. The mean number of
correct responses to comprehension questions from a maximum of 16 was 13.68 (SD 1.70)
for questions following narrative texts and 14.36 (SD 1.22) for questions following
expository text. A t-test showed no significant difference in comprehension scores in terms
of the format of the preceding passage (t(21) = -1.54, ns). Thus, text format did not appear
to affect comprehension of the passage.
89
c) Analysis of coherence break: While the results of the test sentence analysis
suggest that causal coherence inferences are drawn from narrative and expository text, it is
not clear whether they are drawn during encoding of the passage or following completion
of the passage. Magliano et a1. (1993) has shown that a 400msec SOA is sufficient for the
generation ofa coherence inference. In this experiment, TSI was always presented
500msec following the completion of the passage, thus allowing enough time for the
inference to be drawn between passage completion and presentation of the test sentence.
In order to investigate the time course of coherence inference generation in this
study, reading times were analysed for the sentence that represented the coherence break in
each passage. Itwill be recalled that, each experimental passage was created so that, in
order to fully understand the text, a causal coherence inference needed to be drawn to
bridge a gap between sentences 4 and 5. In practice, this meant that unless linked with the
information presented in sentence 4, sentence 5 would seem inconsistent with the rest of the
text (a coherence break). If the inference required to resolve this coherence break was
drawn on-line, then reading times for sentence 5 in the passages with a coherence break
should be longer than for passages with no such break, allowing the reader to refer back to
sentence 4 in order to form a full mental representation of the text.
Thus, the reading times for sentence 5 in the experimental passages were compared
to the reading times for sentence 5 in the filler passages, constructed such that no specific
inference was required to comprehend the text. Sentence 5 contained on average 9.13
words in the experimental passages and 8.16 words in the filler passages (t(61) = 1.56, ns).
Table 4.4 summarises the mean reading time for sentence 5 in narrative and expository
texts for both the experimental and filler passages.
Condition
Experimental
Filler
Format
Exposition
4145.52 (1733.54)
3676.49 (3676.49)
Narrative
3929.36 (1428.11)
3771.01 (1235.29)
Table 4.4 Mean coherence break reading times for passages of each format in each
condition (standard deviations in parentheses.)
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Initial analyses revealed no main effect of Form so the data was collapsed across
Lists for the remaining analyses. A 2 x 2 mixed analysis of variance was conducted with
the between subject factor Format (exposition and narrative). The within subject factor was
Passage Type with two levels (experimental and filler passages). A by-items analysis was
not conducted on these data as the items presented to individual participants were not
comparable. For example, the experimental items presented to each participant varied
depending on the list received while all participants received the same filler items in the
same format. There was a significant main effect of Passage Type (F(1,21) = 13.26, p<.OI)
indicating that sentence 5 took longer to read in experimental passages than in filler
passages. No other main effects were significant. However, the interaction between
Format and Passage Type approached significance (F(1,21) = 4.00, p = .059). Post hoc
Tukeys revealed that sentence 5 reading times for expository test passages were
significantly slower than for either expository or narrative filler passages. Sentence 5
reading times for narrative test passages were also slower than for either filler passage type
but this difference did not reach significance. There was no significant difference in
sentence 5 reading times between expository test and narrative test passages, nor between
expository filler and narrative filler passages.
d) Individual differences in children's on-line text processing: To assess
individual differences in reading accuracy, reading comprehension and vocabulary skill, the
children completed a number of standardised measures in addition to the experimental task.
Mean standard scores for each group are shown in Table 4.5. T-tests showed there was no
significant difference between groups on any of the measures (NARA II accuracy t(20) = -
0.34, ns; NARA II comprehension t(20) = -0.75, ns; WISe Vocabulary t(20) = 0.62, ns).
Therefore, when examining individual differences, the data were collapsed across groups.
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Measure Group 1 Group 2
NARA II Accuracy a Mean 101.09 (9.77) 102.55 (10.58)
Range 89-119 89-121
NARA II Comprehension a Mean 92.27 (7.32) 94.55 (6.80)
Range 87-100 86-105
WISC Vocabulary b Mean 6.64 (2.91) 5.91 (2.55)
Range 3-13 2-9
Table 4.5 Mean scores on standardised measures of reading, vocabulary and
comprehension (a = average 100, SD 15; b = average 10, SD 3).
Table 4.6 shows the zero order correlations between response times to TSI (Causal)
and TS2 (Elaborative) and performance on each of the assessment measures. The
correlations suggest a relationship between target sentence response times and NARA II
reading comprehension. However, reading accuracy is also significantly correlated with
target sentence response times. As discussed in chapter 3, reading comprehension is
confounded by reading accuracy, because in order to comprehend a text you must first be
able to decode it. Therefore, it is not clear how much of the relationship between reading
comprehension and the target sentence response times is mediated by reading accuracy. A
partial correlation was therefore run to control for the influence of reading accuracy.
Importantly, the correlation between response times to target sentences and reading
comprehension remained significant when reading accuracy was controlled.
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Chron NARA II NARAII WISC TSI RT TS2 RT
Age Accuracy Comp Vocab
Chronological 0.08 0.44* 0.41 -0.33 -0.40
Age
NARAII 0.59** 0.48* -0.43* -0.48*
Accuracy
NARAII 0.49* 0.43* -0.59** -0.60**
Comprehension
WISC Vocab 0.43 10.20 0.59* -0.66***
TSIRT -0.33 -0.46* -0.48* 0.96***
TS2RT -0.40 -0.45* -0.56** 0.95***
Table 4.6 Zero Order correlations between target sentence response times and performance
on standardised measures (Chron Age = chronological age) and partial correlations (below
diagonal) between these variables when reading accuracy is controlled for. * p<.05,
**p<.OI, *** p<.OOI
Multiple regression analyses were conducted to investigate whether response times
to the target sentences could predict performance on the NARA II comprehension measure.
As previously discussed, it has long been accepted the ability to make inferences is a
fundamental component of comprehension skills (e.g.Kintsch & van Dijk, 1978; Paris &
Lindauer, 1976; Zabrucky, 1986). Itwas anticipated therefore that response times to both
target sentences would reliably predict NARA II comprehension raw scores. NARA II
accuracy was not included in the regression since the results of the partial correlation
indicated that the relationship between comprehension and response times was not
mediated by decoding skills.
The results of the regression analyses shown in Table 4.7 indicate that age is a
significant predictor of comprehension ability when entered on the first step (43%). WISC
Vocabulary accounts for 7% of the variance in comprehension scores which is marginally
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significant. Response times to TSI account for 12% of the variance when entered on step 3,
and response times to TS2 account for 12% of the variance when entered on step 3, both of
which are significant. These results indicate that even after age and vocabulary knowledge
are taken into account, response times to inference target statements are reliable predictors
of comprehension ability.
Step Measure R change p
1 ChronAge 0.43 0.00
2 WISC Voc 0.08 0.08
3 RTTSI 0.12 0.02
3 RTTS2 0.12 0.02
Table 4.7 Multiple regression with NARA II comprehension as the dependent variable and
response times to target sentences, chronological age and WISC vocabulary as the predictor
variables.
4.5.3 Discussion.
Experiment 2 examined on-line inferences during children's reading of narrative
and expository text using a sentence judgement task. Test sentence 1 stated a mediating
idea which would have had to have been activated if the coherence inference embedded in
the text were to be drawn, while test sentence 2 simply stated a possible elaboration of the
text. Analysis of the response time data indicated that responses to test sentence 1 were
faster than those test sentence 2. It appears therefore that the causal coherence inference
that could be generated from the preceding text was drawn at a faster rate than the
elaborative inference suggesting that the mediating idea referred to by the causal coherence
test sentence was more readily available than that referred to by the elaborative inference
test sentence. As outlined in Chapter 1 of this thesis, and in the introduction to this chapter,
previous research has shown that causal coherence inferences are drawn on-line during
reading while elaborative inferences are drawn off-line and only when they are specifically
required by the reader. Based on this previous research, one plausible explanation for the
results of the current study is that the causal coherence inferences were drawn during the
reading of the passage and were therefore available in working memory when the test
sentence was presented, priming the participant's response to that sentence. Conversely, the
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elaborative inferences were not generated during reading and therefore the subsequent test
sentences were judged without priming from the preceding text explaining the longer
response times for sentences of this type. In this way, the current findings can be
interpreted as adding further support to previous studies showing that causal coherence
inferences are drawn from text more reliably than elaborative inferences.
The finding that TS 1 response times were faster than TS2 response times is further
supported by the effect of content on sentence judgement times. Response times to false
test sentences were longer overall than response times to true test sentences indicating an
increase in the processing time taken to judge a false test statement. This is not unexpected
since a "false" sentence is incongruent with real world knowledge causing confusion and
therefore a delay in responding. This finding is related to the "belief bias effect" commonly
found in research on deductive reasoning whereby people find it difficult to set aside their
real world knowledge in order to draw a valid deductive conclusion based on false
premises. Thus the ability to deal with false information is consistently found to be
problematic (e.g. Evans & Perry, 1995; Franks, 1996; Moshman & Franks, 1986).
However, the fact that responses to test sentence 2 were particularly inhibited by false
content indicates that some extra processing was involved in responding to these
statements.
The results indicated no effect of text format. It appears that the pattern of response
times to test sentences is consistent across narrative and expository text. Thus, in line with
Singer et al. (1997), these results show that coherence inferences are reliably drawn in both
narrative and expository text whereas elaborative inferences are not.
While these results suggest that the causal coherence inferences embedded in the
passages were generated prior to the elaborative inferences, a limitation of the present
design was that test sentence 1 always corresponded to the coherence inference, while test
sentence 2 always corresponded to the elaborative inference. The smaller response times to
TS lover TS2 could therefore be due to an order effect. Bahri and Hussain (1997)
investigated order effects in inference generation and found that the order in which
inferences were presented did not effect inference processing. They presented participants
with stories embedded with target statements representing either a goal inference (a form of
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coherence inference) or a state inference (a form of elaborative inference). The order in
which the target statements were presented was manipulated such that the goal inferences
appeared first in some stories and second in others. The results demonstrated that
irrespective of the order in which they were presented, reading times for the state inference
target statements were consistently longer than for the goal inference statements suggesting
that goal inferences were generated faster than state inferences. Thus, while an order effect
may have influenced response times in the present study, there is some evidence from
previous research to suggest that this is not necessarily the case. Moreover, data was
collected, although not reported in the present study, which demonstrate that there was no
difference in difficulty between test sentence 1 and test sentence 2. Participants were
presented with the test sentences in a random order with no preceding passage context, and
were asked to respond "true" or "false" by pressing a button on the keyboard. When
presented with the test sentences with no preceding context, the response time difference
between the two test sentences disappears. These data are can be found in appendix 2.
Taken together, these results suggest that, while the increased response time to TS2 might
be due to an order effect, the interpretation that it is a reflection of the differences in the
time-course of inference generation between coherence and elaborative inferences cannot
be ruled out.
A second limitation of the present design is that the sentences constructed in the
present study to test elaborative inferences were not constrained in any way. They simply
stated one of any number of alternative inferences that could have been drawn from the
passage. In addition to this, during the time lapse between the offset of the passage and
presentation of TS2, the children were actively responding to TS 1, which may have
interfered with drawing the subsequent elaborative inference.
However, the results of the coherence break analysis support the assumption that
coherence inferences were drawn on-line in the test passages. Narrative and Expository
experimental passages invoked longer sentence 5 reading times than either of the filler
passages despite the fact the passages were matched for the number of words in each
sentence, although this was only significant in the case of Expository texts. Thus it can be
argued that reading sentence 5 in the experimental test passages involved more processing
than reading the same sentence in the filler passages. As such it seems plausible to suggest
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that in the present study, coherence inferences were drawn on-line in both formats. Finally,
there was no difference in sentence 5 reading times between narrative and expository text in
the experimental condition. Nor was there a difference in reading time between these two
text types in the filler condition. Thus, text format did not appear to influence inference
generation when passages were compared within each condition.
One further criticism that may be levelled at this study is that the passages did not
actually differ clearly in structure because both passage formats required a causal link.
Thus, all the passages could be considered to have a narrative structure. If this were the
case then the finding that there was no effect of passage format on inference generation is
unsurprising. However, a lack of causal constraints is only one of the ways in which
expository texts differ from narrative texts. Furthermore, it is not the case that expository
texts never contain causal links. If that were true then an investigation of this nature would
not be necessary. However, while the segments in narrative texts must be causally
connected, this causal constraint is unnecessary in expositions, although it is entirely
possible. In this case, in order to investigate the effect of text format on inference
generation it was necessary for the expository texts to contain a causal link so that a
comparison could be made with narrative text passages. However, the format of the
passages used in experiment 3 differed in many of the aspects discussed by Olson et at.
(1981). For example, the narrative texts related a story, contained characters, and were
dynamic and engaging. Conversely, the expositions contained no specific characters, were
passive, and were written as informative commentaries.
The multiple regression analysis indicated that inferential skill was a reliable
predictor of comprehension ability. This is in line with previous research indicating that
comprehension is at least partially reliant on inference generation (e.g. Kintsch & Van Dijk,
1978; Paris & Lindauer, 1976; Zabrucky, 1986). However, it is important to note that no
clear causal relationships could be deduced from the statistical analyses used here. It is
possible that both processes could be mediated by a third variable, although vocabulary and
age were both discounted in the present study.
Finally, although text format did not affect sentence judgement response times, the
content of the target sentence did prove to be an influential factor. Target sentences
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containing information that was false in terms of passage content and real world knowledge
were responded to slower than target sentences containing a statement of fact. Since many
narratives read by children are based in fantasy or fiction, many of the inferences needed to
form a representation of the text would also be false in terms of real world knowledge
although true in relation to the passage. If children have difficulty dealing with empirically
false information, as suggested here, then it is plausible that passage content may influence
inference generation. An investigation into the effect of content on inference generation
would further add to current knowledge of inference processing.
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Chapter 5
On-Line Inference Generation During Children's Reading Of Fairy Tales.
5.1 Introduction
As discussed in chapter 4, Singer, Harkness and Stewart (1997) investigated
whether the pattern of inference generation differed during the reading of narrative and
expository texts. Contrary to previous studies (Millis & Graesser, 1994; Millis,
Morgan, & Graesser, 1990; Noordman, Vonk, & Kempff, 1992) they found that the
format in which the text was presented did not influence the generation of inferences.
These findings were replicated in experiment 2 of this thesis. Given the inconsistency
of these findings, there is clearly a need to identify factors that reliably affect the
generation of inferences. One area that requires further investigation is textual content.
In the majority of studies, the materials used are short stories, the content of which is
generally based in real world knowledge. The inferences to be drawn from the passages
are therefore also in agreement with real world knowledge and should pose no problem
to the reader provided they are in possession of the general knowledge required.
However, some narratives contain fictional information and are based on facts that are
true only in the context of the story. In cases such as these, the inferences required for a
comprehensive understanding of the passage will also be based on information that may
contradict the reader's own knowledge base. In other words, readers are required on
occasion to set aside their own knowledge and accept empirically false premises as true
in order to form a coherent representation of a text. The content of a passage may
therefore inhibit a reader's ability to generate inferences if they are unable to ignore
their own understanding of the world in order to fully comprehend the text at hand.
5.2 Reasoning From False Premises: Evidence From Deductive Reasoning
Drawing inferences from false premises has largely been investigated in the
context of deductive reasoning. Fundamental to this research is the distinction between
validity and soundness. Validity refers to the form or structure of an argument while
soundness refers to its content. In deductive reasoning, an argument is said to be valid
if the conclusion of the argument necessarily follows from its premises. For example,
argument A in Table 5.1 is a valid argument because the only possible logical
conclusion based on the structure of the argument is that a sparrow has wings.
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Furthermore, argument A is also sound because the information contained in the
premises is empirically true, that is true according to our experience of the world.
However, an argument can contain empirically false information, rendering it unsound,
while still retaining its validity. For example, argument B is clearly unsound as the
premises are empirically false. However, the conclusion necessarily follows from the
premises and thus, argument B is valid. Therefore, when drawing deductive inferences,
it is the structure of the argument, and not the content that is the key to a successful
conclusion.
Valid Inferences.
A B
Soundness Sound Unsound
Premise 1 All birds have wings.
A sparrow is a bird.
All fish have feathers.
Premise 2 A trout is a fish.
Conclusion A sparrow has wings. A trout has feathers.
Table 5.1 Examples of valid arguments with sound and unsound premises.
Research into reasoning from false premises typically involves the presentation
of a number of premises that have been manipulated in terms of their validity and
soundness. The participant's task is to provide a conclusion to the argument. In the
case of valid but unsound arguments, the question of interest is whether participants will
be able to set aside their real world knowledge, ignoring the soundness of the argument,
and focus instead on its structure, or validity. Research has shown that children
experience difficulty with this kind of reasoning (Franks, 1996; Moshman & Franks,
1986). For example, Franks (1996) composed a number of narratives, the content of
which were either empirically false, empirically true or neutral. The narratives
contained embedded premise information and a deductive inference question was
presented immediately following the presentation of the premises. For example, the
following passage is part of a story used by Franks (1996). The story contains false
information and the sentences in italics represent the premises of the argument:
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At the end of our tour, we were taken to meet the beings of planet Glinko. The
robot took us to a tall tower that was made of something like glass, so we could
see the inside of it. When we got closer, we saw what looked like some people
and some dogs inside. From the inside, we heard the sound of many voices
talking at once. I said, "Well, either thepeople here talk or their dogs do." The
robot said, "All thepeople of Glinko can read each other's minds, so they never
speak aloud. "
Having read the passage, participants were presented with the following forced
choice question:
Q. Who was talking, the people or the dogs?
a) The people.
b) The dogs.
In order to select the correct response from the two alternatives, the participant
would have had to have read and understood the premise information. Furthermore,
they would have had to discard their own belief that dogs can't talk and simply
followed the logic of the argument. The character in the story heard talking coming
from a room in which there were people and dogs. Since the people on Glinko did not
speak aloud, the only logical conclusion is that the dogs were doing the talking. While
this conclusion does not fit in with our empirical knowledge of the world, it is
consistent with the argument structure.
The passages were given to children of 9-10 years and 12-13 years, and to adults
from 19-30 years of age. It was predicted that the younger children would find it more
difficult to reason from false premises than either the older children or the adults in
spite of the additional contextual information given by the surrounding narratives.
Since the inference forms used in the narratives were well within even the youngest
children's capabilities, this difference in performance could be attributed solely to the
false content of the arguments. Consistent with this, a developmental trend was
observed in the ability to draw deductive inferences from all three content conditions
and this trend was strongest between the ages of 9 and 12 years. Moreover, while false
premises proved more problematic than true or neutral premises for all age groups, the
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effect was most notable for children of the youngest age group. Similar findings were
reported in a later study (Franks, 1997).
Franks (1996, 1997) interprets her findings in terms of Moshman' s
developmental theory of logic (Moshman, 1990), which distinguishes between basic
logical reasoning and metalogic. Metalogic can be described as the ability to recognise
the importance of the relationship between the premises and conclusion of an argument
over and above the empirical truth of the premises. Moshman proposes that logical
reasoning develops in four stages; Explicit Content-Implicit Inference, Explicit
Inference-Implicit Logic, Explicit Logic-Implicit Metalogic, and Explicit Metalogic.
1. Explicit Content- Implicit Inference: At this stage the child can
accurately draw inferences from premise information but is not explicitly aware that
they are doing so. The child focuses on the content of an argument and not its form.
Stage 1 children are typically of pre-school age.
2. Explicit Inference-Implicit Logic: Between the ages of 6 and 10, children
reach the second stage of development. At this stage children have some understanding
of logical necessity and can distinguish between logically necessary and logically
probable arguments. Thus, metalogic has begun to develop. However, children at this
stage still have no explicit awareness of logical form and are unable to distinguish
between validity and soundness.
3. Explicit Logic-Implicit Metalogic: An explicit awareness of the
importance of logical form begins to develop in children of approximately 11 years of
age. At this stage the child will be able to form a conclusion that necessarily follows
from the premises, rather than relying on the empirical truth of the premise as a guide.
4. Explicit Metalogic: At this stage the adult thinker is able to move away
from solving individual problems and begin to think about logic explicitly as a formal
system, relating it to language and other formal systems. Logicians and students of
logic are likely to reach this level. However, this final stage in the development of
logical reasoning is one that Moshman suggests is never reached by most people.
Moshman's theory (Moshman, 1990) would predict that children are unable to
reason from false premises until they reach the third stage of development as it is not
until this stage that they would be able to distinguish between the form of the argument
102
and its content. Thus, children in a preceding stage would be unable to ignore the
content of the argument and concentrate on its validity. Franks (1996, 1997) findings
are clearly in line with this prediction. Furthermore, while not directly based on
Moshman's developmental theory, investigations into the belief bias effect in deductive
reasoning yield similar findings. The belief bias effect is a common phenomenon in
studies of deductive reasoning and refers to the inability of participants' to inhibit their
own beliefs in order to draw a conclusion based on logical validity. Studies have shown
that children are vulnerable to the belief bias effect. Evans and Perry (1995) conducted
a preliminary rating study in which children judged a list of statements as believable
(i.e. cars carry people), neutral (Le. donkeys have 14 teeth) and unbelievable (i.e. cows
live in ZOOS)I. In a subsequent reasoning experiment, the previously rated statements
were presented as conclusions to a series of problems. Thus, children were presented
with 12 problems, 4 of which had a believable conclusion, 4 with a neutral conclusion
and 4 with an unbelievable conclusion. Each problem was followed by the question
"Does it follow that (conclusion)? with one of the previously judged statements inserted
as a conclusion. Furthermore, 2 of each problem type (believable, neutral and
unbelievable) were logically valid while 2 were logically invalid. The problems were
read aloud by the experimenter but the children were also provided with a written
version of each problem that they could re-read if necessary. Having heard the problem
and the question the children were asked to tick either 'yes' or 'no' in a response space
on a test form.
The results of the study provide evidence of premise-based reasoning suggesting
that children could separate the structure of the problem from its content. However,
there was also a strong belief bias effect such that more believable than unbelievable
conclusions were accepted. Furthermore, there were developmental trends indicating a
suppression of the belief bias effect and an increase in premise-based reasoning with
increasing age. Evans and Perry suggest that while the children were clearly capable of
reasoning on the basis of validity they could not completely suppress the tendency to
form judgements based on prior knowledge.
In contrast to the findings of Franks (1996, 1997) and Evans and Perry (1995),
other investigations have found that children can overcome the belief bias and reason
IExamples taken from Evans & Perry (1995) pl06.
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from false premises when given some supportive context. For example, Dias and Harris
(1988) presented syllogistic reasoning problems to children of 4-, 5-, and 6-years of age.
The content of the problems was either known (All cats miaow; Rex is a cat; Does Rex
miaow?) unknown (Pogs wear blue boots; Tom is a pog; Does Tom wear blue boots?)
or contrary to empirical knowledge (All cats bark, Rex is a cat; Does Rex bark?). The
problems were presented either verbally, or within the context of play; that is with the
use of toys and props.
The results of the study showed that children's performance on syllogistic
reasoning problems was more accurate when the problems were presented in the context
of play or when presented as a story, and that this effect was strongest when the content
of the problems was unknown or contrary to the children's empirical knowledge. The
children were asked to justify their responses and their justifications were classified into
3 categories; those that were empirical or based on prior beliefs, those that were
theoretical or based on information contained in the premises, and those that were
arbitrary. The results suggested that the children in the play group gave many more
theoretical justifications than the children in the verbal group, particularly for the
unknown and contrary problems. That is, the children in the play group focused more
on the information contained in the premises than on the truth value of those premises
in terms of their own beliefs.
In a later study, Dias and Harris (1990) found that encouraging children between
4 and 6 years of age to use imagery when faced with contrary to fact reasoning
problems also facilitated reasoning from false premises. Richards and Sanderson
(1999) found that children as young as 2-,3-and 4-years old were able to solve
counterfactual syllogistic reasoning problems when encouraged to use their imagination
and were more likely to justify logical responses in terms of the content of the premises
rather than on the basis of their empirical knowledge.
Leevers and Harris (2000) performed a similar study with normally developing
4-year olds, children with MLD and autistic children. Like Richards and Sanderson
(1999), Leevers and Harris found that normally developing children could produce
logical conclusions to counterfactual syllogisms and justify their responses by referring
to the premises. While performance of children in the MLD group was not comparable
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to that of the normally developing children it was above chance levels indicating that
children with moderate learning difficulties do have the capacity for logical reasoning
from false premises. However, the performance of the children in the autistic group
was at chance.
Further evidence that children can set aside prior knowledge to deal with
information that is inconsistent with that knowledge comes from Power, Taylor and
Nippold (2001). They presented children with proverbs that were either literally true
(Le. the baby has no teeth) or literally false (i.e. every dog is a lion at home). Each
proverb was presented in a short story, which was followed by 4 possible proverb
meanings, one of which was the intended meaning of the proverb and three of which
were closely related foils. The literal meaning of the proverb was never given as an
alternative. The children had to pick the most appropriate intended meaning for the
proverb. In order to do this they had to look beyond the literal meaning of the proverb
and concentrate on the context in which it was used to find the figurative meaning.
Power et a1. (2001) predicted that this task would be easier in the case of literally true
proverbs since they were 'easier to visualize and required less imagination on the part of
the reader' (pS). However, the results suggested that there was no difference in
performance on the proverb comprehension task that could be attributed to the type of
proverb presented. The only significant finding was a developmental trend such that
14- and l l-year olds performed better than 9-year old children, although the two older
groups did not differ from each other. These findings suggest that children can ignore
their empirical knowledge and find meaning beyond a literal interpretation, even when
the literal interpretation is itself contrary to their own beliefs.
5.3 Generating Text-Based Inferences From False Premises.
While investigations into children's deductive reasoning skills have given some
consideration to the difficulties posed by false premise information, research into
children's generation of text-based inferences has not directly addressed this issue.
However, children are rarely presented with logical deductive reasoning problems in
isolation from any surrounding context. A more likely scenario is that children are
regularly faced with reasoning tasks during reading such that they are required to make
inferences in order to, for example, keep track of a sequence of events or explain the
actions of a character. These inferences may not be deductive in nature. That is to say,
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they may not be logically necessary and the conclusions may not be unequivocal.
However, a logically possible conclusion will be drawn which is the most likely
conclusion in the context of the story. Furthermore, many of the stories children are
presented with contain information that is not based in reality, as is the case with fairy
tales. In cases such as this, it is necessary for children to draw inferences based on
information that runs counter to their empirical knowledge of the world. The
conclusions themselves may not be empirically false but the premises on which they are
based, and the overall context in which the inference must be drawn, may not fit with
the child's knowledge of the world. Thus, in contrast to the generation of inferences
from stories based solely in real world knowledge, in fairy tales the child must
overcome a large degree of counterintuitive information in order to generate inferences .
.This is not a "belief bias" effect as investigated in the studies cited earlier in this
chapter, such that the conclusions drawn may not conflict with real world knowledge.
However, the generation of such inferences does require the child to suspend disbelief
in order to form a coherent representation of a text. It is this interpretation of the belief
bias effect which will be investigated in the present study.
GaIotti, Komatsu and Voelz (1997) compared the performance of children from
kindergarten and grades 2, 4, and 6 on deductive and inductive syllogisms. While
deductive inferences are those for which a conclusion is logically necessary, inductive
inferences are those for which a conclusion is logically possible. For example, the
syllogism 'All fish like to swim. Tommy likes to swim. Is Tommy a fish?' requires an
inductive inference because, while it possible that Tommy is a fish, it is equally likely
that Tommy is a person. The conclusion that Tommy is a fish does not necessarily
follow from the premises. All the syllogisms presented by Gaiotti et al. (1997)
contained fantasy content and children were asked to answer yes or no to the inference
question and also to rate how confident they were in their answer. An example of a
deductive syllogism and its inductive counterpart used in the study are presented below.
Deductive: All poggops wear blue boots. Tombor is a poggop. Does Tombor
wear blue boots?
Inductive: Tombor wears blue boots. Tombor is a poggop. Do all poggops
wear blue boots?
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Gaiotti et al. (1997) found that children from grades 2,4 and 6 were more
consistent in their responses to deductive than to inductive inferences, and responded
faster to and were more confident in their responses to deductive items. The experiment
was run a second time with children from grades 2,3,4 and 5 and the children were also
asked to justify their responses. All children showed a tendency to refer to the premises
for justification of a response to a deductive inference and to a sense of uncertainty
about the premise information for justification of a response to an inductive inference.
The results indicated that children were able to set aside prior knowledge in order to
answer deductive inference problems based in fantasy content, but were less capable of
doing so in the case of inductive inferences. As stated above, in narrative texts, many
inferences are inductive in nature such that they do not involve the generation of
logically necessary conclusions. While the inferences presented by GaIotti et al. (1997)
were not presented as narratives, the results suggest that children may have difficulty
generating inductive inferences from fantasy content in a narrative text.
Aims of present study: The present study was designed to compare the ability
of children to generate coherence inferences and elaborative inferences from stories
containing fantasy content with those from stories based in real world knowledge. In
contrast to previous studies investigating the "belief bias" effect, the inferences included
in this study are coherence links, not logical deductions, in order to more closely mirror
the kinds of inferences children might be faced with in their everyday reading
experience. In line with the findings suggested by Galotti et al. (1997) it was predicted
that children would find it easier to draw both coherence and elaborative inferences
from stories containing information that was consistent with real world knowledge.
However, it was also expected that the pattern of inference generation would be
consistent across story types such that coherence inferences would be drawn on-line
during encoding while elaborative inferences would be drawn at a later point during the
reading process.
5.4 Experiment 3
5.4.1 Method
a) Participants: 39 children were selected from the Year 5 classes of two York
primary schools. All the children in the Year 5 classes were given the Suffolk Reading
Scale (SRS; Level2, Form A; Hagley, 1986) to measure basic reading ability and the
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children selected to participate in this study achieved a standard score on the SRS of
between 95 and 115. The overall mean standard score of the sample was 104.18 (SO
7.08) and the mean age of the sample was 121.41 months (SO 4.58). The children were
randomly split into two groups. Group 1 (n = 19) had a mean standard SRS score of
103.58 (SO 6.62) and a mean age of 121.36 months (SO 4.58). Group 2 (n = 20)
achieved a mean standard SRS score of 104.75 (SO 7.61) and a mean age of 121.47
months (SO 3.86). The groups did not differ significantly at ANOVA on standard SRS
score (F(l,37) <1) or chronological age (F(l,37) <1).
b) Design: This study used a 2x2x2 mixed design with one between- and two
within-subjects factors. Each of the three factors contained two levels. The between-
subjects factor was Form and had the levels list 1 and list 2. This factor indicated which
of the two versions of the experimental list the children received; children in Group 1
received list 1 and children in Group 2 received list 2. The within subjects factors were
Passage Type, which had the levels Real and Fairy referring to the type of content
contained in the passage, and Inference Type, which had the levels Causal Link and
Static Property referring to the type of inference being tapped by each test sentence.
Each child read every passage in his or her list and responded to two sentence
judgement trials within each passage. Thus each child completed eight trials in each of
four conditions; Real Causal Link, Real Static Property, Fairy Causal Link and Fairy
Static Property. In addition to this, each child was administered a number of
standardised tests to assess individual differences in reading and comprehension skills.
c) Materials: 16 test passages were created, 8 of which were based on
information that was consistent with real world knowledge (Real), and 8 containing
information that was inconsistent with real world knowledge (Fairy). An example of
each of these passages is given in Table 5.2 and the complete set is available in
Appendix III. Passages were divided into two sections and a test sentence was
presented after each section. 32 test sentences were created to represent either a causal
inference required to link the final two sentences (critical sentences) of each passage or
a static property of a character or object that appeared in these critical sentences. Each
passage contained both a causal and a static test sentence and the content of the test
sentences reflected the content of the passage in which they were presented. Within
each passage, the critical sentences in section 1 were matched for syllable length with
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the critical sentences in section 2. The test sentence following section 1 was matched
for number of syllables with the test sentence following section 2. Matching for
number of syllables contained in critical and test sentences across Real and Fairy
passages would have constrained the flow of the text making the passages appear
stilted. Thus, the number of syllables in the critical and test sentences differed across
passage type. However, t-tests showed these differences were not significant (critical
sentences t(14) = -0.37, ns; test sentences t(14) = -1.56, ns).
Two versions of each passage were written. In version one, a causal link test sentence
would follow section one and a static property test sentence would follow section two.
In version 2 the order would be reversed. In order to create two alternate versions but
maintain the flow of the passage, the wording of the different versions varied slightly
and different test sentences were used. However, the passages were matched so that the
critical sentences and the test sentences contained the same number of syllables in both
versions. Table 5.3 shows the mean number of syllables in the critical sentences and
test sentences in both versions of each passage type. The experimental passages were
also assessed for readability using the book grading formula proposed by Hatcher
(2000). The mean reading grades and corresponding WORD reading age equivalents
(Wechsler Objective Reading Dimensions; Wechsler, 1990) are shown in Table 5.3. A
2x2 ANOV A with the between groups factor of Passage Type and the within groups
factor of Form found no significant difference between the book grading of each
passage type. The passages were organised into two lists each containing 16 passages.
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Each list contained only one version of each passage and the lists were arranged so that
eight passages presented causal link test sentences first and eight presented static
property sentences first.
8 filler passages were written in the same format as the experimental passages.
Four of these passages were based on real world knowledge (Real) and four were
entirely fictional (Fairy). However, the test sentences presented in these passages
required memory for literal information rather than inferential processing. Each
experimental list contained four filler passages; two real world knowledge passages and
two fictional passages. Due to the nature of the study, the correct response to an
experimental test sentence was always TRUE. This meant that the pattern of
responding to each experimental item was always TRUEffRUE. Therefore, the filler
passages were designed such that four of the passages contained a TRUEIF ALSE
pattern of correct responses and four contained a FALSEffRUE pattern of responses.
Within each experimental list, one knowledge-based and one fictional filler passage
would contain the TRUEIF ALSE pattern and the other two passages would contain the
FALSEffRUE pattern.
Finally, in order to assess whether the passages had been understood, 24
comprehension questions were written, one for each of the experimental and filler
passages. The same question was used for each of the versions of the experimental
passages. Examples of the types of comprehension questions asked are given in Table
5.2. A full list of the passages used in the experiment and the corresponding
comprehension questions is given in Appendix III.
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Standardised Tests of Reading and Language Ability.
The Neale Analysis of Reading Ability (NARA II; Form I; Neale, 1989) was
administered as a test of reading accuracy and comprehension. Two sub-tests from the
Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children (Third Edition UK; WISC III; Wechsler, 1992)
were administered; the Vocabulary sub-test as described in chapter 4 and the Similarities
sub test. The Similarities sub-test requires the experimenter to say two words i.e. banana
and apple, and the participant to respond by explaining how those words are related Le.
both are types of fruit. The Test of Word Reading Efficiency (TOWRE; Torgeson, Wagner,
& Rashotte, 1999) was given to assess reading speed and accuracy. The TOWRE is a
timed test in which the child is asked to read as many items as they can from a list of words
within 45 seconds. The task is then repeated using a list of non-words. Three scores are
obtained; a sight word reading efficiency score, a phonemic decoding score and an overall
reading efficiency score.
d) Procedure: Children were tested individually over a course of two 30-minute
sessions. In the first session, children completed 14 passages (2 practice, 8 test and 4 filler
passages). They also completed the WISC Vocabulary and Similarities measures and the
TOWRE. In the second session, children completed the remaining 12 passages (8 test and
4 filler passages) and the NARA II. The WISC sub-tests, TOWRE and NARA II were all
administered in accordance with the instructions laid down in the test manuals.
The experimental paradigm ran as follows. The word READY appeared in the
centre of the computer screen. The child pressed the spacebar and the 'READY' prompt
would be replaced by the first half of a passage that the child read aloud to the
experimenter. The child pressed the spacebar again when they had read and understood the
passage. Then an asterix appeared in the centre of the screen for 500 msecs after which the
first test sentence appeared. The child made a true/false judgement about the sentence by
pressing the key marked True or False on the keyboard, following which, the second half of
the passage automatically appeared on the screen. The child read the second half of the
passage, pressing the space bar again when they had finished. Again, they saw an asterix
for 500msec followed by the second test sentence which they had to judge as true or false
by pressing the appropriate keyboard button. Following this the READY prompt appeared
113
once more. The comprehension question was then given orally signalling the end of the
trial. The second trial would begin when the child pressed the spacebar. All text was
presented in the centre of the screen in size 18 Comic Sans font.
At the beginning of session one, the children were seated in front of the computer
and told to make themselves comfortable. They were told that they were going to read
some passages and answer some questions on the computer. They were then given the
following instructions:
"In a moment you will see the word READY appear on the screen. When you see
that word, you must press the space bar. After you press the space bar, the first half of a
story will appear in the centre of the screen. I want you to read that story out loud to me so
that I can help you with any words you might get stuck on. When you have finished
reading the passage on the screen, you should press the space bar again. Then a sentence
will appear in the middle of the screen, and you have to decide whether the sentence is true
or false. You do this by pressing the true or false buttons on the keyboard as quickly as you
can. Once you have done this, the second half of the passage will appear and again I want
you to read it out loud for me. When you are finished you press the space bar and look at
the sentence on the screen. You then have to decide whether the sentence is true or false by
pressing the true or false keys as before. Is that clear?"
Having established that the child had understood the instructions and was clear
about the buttons on the keyboard the experimenter then prompted the child to complete the
two practice passages. When the child had successfully completed the practice passages
the experimenter then informed the child that after each passage they would be asked a
question to make sure they had understood the passage. Having completed the practice and
instruction phases, the child completed the 12 passages in the experimental phase.
In session two, the experimenter first ensured that the child remembered the
instructions from session 1 and if not the practice trials were repeated. The child then
completed the 12 remaining experimental trials.
114
5.4.3 Results
a) Reading times for critical sentences: A comparison of the reading times for the
critical sentences in Fairy and Real stories was conducted in order to examine in more
detail whether the difference in the number of syllables between Fairy and Real stories
would affect reading time for those sentences. During session 1 of the experimental task,
28 of the children were recorded when reading the passages. These recordings were then
digitised and the critical sentences in each of the eight experimental passages read during
session 1 were identified in each separate recording. Of the 28 recordings made, 8 were
eliminated at this stage due to recording errors. The reading times of the remaining 20
subjects for the critical sentences in each experimental passage were then analysed. Initial
analyses indicated that reading times did not differ between groups. Therefore, the data
were collapsed across groups for further analysis. The mean reading times and standard
deviations for each condition can be seen in Table 5.4.
Passage Type Place in Text Mean Reading Time (SO)
Real Early 9.31 (2.45)
Fairy Early 9.34 (2.05)
Real Late 8.69 (1.81)
Fairy Late 9.74 (2.13)
Table 5.4 Mean reading times (sees) for critical sentences in Early and Late sections of
Real and Fairy passages (standard deviations in parentheses)
A 2x2 repeated measures ANOV A was conducted on the reading time data with the
factors Passage Type (Real and Fairy) and Place in Text (Early and Late). As expected
there was no effect of Passage Type or Place in Text. However, a significant interaction
was revealed (Fl(l,19) = 7.90, p<.05; F2(1, 6) = 0.18, ns). Post hoc analysis using Tukeys
HSO revealed that the critical sentences presented later in the text took longer to read in the
Fairy passages than in the Real passages (HSD F 1 p<.05). No other differences were
significant.
lIS
The difference in the number of syllables in the critical sentences in the Real and
Fairy passages did appear to affect reading times, although this finding was only true for
sentences presented later in the text. On closer analysis of individual reading times, 4
children were identified as having particularly long reading times, which probably
accounted for the differences noted in the ANOV A. The performance of these 4 children
on a number of other measures was examined and no specific problems were identified. It
was therefore decided not to exclude these children from the sample.
b) Response times and error rates to test sentences following experimental
passages: Initial comparisons of response time data using the between subjects factor of
List indicated that there was no significant difference in response times between groups
who received different forms of the test. Thus, for the remaining analyses of test sentence
response time, the data were collapsed across groups. Subjects responses were divided into
the four experimental conditions and the data was examined for outliers. Outliers were
defined as any response time 2.5 standard deviations away from the mean response time of
each subject in each condition and would be replaced with the subjects mean response time
for that condition. No outliers were found. Analysis of the response time data was
conducted on correct responses only.
Causal Mean RT (SD)
Mean no correct
responses (max = 8)
Static Mean RT (SD)
Mean no correct
responses (max = 8)
Story Type
Real Stories Fairy Stories
3615.59 4149.36
(732.71) (1557.62)
7.23 6.97
(0.90) (1.18)
4357.06 4302.88
(1251.23) (1520.73)
4.59 5.23
(1.74) (1.66)
Table 5.5 Mean response times and number of correct responses for target statements in
each experimental condition.
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The mean response time and number of correct responses for each target sentence
are shown in Table 5.5. These data were analysed using a 2x2 ANOVA with the factors
Passage Type and Inference Type. Analyses of the response time data showed that the
main effect oflnference Type was significant (FI(1,38) = 10.90, p<.OI; F2(1,14) = 8.03,
p<.OS). Thus, judgements about causal target statements were made faster than judgements
about static target statements. There was no main effect of Passage Type (FI(I,38) = 1.81,
ns, F2(1,14) = 0.77, ns) suggesting that the inconsistent information present in the fairy
stories did not affect response time. However, there was a significant interaction between
Passage Type and Inference Type by subjects (FI(I,38) = 4.95, p<.05) but not by items
(F2(1,14) = 2.56, p>.05). Post hoc Tukeys indicated that responses to Real Causal test
sentences were significantly faster than responses to Fairy Causal test sentences (HSD FI,
p<.05) and significantly faster than responses to both Real and Fairy Static test sentences
(HSD FI, p<.OI). This finding indicates that there was a belief bias effect when drawing
causal inferences. Analysis of the error rates revealed a main effect of Inference Type
(FI(l,38) = 92.14, p<.OOl; F2(1,14) = 30.57, p<.OOI) showing that more correct responses
were made to causal statements than to static statements. The interaction between Passage
Type and Inference Type was significant by subjects but not by items (F1(1,38) = 6.65,
p<.05; F2(l,14) = 1.28, ns). Post hoc tests revealed more correct responses in both the Real
Causal and Fairy Causal conditions than either the Real Static or Fairy Static conditions
(HSD F 1. p<.OI). Furthermore, there were more correct responses to static target
statements in the Fairy story condition than in the Real story condition and this difference
approached significance (HSD F 1 p<.06). No other effects were significant.
To summarise, children responded faster and more accurately to causal statements
than to static statements in both Real and Fairy stories. These results suggest that causal
inferences are drawn prior to static inference when reading both Real and Fairy stories.
However, responses to Fairy Causal test sentences were significantly slower than responses
to Real Causal test sentences indicating that children have more difficulty making
inferences from information inconsistent with real-world knowledge even when those
inferences were necessary for understanding the text. It was also found that children were
more accurate in their responses to static target statements in the Fairy story condition than
in the real story condition. This finding was unexpected and seems counterintuitive. Given
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the empirical falsity of the static target statements in the Fairy stories, one would expect
more erroneous false responses than to the static target statements in the Real stories.
However, it appears that children are more willing to accept imaginary static properties
than they are real ones.
c) Performance on experimental comprehension questions: Following the
completion of each passage, the children were asked one question designed to assess their
understanding of the passage. The questions following the experimental passages were
scored by giving one point for a correct answer and nothing for an incorrect answer. Each
subject was awarded a comprehension score for real stories (max 8) and one for fairy
stories (max 8). The mean number of correct responses to questions following real stories
was 6.15 (SD 1.35) and the mean number of correct responses to questions following fairy
stories was 5.87 (SD 1.20). A t-test showed no significant difference between the number
of correct responses given to questions following real stories and questions following fairy
stories (t(38) = 1.02, ns).
d) Individual differences in children's on-line text processing: In order to assess
whether on-line sentence processing was related to reading and language skill, the children
completed a number of standardised measures in addition to the experimental task. The
mean standard scores obtained on each of these measures are shown in Table 5.6.
Measure Mean Standard Deviation Range
NARA II Accuracy a 102.87 10.75 88 - 129
NARA II Comprehension a 98.62 10.09 74 -125
WISC Similarities b 8.52 8.52 2 - 15
WISC Vocabulary b 7.54 7.54 2 -18
TOWRE Sight Word a 107.33 10.45 91 - 129
TOWRE Phonemic Decoding a 104.13 12.38 79 - 132
Table 5.6 Mean standard scores on the standardised assessment measures (a = average
standard score 100, SD 15;b = average standard score 10, SD 3).
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Initial correlations between the raw scores obtained on the standardised measures of
assessment, response times to test sentences, error rates and performance on the
experimental comprehension questions are shown in Table 5.7. The raw scores on each of
the TOWRE measures were added together to give a composite measure of reading
efficiency which was entered in the correlation. A significant relationship was revealed
between NARA II comprehension scores and response times to static target statements
which was not reflected in the relationship between NARA II comprehension and response
times to causal target statements. This suggests that general comprehension ability is more
important to making static inferences than causal inferences. However, since response
times to both causal and static target statements were also strongly related to scores on both
TOWRE measures, it could be that the relationship between NARA II comprehension and
Static target statement response times was mediated by reading fluency rather than the
ability to generate an inference. In other words, children with good comprehension skills
may also be able to process information faster than children with poor comprehension and
were therefore able to respond more quickly to the target statements. In order to examine
this possibility, a partial correlation was run controlling for age and the TOWRE composite
score. (See the lower half of the correlation matrix in Table 5.7). After age and reading
speed were controlled, the relationship between NARA II comprehension scores and
response times to static target statements maintained significance, indicating that the
relationship is not reliant on individual differences in reading fluency.
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A series of multiple regression analyses were conducted to look at concurrent
predictors of performance on the NARA II comprehension measure. The first question of
interest was whether performance on the NARA II comprehension measure could be
reliably predicted from target sentence response times. The results of these analyses are
shown in Table 5.8. Age did not correlate significantly with NARA II comprehension and
was therefore not entered into the regression analysis. Reading accuracy as measured by
the NARA II was not controlled for as it is a consistent predictor of reading comprehension
and would therefore account for a large proportion of the variance, masking the effects of
the other variables. Scores on the TOWRE accounted for 5% of the variance when entered
on the step 1 to control for reading fluency, which was not significant. WIse vocabulary
raw scores significantly accounted for 33% of the variance in NARA II comprehension
performance when entered on step 2. Response times to causal target statements accounted
for only 2% of the variance when entered on step 3, which was not significant. However,
response times to static target statements accounted for 7% of the variance when entered on
step 3, which was significant (p<.05).
While the generation of elaborative inferences was predictive of comprehension
skill, a finding that is in disagreement with the predictions of this study, the results suggest
that the generation of causal inferences in the experimental passages did not predict reading
comprehension ability. However, while the response time measure used in the regression
analysis indicates how quickly a child responds to an inference statement, it gives no
information regarding the accuracy of the child's response. Arguably, the accuracy with
which a child responds to an inference statement may be a better predictor of reading
comprehension as it is a clearer indicator of how well the child has understood the passage.
In order to investigate this further, accuracy rates for causal test sentences was entered on
step 3 of the regression analysis. These accounted for 6% of the variance in NARA II
comprehension scores which approached significance (p = .07). Furthermore, none of the
variance was accounted for by accuracy rates to static test sentences when entered on step 3
(see Table 5.8).
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NARA II Comprehension Scores
Step Variable R2 change P
1 TOWRE 0.05 0.17
2 WISe Vocab 0.33 0.00
3 RT causal 0.02 0.27
3 RT static 0.07 0.04
3 Ace causal 0.06 0.07
3 Ace static 0.00 0.75
Table 5.8 Multiple regression with NARA II comprehension as the dependent variable and
TOWRE, WIse Vocabulary, target sentence response times and target sentence accuracy
as the predictor variables.
5.4.3 Discussion.
The present study asked whether children could set aside real-world knowledge in
order to draw causal and static inferences based on information that was inconsistent with
their experience of the world. Analysis of target sentence response times indicated that
causal inference target sentences were responded to faster overall than static sentences.
Moreover, this pattern of inference generation was consistent across both types of story
indicating that the nature of the story did not affect the children's ability to draw inferences
from the text. Furthermore, children were more accurate in responding to causal than static
test sentences. The results of this study indicate that children are faster at drawing causal
coherence inferences than elaborative inferences when reading. One interpretation of these
results is that the children drew causal inferences on-line during the reading of the passage,
while static inferences were not drawn until the test sentence was presented. This pattern is
consistent with other research on inference generation and the findings are further
supported by the fact that responses to causal target statements, were more accurate than to
static target statements irrespective of the empirical veracity of the inference. It should be
noted however, that this is not the only possible explanation for these results. For example,
it may be the case that the children found the information given in the static inference test
sentences less plausible than the information in the causal inference test sentences and
where therefore slower to respond to the static test sentences. Furthermore, while it is clear
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that causal inferences were responded to at a faster rate than static inferences, it cannot be
definitely concluded that these inferences were drawn on-line. Itmay simply be the case
that they too were drawn off-line but at a faster rate. However, as previously stated, the
results of this study are consistent with previous research positing an on-line/off-line
distinction between these two classes of inference. With this in mind, the tentative
conclusion that the results presented here mirror this on-line/off-line distinction between
the generation of causal and elaborative inferences does not seem unreasonable.
While responses to static target statements were less accurate overall than responses
to causal target statements, the children were more accurate in their responses to static
target statements when the content was empirically false than when the content was
empirically true. Because the only correct response to a target statement following an
experimental passage was TRUE, this finding suggests that children made more frequent
TRUE responses to empirically false static properties than to empirically true static
properties. One possible explanation for this finding could be that children were willing to
accept an empirically false static property as true because it referred to an object or
character in a passage that was also empirically false and therefore was consistent with the
overall fictional theme of the passage. In a similar vein, when presented with a static
property that they recognised as belonging to an empirically true object, character or event,
they had no problem responding correctly. However, in cases where the child was unaware
that the object, character or event in question possessed the static property expressed, they
responded to it as if it was an empirically false property. The finding that children are
willing to accept empirically false static properties as true when they are consistent with the
character or object to which they refer is in line with previous research investigating the
ability of children to engage in imaginary role play (see Harris 2000 for a discussion.) In
short, when children engage in role-play, they actively enter into the imaginary world of the
character they have chosen to portray and thus, view the world from that character's point
of view. In terms of the findings reported here, it would appear that the children in this
study were able to accept as true the empirically false static properties that were consistent
with the theme of the story because they were able to make the judgement from the
protagonist's point of view.
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Finally, the number of comprehension questions answered correctly following fairy
stories did not differ from the number of questions answered correctly following real world
stories. This finding indicates that the children in this study had no difficulty understanding
each story type. It could be argued that this was not a good measure of comprehension
since only one question followed each passage. However, the overall results suggest that
the children in this study were able to set aside their real world knowledge and draw
inferences based in a fairy tale context. The results are in contrast with the findings of
Franks (1996; 1997) and Evans and Perry (1995) outlined above.
The results of the initial multiple regression analysis indicated that response times to
static target sentences but not causal target sentences predicted reading comprehension
skill. This was an unexpected result and suggests that the ability to generate causal
inferences does not make a significant contribution to overall reading comprehension
ability. However, the ability to generate static inferences does seem to contribute to overall
reading comprehension skill. Further analyses were conducted using accuracy rates as
predictors of reading comprehension and the results suggested that reading comprehension
could not be predicted by inference generation when inference generation is measured in
terms of the accuracy with which a child responds to an inference statement. These results
appear to support the notion that the generation of causal inferences is not necessary for
constructing a representation of a text during reading. However, the results of the response
time analysis indicated that causal inferences were automatically drawn on-line during
reading while static inferences were made when prompted by the presentation of a test
sentence. Given the apparent automaticity of responding to causal test sentences, a possible
explanation for the findings of the multiple regression analyses might be that there was not
enough variance in the inference generation measure used here to predict variance in
reading comprehension performance.
A further possible limitation of this study is that the critical sentences preceding a
static target statement may in some cases have also contained a potential causal inference.
Therefore, the slower response times to static target statements may reflect the fact that a
causal inference had already been drawn on-line and the generation of the static inference
was therefore delayed by the holding of information relevant to the causal inference in
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working memory. For example, in one story, the critical sentences "The men struggled to
keep control of the wheel. They used all their strength to fight the wind and rain" were
followed by the static test sentence "The men were soaking wet", a plausible elaboration
regarding the physical state of the men given the conditions described by the sentences.
However, it also possible to draw the causal inference from these sentences that the wind
and rain were causing the men to struggle with control of the wheel. In the next chapter,
study 4, the materials were more constrained to ensure that a causal inference could not be
drawn in the critical sentences preceding a static target statement.
A further criticism that could be directed at the study lies in the nature of the
materials. In this study, stories that were used to represent counterfactual information were
written as fairy tales. However, the information may not have been counterfactual in the
sense that it was true in the context of the story. Moreover, while the premise information
presented in the fairy tale passages was clearly incongruent with our knowledge of the
world, the inferences themselves may not have been in conflict with real world knowledge.
Similarly, while the content of the fairy tales was counterintuitive, it may not have been
unexpected since most children have experience of fairy tales throughout their formative
years. Thus, when presented with a fairy tale the children may have recognised the story as
such and changed their perspective accordingly when reading to incorporate the shift in
genre, thus accepting the counterintuitive information presented in the fairy tales as true. A
more rigorous approach may have been to use stories that were based in a real world
context but with contrary to fact information embedded in the critical sentences.
Nevertheless, there is some evidence to suggest that the content of the fairy stories did have
an effect such that the response times to Real Causal test sentences were significantly faster
than to Fairy Causal test sentences.
While the pattern of inference generation seen in this study is consistent with that
found in many previous studies the present experiment only looked at two inference types.
The effect of counterfactual information may be different for inferences about the
emotional, motivational or instrumental aspects of a passage for example. Furthermore, the
inferences were designed to maintain local coherence. However, research has shown that
global coherence is also important in building a coherent representation of a text (e.g. Long,
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Oppy, & Seely, 1997). If a story is full of contradictions to real world knowledge, it may
be more difficult to keep track of the global perspective than if the story is consistent with
our experience and expectations.
To summarise, the results of this study suggest that the children in this study drew
causal inferences on-line even when the information required to make those inferences was
contrary to empirical knowledge, although inconsistent information did impede this
process. Furthermore, there was no difference in the time-course of the generation of static
inferences from inconsistent premises and that from consistent premises. Thus, it appears
that the children in this study were able to overcome the belief bias and draw conclusions
based on false premises in a narrative context.
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Chapter 6
The Development of Children's On-Line Inference Generation during Reading.
6.1 The Development of Inferential Skills
Thus far this thesis has aimed to establish a pattern of on-line inference generation
during reading in children with normal reading skills. Experiments 2 and 3 demonstrated
that children made causal inferences on-line and elaborative inferences at a later point in
reading. Moreover, experiment 3 indicated that children were able to suspend disbelief
when reading in order to generate inferences from information that is inconsistent with real
world knowledge. However, while this pattern of inference generation was consistent
across studies, the conclusions are limited to children of approximately 9 to 10 years of age.
In order to fully address the question of whether children with comprehension difficulties
have difficulties with inference generation, this chapter investigates the developmental
pattern of inference generation in children and how this is related to reading skill.
Research investigating developmental differences in inference generation has shown
that the ability to generate inferences from text increases with age. Johnson and Smith
(1981) looked at inference generation in third-grade and fifth-grade children. Using a
between-subjects design, they tested children under 3 conditions; an implicit story
condition, an explicit story condition and a sentence condition. In the implicit story
condition, the children were presented with sets of premises embedded in a simple story.
Having read the passage, the children were asked questions about information that was
implied by the premises. They were also asked a number of questions based on information
that was explicitly stated in the premises. The explicit story condition was similar to the
implicit condition except that the inference only implied in this condition was made explicit
by including it in the text. Finally, in the sentence condition, the children were presented
with each set of premises and the corresponding inference question outside of the context of
the passage.
In the implicit story condition, third-grade children answered 46% of inference
questions correctly, and fifth-grade children 60%, suggesting that children in the younger
reading group made fewer inferences than the older children. In the explicit story condition
third-grade children answered 53% of inference questions correctly whereas 5th graders
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were 76% correct. Performance was best for both groups of children in the sentence
condition; third-grade 75% correct, fifth-grade 88% correct, indicating that the younger
children were able to integrate the implied information successfully in this condition.
Taken together these findings suggest that even when the information was explicit in the
text, the younger children had difficulty integrating it into their story representation. The
poor performance of the younger children in the implicit story condition cannot, therefore
be attributed solely to an inability to generate inferences. Given that in both story
conditions the children had to read the entire passage before being presented with a list of
questions it may be that the younger children performed poorly because of the memory
requirements of the task. In the sentence condition, this memory load was alleviated as the
inference question was asked directly after each set of premises.
Casteel and Simpson (1991) conducted a study with second-, fifth- and eighth-grade
children, and a group of undergraduate students. Each participant was given 8 stories to
read, sentence by sentence, using a self-paced reading paradigm. Each story contained 2
forward (elaborative) inference sentences and 2 backward (coherence) inference sentences
with corresponding inducing sentences. The forward inference sentences were designed to
represent an action or event that could be encoded into a mental representation without
knowing its consequence. For example, in the following passage taken from Casteel and
Simpson (1991), the sentence in italics represents a forward inference:
"One weekend Pam went roller-skating with her friends. She tried to roller skate
for the first time. After skating, the girls had a slumber party at Pam's."
There are many potential consequences that could be generated from the forward
inference sentence given above. However, the generation of a consequence is not
necessary for the sentence to fit into a mental representation of the passage.
The backward inference and corresponding inducing sentence pairs represented a
sequence of events that required a bridging inference to be made in order to maintain
coherence. For example:
"Pam's father told the girls a ghost story. All of her friends screamed."
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This sentence pair would require the inference that the ghost story scared the girls in
order to maintain coherence.
After each story was presented, a series of questions were presented on the screen.
These were designed to tap the different inferences embedded in the passage. For example,
the question "Did Pam fall down a lot when roller-skating?" would assess the generation of
the forward inference, and "Did the ghost story scare Pam's friends?" would assess the
generation of the backward inference required by the sentence pair given above. Responses
and reaction times to each question were recorded.
Second-grade children performed significantly better than chance but significantly
less accurately than children in all other grade levels. The results suggest that they were
less likely to draw inferences than any of the other age groups although they were able to
generate inferences to some extent. No other age differences were significant. Analysis of
the response time data shows that 8th grade children responded faster than 5th grade children
who in tum responded faster than 3rd grade children. However, there was no significant
difference in response time between the 8th grade children and the undergraduate students.
Finally, responses were faster and more accurate to backward than to forward inferences
indicating that backward, or coherence inferences were drawn prior to forward, or
elaborative inferences. These results were replicated in a later study (Casteel, 1993) and
suggest that children as young as 7-years of age generate inferences that are necessary for
textual coherence. Furthermore, the pattern of inference generation found in these studies
mirrors that of the pattern consistently found in the present thesis.
The studies described above looked at children aged 7-years and over. However,
Thompson and Myers (1985) carried out a study looking at inference generation and recall
in children aged 4- and 7-years, thus comparing pre-school children with children who have
some school experience. The children were given three stories to read. The stories varied
in terms of the manner in which the target events in the story were connected. In one story.
the target events occurred as a result of a physical cause, in a second story, the events were
psychologically connected Le. the emotional state of a character caused a target event, and
in the third story, termed the enablement version, the events which preceded the target
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event were necessary but not sufficient to have caused that event. Each story had eight
corresponding questions. Two questions required the children to make a causal coherence
inference and were termed 'logical inference' questions, and two questions required the
application of real world knowledge to the text in order to interpret propositions and events
in the story. These questions were termed 'constrained informational inference' questions.
It is important at this point to distinguish between these questions and the logical inference
questions described above. To illustrate, the example below is a 'physical cause' story used
by Thompson and Myers (1985) followed by the corresponding 'logical cause' and
'constrained informational inference' questions:
One day Jennifer's parents gave her a dollar because she wanted to buy a turtle. But
as she was walking to the pet store, she turned a somersault (physical cause) and
lost it. Jennifer was worried that her parents would be angry with her, so she
decided to search every bit of the sidewalk. For 10 long minutes she looked in all
the cracks and grass. Finally, she found the dollar. When she got back to the store
she was told that the last turtle had been sold just 1 minute ago.
What made Jennifer lose her dollar? (logical cause)
Why would Jennifer's parents be angry with her? (logical cause)
How old do you think Jennifer is? (constrained)
Did Jennifer have a dollar bill or a dollar in change? (constrained)
The example above shows that while the 'constrained informational inference'
questions were based on information that could be easily inferred from the text, the number
of possible alternative answers to these questions was greater than to the 'logical cause'
questions. Thus, while both inference types could be said to aid textual coherence, it could
also be argued that the restraints placed on responses to logical inference questions would
create a more succinct interpretation of the story.
Two further questions were asked regarding information that could have been
elaborated from the story but were not necessary for comprehension. Finally, two
questions were asked which required recall of information that was explicit in the text. The
children were asked to retell each story when they had finished reading and the questions
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were either asked at appropriate points during the story, or following the child's retelling of
it.
Seven-year old children made more correct responses to inference questions than 4-
year olds in the psychological cause and enablement stories, but not in the physical cause
stories. These results indicate that children as young as 4-years old are able to generate
inferences when they are related to a physical cause. However, inferences based on
abstract or incomplete information are not easily drawn by this age group, although the
overall performance of the younger children was still better than chance on logical
questions, suggesting some ability to generate causal inferences. Moreover, the 4-year old
children responded most often to the unconstrained inference questions indicating a high
degree of unnecessary elaboration. Conversely, the 7-year olds responded least often to
these questions. Thus the 7-year old children appeared to have developed a more efficient
inference generation strategy, concentrating on those inferences that were necessary for
coherence. While the point at which this strategy shift takes place is not clear, it is possible
that it is related to the formal reading instruction the older group has received through their
school experience. Unsurprisingly, the older children's retelling of the stories suggested a
greater degree of comprehension than the younger children, their accounts being more
complete, accurate and well-structured. However, recall performance of both age groups
was greatest for stories that contained physically connected events, indicating the 7-year old
children were still not fully competent in generating inferences from emotional or
insufficient information. These results suggest that, while overall inference generation
skills begin to develop at a relatively young age, the rate at which the ability to generate of
specific inference types varies with age.
Taken together these studies suggest that while young children are not as able as
their older peers to generate inferences from text, they still engage in some degree of
inference generation during reading. Furthermore, the limited degree of inference
generation observed in younger children is not necessarily due to an absence of inferential
skill, rather other factors such as memory capacity, processing speed and general
knowledge could playa role. Moreover, the results of Thompson and Myers (1985)
suggest that strategies for inference generation become more efficient with age, with older
children becoming less likely to draw unnecessary inferences than younger children.
131
Clearly, the studies discussed here focus on the changes in inferential processing as a
function of chronological age. Similarly, the present study was initially intended to focus
on age-related differences in performance on the experimental task used in study 3 and as
such the experimental task was given to three groups of children in each of years 3, 4 and 5.
Nevertheless, analysis of the results revealed a pattern of performance that was unreliable.
As might be expected based on the literature outlined above, children in Year 4 performed
better on the experimental task than children in Year 3, thus reflecting an improvement in
performance with an increase in chronological age. However, the performance of children
in Year 5 was below that of children in Year 4, suggesting a developmental pattern that was
not in line with previous research. Moreover, the children in Year 5 performed poorly on
the individual measures of reading and comprehension relative to the children in Years 3
and 4. On reflection it was felt that this discrepancy in performance might be due to a
difference in teaching strategy at the school from which the children were selected rather
than differences in ability between the children in Years 3 and 4, and the children in Year 5.
For example, the introduction of the literacy hour and the initiatives ofa new Headteacher
may have changed the teaching environment and this change was of primary benefit to the
younger children coming up through the school. Thus, the reading and language skills of
children in Year 5 may have confounded their performance on the experimental task,
resulting in an overall developmental pattern that may not have reflected reliable age-
related differences but rather differences in educational experience. With this in mind, it
was felt that analysis of performance on the experimental task in terms of chronological age
resulted in an unreliable picture of the development of inference generation. The aim of the
study was therefore revised to investigate the influence of reading ability on inference
generation. Given that children of the same chronological age may show large variations in
their reading ability, the influence of reading skill on inference generation is clearly of
interest. However, the literature tends to focus on age-related differences and the impact of
reading ability on inference generation has not been investigated to the same degree.
Moreover, since comprehension processes in reading are often constrained by decoding
skill, it was decided in the present study to investigate the performance of skilled and less-
skilled readers on the inference generation task used in experiment 3.
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Aim of the present study
The aim of the current study was to assess whether the pattern of inference
generation found in experiments 2 and 3 of this thesis varied as a function of reading age.
Experiment 3 demonstrated that children aged 9-10 years of age were able to overcome
their belief bias in order to generate inferences based on empirically false information.
However, investigations into the belief bias effect in deductive reasoning have shown that
this effect is subject to developmental change (e.g. Evans and Perry, 1995) Therefore, this
study also aimed to investigate developmental differences in the belief bias effect on
inference generation during reading.
6.2 Experiment 4
6.2.1 Method.
a) Participants: All the children in years 3, 4 and 5 of two York primary schools
were given the Suffolk Reading Scale (SRS; Level2, Form A; Hagley, 1986). Children
who achieved a standard score of above 95 (a raw score over 40) were selected to take part
in the study. Following selection the children were given the Neale Analysis of Reading
Ability 1I (Neale, 1989). They were then assigned to two groups on the basis of their NARA
II accuracy reading age. Children with a reading age between 7 years and 9 years 11
months were assigned to the Less-Skilled group. Children with a reading age between 10
years and 12 years 11 months were assigned to the Skilled group. In addition to this,
children with a NARA II Comprehension standard score below 95 were excluded from the
sample.
The children in each Reading Group were randomly assigned to one of two
experimental groups: Group 1 received List A and group 2 received List B. However, the
factor List did not reach significance in any of the initial analyses conducted and the data
reported here is therefore collapsed across List. Table 6.1 shows the mean age, SRS
standard score, NARA II accuracy age and NARA II comprehension standard score for
each experimental group. As previously stated, the aim of this experiment was to
investigate the effect of reading age on the ability to draw inferences during reading and as
such the children were assigned to the Skilled and Less-skilled reading groups on the basis
of their NARA II accuracy age. A series oft-tests revealed that the two groups differed
significantly in NARA II accuracy age (t(36) = -14.22, p<.OO1), NARA II comprehension
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standard score (t(36) = -2.72, p<.OI), Suffolk standard score (t(36) = -2.16, p<.05) and
chronological age (t(36) = -2.69, p<.05).
Measure Less-Skilled Readers Skilled Readers
(N = 19) (N = 19)
Chronological Age (mths) 97.21 (10.93) 106.24 (9.75)
NARA II Accuracy age (mths) 100.83 (7.16) 143.77 (11.04)
NARA II Comprehension age (mths) 104.42 (6.03) 110.53 (7.72)
Suffolk Standard Score 107.32 (5.20) 111.79 (7.36)
Table 6.1 Mean standard Suffolk Reading Scale (SRS) score, chronological age (months),
NARA II reading accuracy age (months) and NARA II comprehension standard score for
each Reading Group (standard deviations in parentheses).
b) Design: This study was a replication of the study 3 but with the introduction of
the factor Reading Group. A mixed factorial design with the between subjects factor
Reading Group (Less-Skilled and Skilled) and the within-subjects factors Passage Type
(Real and Fairy) and Test Sentence (Causal Link and Static Property) was used. As in
study 3, each child read each passage and responded to two sentence judgement trials for
each. Thus each child completed eight trials in each of four conditions; Real Causal Link,
Real Static Property, Fairy Causal Link and Fairy Static Property. The trials were
presented in a random order. Each child was also administered a number of standardised
tests to assess individual differences in reading, comprehension and reasoning skills.
c) Materials: The materials used in experiment 3 were used in the present study
with some modifications. First, the experimental passages were adjusted to overcome the
confound noted in the discussion of chapter 5 that, in some cases, the critical sentences
preceding the static property test sentences required a causal link. To this end, the
materials were altered so that, in all cases where a static test sentence was presented, the
critical sentences preceding it did not require a causal link. Examples of these modified
passages and the corresponding questions are given in Table 6.2. In making these changes,
the number of syllables in the critical sentences had to be altered, although the same
matching criteria was applied as in the original study. Table 6.3 shows the mean number of
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syllables in the critical sentences and test sentences of all the passages in both lists together
with the book grading levels and equivalent WORD reading ages for the modified passages.
There was no difference between Real and Fairy passages in the number of syllables in
critical sentences (t(10) = -0.2, ns) or in the test sentences (t(lO) = -1.74, ns). An ANOVA
was run on the modified book grades using the within subjects factor List (list 2 or list 2)
and the between subjects factor Story Type (Real or Fairy). There was no main effect of
either List or Story Type and no interaction.
Second, an additional comprehension question was written for each experimental
and filler passage. A full list of the passages, test sentences and comprehension questions
can be found in Appendix IV.
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32 adult raters were presented with a multiple choice otT-line version of the task
in order to validate the inferences generated from the stories. Raters were presented
with a booklet containing each of the stories in one list. The stories were presented in
two sections as in the experimental task. However, after each section, raters were asked
a question which tapped the inference concept generated by the critical sentences.
Raters were given three possible answers to choose from; the inference used in the
experimental task, a second plausible inference and a third implausible inference, and
they had to indicate on the booklet which answer they had selected. The order in which
the sentences were presented was randomised across stories. Participants were given 12
stories, each containing 2 questions, thus answering a total of 24 questions. It was
predicted that raters would select the answer corresponding to the test sentence
presented in the on-line version of the task. An example of one of the stories used in
this task is shown in Table 6.4 and a full list of materials can be found in Appendix V.
Section A John looked behind the wagon and saw the Red Indians approaching.
He called for his father. Henry grabbed his rifle and pulled himself up
to the front of the wagon. As the Red Indians rode closer, John could
see they were carrying weapons. He raised his own weapon and aimed
it at the enemy. But Henry held up his hand. John took his finger otT
the trigger and carefully lowered his gun.
Question What did Henry want John to do?
a Henry wanted John to fire his gun.
b Henry wanted John to wait.
c Henry wanted John to read a book.
Section B The Indians were so close that John could see their brightly coloured
faces. John's hand was firmly on his rifle as he waited in the wagon.
Then Henry gave the signal and John and Henry opened fire. The battle
lasted only a few minutes but seemed a lot longer. Finally, the Indians
had weakened. They turned and disappeared into the mountain range.
What did the Indians ride?Question
a The Indians rode camels.
The Indians rode horses.
The Indians rode bicycles.
b
c
Table 6.4 Example of story and questions given to raters in the otT-line validation task.
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16 raters were given the stories presented in List 1 and 16 were given List 2.
The modal response across raters was recorded for each story. For participants given
List 1, the modal answer selected for 22 out of the 24 items corresponded to the test
sentence presented in the on-line version of the task. For list 2, the answer
corresponding to the on-line inference was selected as the modal response for 21 out of
the 24 items. The 5 items for which the modal response did not correspond to the on-
line inference sentence were all examples of static inferences and one of these items
was the same in both list 1 and list 2. Due to the fact that only 5 of the 48 items were
identified as problematic, the materials were not adjusted. However, in the final
analysis close attention was paid to these items.
Reading Skills
To assess reading skills, the children were given the Neale Analysis of Reading
Ability (NARA II; Form 1; Neale, 1989), and the Test of Word Reading Efficiency
(TOWRE; Torgeson, Wagner & Rashotte, 1992).
General Cognitive Ability
The WISC Vocabulary sub-test (Third Edition UK; WISC III; Wechsler, 1992)
and the Verbal Reasoning sub-test of the Cognitive Abilities Test (Thorndike, Hagen, &
France, 1986) were administered to assess general cognitive ability.
The CAT verbal reasoning test is administered as a group test. The children are
asked to solve a number of verbal analogies within an 8-minute time period. The
children are given a booklet of problems and an answer sheet on which to record their
responses. Each problem is presented in the following way. A pair of words is
presented which are related in some way. Next to this pair of words is a third word.
The child's task is to choose one word from a list of 5 possible alternatives which
relates to the third word in the same way as the second word relates to the first. For
example, in the problem shown below, the words big and large are related because they
mean the same thing. Therefore, in order to solve the problem the child should choose
the word 'small' from the list of alternatives because it relates to 'little' in the same way
as big relates to large i.e. it means the same thing.
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d) Procedure: The children were seen over a course of2 x 30 minute individual
sessions and 1 group session lasting 15 minutes. In sessions 1 and 2 they were given
the experimental task. The procedure for this task was the same as in study 3. The
NARA II, TOWRE and WISC vocabulary sub-test were also given in these sessions. In
the group session, the children were administered the CAT verbal reasoning subtest.
6.2.2 Results
Response times and error rates to test sentenees'. Initial analysis of response
time data indicated no significant effect of List on the response times of participants.
Further analyses of response times therefore used data that was collapsed across lists.
Subject's responses were divided into the four experimental conditions and the data was
examined for outliers. Outliers were defined as any response time 2.5 standard
deviations away from the mean response time of each subject in each condition and
were replaced with the subject mean response time for that condition. 1.21% of
response times were adjusted in this way. Only items to which responses were correct
were included in the response time analysis.
The mean response times for correctly judged sentences and the number of
correct responses overall are shown in Table 6.5. A 2x2x2 repeated measures ANOV A
was conducted on the response times to items answered correctly with the between
subjects factor Reading Group (Less-Skilled and Skilled), and the within-subject factors
Passage Type (Fairy, Real) and Inference Type (Causal, Static). There was a significant
main effect of Reading Group (F.(l,30) = 4.60, p<.05; F2{1,1O) = 5.24, P <.05) such that
the Less-Skilled group response times were significantly slower than the Skilled group.
There was a main effect of Passage Type by subjects (F. (1,30) = 8.97, p<.O I) such that
response times to Real stories were faster than response times to Fairy stories. This
effect was not significant by items (F2{1,10) = 2.71, ns). There was a main effect of
Inference Type (F.(1,30) = 16.97, p<.OOl; F2(l,10) = 12.49, p<.OI) such that response
times to Causal inferences were faster than response times to Static inferences. No
IResponse times and error rates analysed excluding the 5 items previously identified as unreliable
revealed the same pattern of results. These items were therefore included in the final analysis.
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other main effects or interactions were significant. These results are shown in figure
6.1.
2000
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o
Real Causal Fairy Causal Real Static Fairy Static
Condition
Figure 6.1: Mean response time of each experimental group in each test sentence
condition
A repeated measures ANOV A was conducted on the number of correct
responses given to target sentences. Results revealed a main effect of Passage Type in
the by-subjects analysis (F)(1,36) = 9.77, p<.01) such that more correct responses were
given to Fairy than to Real stories. No such effect was found in the by-items analysis
(F2(1,10) = 0.92,ns). The main effect ofInference Type was also significant by
subjects (F )(1,36) = 72.00,p<.OOl) such that more correct responses were given to
Causal test sentences than to Static test sentences. This effect was not significant by
items (F2(1,l0) = 1.71, ns). There was a main effect of Reading Group by items
(F2(1,10) = 46.28, p<.OOI) but not by subjects (F)(1,36) = 0.53, ns) such that overall the
Skilled group were more accurate across items than the Less-Skilled group. No other
main effects or interactions were significant. These results are shown in figure 6.2.
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Figure 6.2: Mean number of correct responses of each experimental group in each
condition
142
,,-..
1.0 ,,-.. -u ~ ('f") 00 I'''::: 0 "1 1.0 ~$ 8 ~ -- -til '-" ('f") '-" ('f") '-"til~..... ..__,
til
... Cl.~ .9 - ='a til ta 1.0 - - ~0 .~ ~ ~ Ir'I ('f") - 00Cl. S 0'\ ~ <""! ~ ~til ~ -.:f - - Ol)~ ~ u ..__, Ir'I '-" ~
t)
Ol)
~ ~I:: ,,-..1.0 ~
0 u ,,-.. - ~u ''':::
~
- 00 0 ...('f") 1.0 ~... $ - ~ ..r:::li C"i - N ~til til '-" -- N ..__,~ ~·c ...
Z .9 ,,-.. c£ta \0a til - - tilta ~ ~ ~ 0 0'\ 00 ~0'\ - til~ ~ 00 0 r--- c~ U -.:f -.:f - ~..__, -- ..__, e-- ,,-.. u00 Ir'I 0'\ 00 ~\0 -.::t00 N N -.:f 0u 0\'''::: 1.0 N e- o t<'\
$ Ir'I 0 N N c-
~
00 N - - 0 -til Ir'I -- Ir'I '-" ...til i~til ·c -~ .9 N -.S r--- 0 ~ ('f") Ctil 1 ~ 0\ N Ir'I~ 0 ('f") -.::t 0\ - ~~ 'a - - r--- ('f")til 0 - r--- r---c ~ U Ir'I -- ('f") -- til8- ~·Btil
~ - - ar--- Na Ir'I "1 00 r---<""! N 0\ ~~ u ('f") cO::g '+=2 Ir'I \0 ('f")$ - Ir'I 1.0 00 e0'\ - Ir'I -til -.::t -- -.::t '-" ~til ~~
~ -·c -- til.9 0'\ - \0 ~0 r--- ~til ta "1 0'\ 00 ..0 ~
ta ~
('f") 0 0 N 1;; ~0'\ \0 r--- 0 ~
~ u ~ 0\ \0 - ~-- ('f") -- ~~ Cl.
"t:I ~ .5
~ '" r:l:;;; "t:I le) 0til '.o:;l
I ~ ~ ~til - 'f>oC>til :g~ ~ ~....l til
The results suggest that Causal sentences were responded to faster and more
accurately than Static sentences; that Skilled children responded faster and more accurately
than Less-Skilled children; and that Real story test sentences tended to be responded to
faster but less accurately by the children than Fairy story test sentences. Given that not all
effects were significant by subjects and by items it was decided to look at the relationship
between speed and accuracy in order to rule out trade-off effects. Accordingly, correlations
between the speed and accuracy of responding to the Causal and Static test sentences for
each Reading Group were calculated. The results show a significant positive correlation
between speed and accuracy of responding to static test sentences in the Less-Skilled group
(r = 0.49, p<.05). This indicates that, for children with a lower reading age, taking time to
respond to static test sentences resulted in a higher number of correct responses, suggesting
that these responses are not made automatically, but require strategic processing. No other
correlations were significant. However, although marginal, for Skilled readers there is a
trend for faster response times to causal test sentences to be associated with higher accuracy
scores indicating that there is no speed/accuracy trade-off (r = -0.44, P = 0.63). Figures 6.3
and 6.4 illustrate these results.
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Figure 6.3 The relationship between speed and accuracy of responding to Causal and Static
test sentences for the Skilled group.
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Figure 6.4 The relationship between speed and accuracy of responding to Causal and Static
test sentences for the Less-Skilled group.
b) Performance on experimental comprehension questions: Children's scores on
the comprehension questions asked after each passage for the three Passage Types (Real
and Fairy) are shown in Table 6.6. A repeated measures ANOVA was used with the
within-subjects factor of Passage Type and the between-subjects factor of Reading Age
Group (Less-Skilled and Skilled). There was no effect of Reading Group indicating that
both Less-Skilled and Skilled children performed equally well on the comprehension
questions (F(1,36) = 1.79, ns). The main effect of Passage Type was not significant
(F(1,36) = 2.50, ns) and there was no interaction between Reading Group and Passage Type
(F(l,36) = 2.50, ns).
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Real Story Fairy Story
(max 12) (max 12)
Less-Skilled 8.53 (1.95) 7.58 (2.36)
Skilled 8.89 (2.31) 8.89 (1.94)
Table 6.6 Mean performance on experimental comprehension questions for each
Reading Group (standard deviations in parentheses).
c) Individual differences in children's on-line text processing: The mean
standard scores obtained on each of the standardised measures completed by participants
are shown in Table 6.7. Significant differences were revealed between groups for NARA II
accuracy standard score (F(I,36) = 56.78, p<.OOI), NARA II Comprehension standard
score (F(I,36) = 7.38, p <.05); TOWRE Sight Word Reading (F(I,36) = 6.42, p<.05);
TOWRE Phonemic Decoding (F(I,36) = 12.91, p<.OI) and Chronological Age (F(I,36) =
7.22, p <.05). The two groups did not differ in performance on the CAT test of verbal
reasoning (F(l, 31) = 1.29, ns) and WISC vocabulary task (F(l,36) = .002, ns).
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Measure Less-Skilled
(N =19)
Chronological Age 97.21 (10.93)
(mths)
NARA II Accuracy 102.11 (4.98)
a
NARAII 104.42 (6.03)
Comprehension a
WISC Vocabulary 8.95 (3.03)
b
TOWRE Sight 60.47 (6.39
Wordc
TOWRE Phonemic 28.84 (7.16)
Decoding C
CAT Verbal 9.94 (2.54)
Reasoning C
Group
Range Skilled Range
(N = 19)
86.04 - 125.04 106.24 (9.75) 90-
118.92
92 - 111 117.78 (7.63) 101 - 129
95 - 115 110.53 (7.72) 96-122
3 - 15 8.90 (3.23) 1 - 13
47 -73 70.58(5.15) 62-81
IS - 44 41.S4 (7.14) 28 - 58
5 - 14 11.25 (3.S5) 4 - 18
Table 6. 7 Standard scores of each Reading Group on the standardised assessment measures
(standard deviations is parentheses; a = standard score; b = scaled standard score; c = raw
score (CAT Verbal Reasoning N = 17 for each group).
Correlations between the raw scores obtained on the standardised measures of
assessment, response times to test sentences, error rates and performance on the
experimental comprehension questions are shown in Table 6.S. As in section 5.6e, a
TOWRE composite raw score was entered into the correlation. Consideration of the data in
Table 6.8 will concentrate specifically on the relationships between test sentence response
times and accuracy levels with the standardised measures of assessment.
147
4)-s
d ~
0 -4) 0
~
V·
0.
e **
~
~
11"\
0
5 8- V·r:n "'I:J 0.
I:: 11"\ 1.0 ~ *N 0 - 1.0 II') l' II') 00 0 0 - - 0 0 0 - N Cl) ...:U I 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ tS
0 "'I:J
~ 4)
~
--* d ~U * 0.-N * ~ Cl)I:: 00 l' 00 N - r-- ~ d 00 N ()0 0 0 0 - M II') 0 0 ~ .sU 0 0 0 0 0 0 c:::::) Cl)I I ~ ....4)0.
~8rg * 0 d* * () .sr:n II') ~ 1.0 M 00 * ]M N - - - 0 M 0. ~ ~
~ 0 0 0 0
0 II') ~ .....
0 0 0 c:::::) c:::::) d Cl)I I I I I
~
4)
~ * * *
.t: ~
* * * * * * ~ '5* * * * *u ~ l' II') M 1.0 '0 * 0. ~ >~ 4)E-c II') ~ '0 "1 ~ -.:t ..... ~
~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 c:::::) c:::::) c:::::) >: 4)I I I I I I I I
~
-s
d 00
* () 4) VU * * ai ! -* - * * ..... *r:n - - ~ N 0 ~ 00 0. ~ 4)
~
'0 0 M - ~ c:::::) ..... ~ ~ a ~0 I 0 0 0 I ~ c:::::) c:::::)
~
-..
]
~ 0
~
00 0 '0 1.0 -. ~ ~ ~ ~ iii' ~N N - - ~ ..... ~ ..... 4) .-u 0 0 0 0 ~ c:::::) c:::::) c:::::) c:::::) .§ "'I:JI I - ~I0-- e- * * * §
~ ~
* * * * ~* * * 00 -.~ ~ M ~ ~ ~ ~ d
....~ ~ tU0 ~ 00 f"t c:::::) ~ ~ ~ 4)Z u 0 0 0 c:::::) ~ c:::::) c:::::) ! -I I ~- ..8 8- * * * * -a
~
* * * * se* * * f't') 0. ~ 'i() M - ~ ~ ~ f't') f't') 00 0() '0 r- -. -. ~ ',Q
Z < 0 0 c:::::) c:::::) ~ c:::::) ~ ~ c:::::) t':S 0.I I I -~ ]
* * * 8 Cl)
~
* * * * t) ~* * * t-.. ~- ~ ~ ~ ~ f't') -. f't') ~ "2 ~~ '0 '1'\ c:::::) ~ ..... ~
~
d c:::::) c:::::) c:::::) c:::::) I I c:::::) c:::::) 8
~ - - ~ !9 N ] -
~
- - ~ 00 8
~ ~
!9 :.ar::
~
U U fIl 'CS i] 8 ~ fIl U fIl t= 6 ~ ~0 0 ~ ~ ~ 0 ~ *U E-c < U U U U ~ **
The zero-order correlations revealed that response times to causal test sentences
were significantly related to both NARA II reading accuracy and comprehension,
chronological age, WISC vocabulary and performance on the TOWRE. In contrast,
response times to static test sentences were only significantly related to chronological age.
The number of correct responses made to static test sentences did not correlate with any of
the measures of interest, while the number of correct responses to causal test sentences
correlated with performance on the WISC vocabulary task, indicating that responding
accurately to these sentences required a good level of vocabulary.
Given the strong relationship between chronological age and all of the standardised
measures, a partial correlation was performed to ascertain whether the relationships
between causal test sentence RT and NARA II accuracy, NARA II comprehension and
TOWRE performance were mediated by age. Due to the fact that Less-Skilled children
have already been shown to be slower in responding than Skilled children, it was felt that
controlling for age also controlled for differences in processing speed. Therefore,
performance on the TOWRE was not partialled out on this occasion. When age was
controlled, the correlations between response times to causal test sentences and NARA II
accuracy, NARA II comprehension and TOWRE remained significant. Response times to
static test sentences failed to correlate significantly with any of the measures of interest.
Response accuracy for causal test sentences continued to correlate with WISC vocabulary.
Multiple regression analyses were conducted to examine the relationship between
response times to causal and static test sentences, with NARA II reading comprehension as
the dependent variable. Chronological age was entered on the first step to control for age-
related differences in reading comprehension. WISC vocabulary was entered on step 2 to
control for the influence of vocabulary knowledge on reading comprehension. The
predictor variables of interest in these analyses were response time to causal and static test
sentences, and accuracy of responding to causal and static test sentences. These four
variables were entered individually on step 3 in four separate analyses. The results can be
seen in Table 6.9
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NARA II Reading Comprehension
Step Variable R2 Change P
1 Age 0.19 0.01
2 WISC Vocabulary 0.04 0.19
3 RT Causal 0.10 0.03
3 RT Static 0.00 0.91
3 Causal Accuracy 0.00 0.74
3 Static Accuracy 0.06 0.11
Table 6.9 Multiple regression analyses with NARA II comprehension as the dependent
variable and Chronological Age, WISC vocabulary, RT Causal, RT Static, Causal
Accuracy and Static Accuracy as the predictor variables.
When entered on step I, Chronological Age accounted for 19% of the variance in
NARA II comprehension performance (p<.01). WISC vocabulary accounted for 4 % of the
variance when entered on step 2, which was not significant. When entered on step 3,
response time to causal test sentences accounted for a significant 10% of the variance in
performance on the NARA II comprehension measure. Response times to static test
sentences, accuracy in responding to causal test sentences and accuracy in responding to
static test sentences all failed to account for a significant proportion of the variance in
comprehension performance when entered on step 3.
6.2.3 Discussion
The overall results of the response time and accuracy analysis replicate the findings
of experiment 3 in that Causal test sentences were responded to faster and more accurately
than Static test sentences. Moreover, this pattern was observed for both passage types.
Fairy Causal test sentences were responded to faster and more accurately than Fairy Static
test sentences. Real Causal test sentences were responded to faster and more accurately
than Real Static test sentences. Furthermore, the finding that for the Skilled group's
responses to causal test sentences, a greater degree of accuracy was associated with faster
response times adds further support to the assumption that these inferences are made on-
line automatically during reading in children with well-developed reading skills. As in
ISO
studies 2 and 3, this interpretation of the results is not unequivocal. However, as in study 2,
given the congruence of these results with previous research into the time-course of
inference generation, the conclusion that in the present study, causal coherence inferences
were drawn on-line is a plausible one. Finally, in line with the findings of experiment 3,
responses were faster overall to Real test sentences than to Fairy test sentences indicating
that the belief bias effect found in deductive reasoning is present when generating
inferences from text, even when those inferences are necessary for comprehension.
A developmental pattern was observed such that children in the Skilled group
responded faster and more accurately overall than children in the Less-Skilled group. This
suggests that children with less well developed reading skills are less efficient at drawing
both causal and static inferences during reading than children with good reading ability.
However, children in the Less-Skilled group demonstrated the same pattern of inference
generation as children in the Skilled group such that responses were faster to Real and Fairy
Causal test sentences than to their Static counterparts. Thus, children as young as 7-years
old find it easier to draw causal inferences than elaborative inferences when reading.
However, the difference in response time to Static test sentences in the Real and Fairy story
conditions was larger for the Less-Skilled than the Skilled reading age group (Less-Skilled
941.63 msecs, Skilled 561.01 msecs), indicating a greater degree of difficulty in responding
to Static test sentences for the Less-Skilled group. Furthermore, there was a trend in the
data such that the difference in response time to Real Causal test sentences and Fairy
Causal test sentences was greater for the Less-Skilled group than the Skilled group (Less-
Skilled 519.48 msecs, Skilled 108.38msec). Although not significant, these results suggest
that the presentation of counterintuitive information had a greater effect on the Less-Skilled
group, suggesting that when generating causal links, the Skilled group were more efficient
at suspending disbelief and were able to respond with equal speed to Real and Fairy Causal
test sentences. In contrast, responses of the Less-Skilled children were somewhat inhibited
by the Fairy Causal test sentences. Response times of this group for Fairy Causal test
sentences were slower than for Real Static test sentences, indicating that the Less-Skilled
children did not draw causal inferences on-line when reading Fairy stories, but instead were
generating the inferences when presented with the sentence judgement task.
tSt
Taken together the results so far suggest that a form of belief bias effect does extend
to inference generation from text, although there is some evidence to suggest that children
with well-developed reading skills can overcome this effect if causal links are required.
There is some evidence of a developmental progression such that the children with reading
ages of 10 years and over become more efficient at dealing with inconsistent information
and accept it more readily as part of their mental representation. In contrast, children with
less well developed reading skills were unable to process information that was inconsistent
with real world knowledge and as a result, they failed to draw causal links on-line when
reading fairy stories. However, this suggestion is not fully supported by the present
findings and requires further investigation.
The results of the zero-order and partial correlations suggested that causal inference
generation shared a relationship with reading comprehension that was not mediated by age
and that this relationship was not reflected in that between static inference generation and
reading comprehension. Multiple regression analyses confirmed this assumption. Causal
test sentence response time was a reliable predictor of reading comprehension after age and
vocabulary were controlled. Conversely static inference response time did not predict
reading comprehension. Neither causal test sentence accuracy nor static test sentence
accuracy significantly predicted reading comprehension. Nonetheless, these results suggest
that the ability to generate causal inferences is an underlying factor in the development of
reading comprehension.
The finding that causal test sentence response time was a significant predictor of
reading comprehension while static test sentence response time was not is clearly in
contrast to the results of study 3 in which the opposite pattern was found. One possible
explanation of these fmdings may lie in the changes made to the materials for use in the
current study. As outlined in the discussion of Chapter 5, the materials used in study 3
were confounded by the possibility that the critical sentences preceding a static target
statement may in some cases have also contained a potential causal inference. The slower
response times to static target statements may therefore have reflected the fact that a causal
inference had already been drawn during reading. Thus, responses to the static inference
test sentences might have been delayed because participants bad to suppress this causal
inference information before they could make a judgement about the information presented
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in the static test sentence. Arguably, therefore, responses to static test sentences in study 3
might have involved a higher degree of comprehension skill than responses to causal test
sentences. In the present study the materials were constrained such that a causal inference
could not be drawn in the critical sentences preceding a static target statement. Thus, the
hypothesised suppression of causal inference information that might have been required in
responding to static test sentences in study 3 was no longer required in the present study.
However, while this explanation is a plausible one, there is no systematic evidence
available to support it. It may be the case that the discrepancy in results between studies 3
and 4 was simply due to noise in the data, possibly as a result of the larger age range of the
participants included in study 4. A replication of the results of study 4 using the modified
materials would help to clarify this issue.
To summarise, the results of the current study suggest that children with reading
ages between 7 and 13 years present the same pattern of inference generation when reading
stories based in real world knowledge. Both reading age groups studied in experiment 4
generated causal inferences faster than static inferences during reading. While speed and
accuracy increased with reading age, the pattern of responding did not change, indicating
that even the youngest children seemed to recognise the necessity of causal relationships in
maintaining discourse cohesion, thus attempting to resolve the coherence breaks embedded
in the stories with speed and efficiency. In-line with the findings of other investigations
into children's inference generation (e.g. Casteel & Simpson, 1991; Casteel, 1993), this
finding could be interpreted as indicating that children drew coherence inferences on-line
during reading. Conversely, all the children seemed to generate static inferences only when
required i.e. when presented with the test sentence, suggesting that none of the children
found this level of information necessary for maintaining coherence when reading the text.
It should be noted that, as in experiment 2, it is possible that while coherence inferences
were certainly drawn faster than elaborative inferences in this study, they may still have
been drawn off-line. However, while the results of the current study do not prove
conclusively that coherence inferences were drawn on-line during reading, they certainly
suggest that this is a reasonable conclusion.
Furthermore, while there was a slight increase in accuracy scores with increased
reading age, both groups of children were responding to test sentences at a comparable
IS3
level. This suggests that both reading age groups were to some extent able to set aside their
empirical knowledge to generate causal inferences based on false premise information. An
alternative explanation is that the test sentences presented in the present study were too
easy, enabling the Less-Skilled readers to respond with the same degree of accuracy as the
Skilled readers. However, Less-Skilled children demonstrated response times to Fairy
Causal test sentences that were comparable to those for Real Static test sentences
suggesting that, when reading stories containing information that is inconsistent with real
world knowledge, the Less-Skilled group did not draw causal inferences on-line, but
instead waited until the inference was required i.e. when presented with the sentence
judgement task. Therefore, the presentation of information in stories that is contrary to our
empirical knowledge of the world, does inhibit inference generation during reading. This
effect is strongest for children with a reading age below 9 years 11 months, indicating that
the development of proficient reading skills may help to overcome the difficulties faced
when generating inferences from false premises.
Finally, the results presented here suggest the ability to generate causal inferences is
a fundamental skill underlying reading comprehension while generation of static
inferences is not related to reading comprehension skill.
154
Chapter 7
Inferential Skills of Children with Spedfic Comprehension Difficulties.
7.1 Introduction
The work reviewed in chapter 1.1. suggests that children with specific
comprehension difficulties have problems with inferential processing. For example, the
work of Oakhill and colleagues demonstrated that less-skilled comprehenders do not
actively integrate information across sentences (Oakhill, 1982), do not instantiate
specific examples of category nouns (Oakhill, 1983) and are less efficient in their use of
lexical cues than skilled comprehenders (Oakhill & Yuill, 1986; Yuill & Oakhill,
1988a). Furthermore, on standard question answering tasks in which they are asked to
read a passage and answer related questions, less-skilled comprehenders perform
significantly less well than skilled comprehenders when the information needed to
answer the question has to be inferred from the passage. However, when the questions
tap information explicitly stated in the passage, less-skilled comprehenders perform at a
level comparable to age-related peers (Cain & Oakhill, 1999; Oakhill, 1984). Finally,
Yuill & Oakhill (1988b) demonstrated that training in inference awareness dramatically
improved the reading comprehension of children with comprehension difficulties.
Taken together these results indicate that children with specific comprehension
difficulties do not engage in the inferential processing activities used by RA Controls to
form coherent mental representations of text.
One limitation of this research is its focus on the use of lexical cues and
cohesive devices to maintain textual coherence (e.g. Oakhill, 1982; 1983; Yuill &
Oakhill, 1988a). As discussed in chapter 1.2, lexical cues, such as anaphora and
pronoun resolution, which are used to maintain textual cohesion are not considered
examples of inference generation by all researchers (Fulcher, 1989; Graesser, Singer, &
Trabasso, 1994). Second, studies that have aimed to investigate knowledge-based
inferences have tended not to differentiate between different inference types. Oakhill
(1984) gave children passages to read followed by two types of question; literal
questions tapping information explicit in the passage, and inferential questions tapping
information to be inferred from the text. The inferential questions varied in terms of the
type of information required to answer the questions; while some of the questions
required the generation of a causal link, other questions were not causal in nature,
requiring inferences about the emotional state of a story protagonist for example. An
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open question is whether the problems of children with specific reading comprehension
difficulties may in fact depend upon inference type.
A further consideration is that the majority of studies tend to use narrative
passages containing information that is based in real-world knowledge. As discussed in
chapter 5, children can be influenced by the belief bias effect and may find it difficult to
make inferences that are based on information that is empirically inconsistent. Cain,
Oakhill, Barnes and Bryant (200 1) addressed this issue by comparing the performance
of skilled and less-skilled comprehenders on a task designed to assess their inference
making ability in a situation that was not based in real life experience. The children
were first taught twelve facts about a planet called Gan. These facts comprised the
knowledge base and the children had to have perfect recall of all twelve facts before
moving on to the next stage of the experiment. In stage 2, the children were read a short
story about Gan that was divided into 6 episodes. Following the completion of each
episode, the children were asked 4 questions; an elaborative inference question, a
coherence inference question, a literal information question and a question which asked
the meaning of a novel simile included in the story episode e.g. 'What does "Dack was
like a boxer who had lost a fight" mean?' Less-skilled comprehenders performed at a
lower level than skilled comprehenders on all but the simile question. Thus, it appears
that overall comprehension ability rather than story content influences the generation of
inferences. Skilled comprehenders were able to set aside their real world knowledge in
order to generate the inferences required.
However, in this study, rather than setting aside their empirical knowledge of
life on earth, the children were asked to interpret the story from the perspective of their
newly acquired knowledge Le. from the perspective of life on Gan. Cain et al. (2001)
did not in this study make a comparison between the Gan story and an alternative
passage based in real-world knowledge. It is possible therefore that group differences
in performance on the inference questions may have varied had the information in the
stories been true to real world knowledge. The experiments described in chapter 5 and
6 of this thesis included a comparison of stories based in real-world knowledge and
those that were inconsistent with real-world knowledge. The results showed that
children with normal reading skills were able to overcome the belief bias effect and
make inferences based on inconsistent information. The results of'Cain et al. (2001)
suggest that children with comprehension difficulties may be more affected by the
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belief bias effect and therefore be unable to suspend disbelief in order to generate
inferences. However, it is not clear whether children with comprehension difficulties
would be able to generate inferences consistent with real world knowledge.
Aim of present study: The present study investigated the inference processing
skills of less-skilled comprehenders using the paradigm employed in experiments 3, 4
and 5 of this thesis. The main aim was to extend previous findings by using an on-line
measure of inference generation including materials based on both real world
knowledge and empirically false information, while concentrating on two specific
inference types; causal and static inferences. It was predicted that children with
comprehension difficulties would be slower and less accurate in responding to test
sentences requiring a coherence inference, but that there would be no difference
between groups in speed or accuracy of responding to elaborative inference test
sentences. It was also predicted that children with comprehension difficulties would be
less able to suspend disbelief in order to generate inferences, with responses to test
sentences based on information inconsistent with real world knowledge being slower
and less accurate than those based in real-world knowledge.
7.2 Experiment 5
7.2.1 Method
a) Design: A mixed factorial design was used with the between-subjects factor
Comprehension Group (Control Group and Less-Skilled Comprehenders) and the
within-subjects factors Passage Type (Real and Fairy) and Inference Type (Causal Link
and Static Property). The within-subjects factors combined to form four experimental
conditions; Real Causal; Real Static; Fairy Causal and Fairy Static. However, initial
analyses revealed that Passage Type had no effect on speed or accuracy of responding
and this factor was therefore dropped from the design. Each child completed twelve
trials in each condition (Causal and Static) and the order of the trials was randomised.
A battery of standardised tests was also administered to assess each child's reading and
language skills.
a) Participants: 10 less-skilled comprehenders and 10 reading age match
controls were selected to take part in this study. The less-skilled comprehenders all had
age appropriate reading skills, as measured by the Neale Analysis of Reading Ability
(NARA II; Form 1;(Neale, 1989) and the Test of Word Reading Efficiency (TOWRE;
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(Torgeson, Wagner, & Rashotte, 1999), but their NARA II comprehension age was at
least 9 months below their chronological age and at least one year below their NARA II
reading accuracy age. The control group were matched with the less-skilled
comprehenders on the basis ofNARA II reading accuracy age and chronological age.
The children were also given the WISC III vocabulary subscale (Third Edition UK;
WISC III;(Wechsler, 1992) as a measure of vocabulary knowledge. Performance on
these standardised tests can be seen in Table 7.1.
Less-Skilled RA Controls
Comprehenders (n = 10) (n = 10)
Chronological Age (mths) 111.79(12.18) 112.31 (11.54)
NARA II Accuracy Age (mths) 115.48 (13.61) 115.88 (14.81)
NARA II Comprehension Age 94.15 (7.69) 114.96 (10.49)
(mths)
TOWRE Sight Word a 111.50 (10.70) 110.30 (4.08)
TOWRE Phonemic Decoding a 109.00 (11.90) 110.60 (4.55)
TOWRE Total Efficiency a 112.30 (11.64) 112.00 (3.94)
WISC Vocab b 7 (3.09) 10.80 (2.20)
Table 7.1 Mean performance of Less-Skilled Comprehenders and RA Controls on tests
of reading and language ability (standard deviations in parentheses; a) standard score; b)
scaled score; average 10 (SD 3).
A series oft-tests revealed significant differences between groups for NARA II
Comprehension age (t(18) = 5.06, p<.OOI) and WISC III vocabulary (t(18) = 3.17,
p<.OI). No other differences were significant (Chronological Age t(18) = 0.10, ns;
NARA II Accuracy age t(18) = 0.06, ns; TOWRE Sight Word Reading t(18) = 0.33, ns;
TOWRE Phonemic Decoding t(18) = 0.40, ns; TOWRE Total Efficiency t(18) = 0.08,
ns). Therefore, while the groups differed in terms of comprehension skill and
vocabulary, there was no difference in terms of decoding ability. Any subsequent
differences found between groups in terms of inference generation can therefore not be
attributed to differences in decoding skills.
c) Materials: The computer-based inference generation task used in experiment
4 was used in the present study. Children read a series of passages presented on the
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screen. At the end of each passage, children were required to judge whether a target
sentence was true or false, using a key-press response on the computer keyboard. Each
target sentence related to specific information embedded in the passage. Three types of
test sentence were used; sentences that relayed information explicitly stated in the text,
sentences that represented the mediating idea underlying a causal inference required for
textual coherence, or sentences that represented a possible elaboration from the text.
d) Procedure: Following the initial screening phase, the children were seen in
two individual sessions lasting approximately half an hour each. In session one, the
first half of the computer-based task was completed. In session 2, the children
completed part 2 of the inference-generation task and were given the WISC vocabulary
test and the TOWRE.
7.2.2 Results
a) Response times and error rates to test sentences following experimental
passages: Due to the lack of a significant difference in response times between groups
receiving different forms of the test in the previous studies reported in this thesis, the
data from the present study was collapsed across List for the purpose of analysis.
Subject's response data in each of the two conditions (causal inference and static
inference) was examined for outliers. Outliers were defined as any response time 2
standard deviations away from the mean response time of each subject in each condition
and would be replaced with the subjects mean response time for that condition; 5.3% of
responses were replaced in this way. Analysis of the response time data was performed
on correct responses only.
Response Times No. Correct Responses
Causal Static Causal Static
RA Controls 3970.44 4464.71 10.4 6.4
(N = 10) (674.07) (941.30) (0.8) (4.27)
Less-Skilled 4528.73 5014.85 8.2 6.5
Comprehenders (N=IO) (1433.80) (1514.70) (2.15) (2.42)
Table 7.2 Mean response time and number of correct responses (max 12) to target
sentences for Less-Skilled Comprehenders and RA controls (standard deviations in
parentheses).
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The mean response times and number of correct responses for each target
sentence are shown in Table 7.2. These data were analysed using a 2x2 ANOVA with
the between subjects factor of Group (RA Controls and Less-Skilled Comprehenders)
and the within subjects factor of Inference Type (Causal and Static). Analysis of the
response time data revealed a main effect ofInference Type (FI(1,17) = 7.32, p<.05;
F2(l,II) = 4.73, p =.052) such that Causal test sentences were responded to faster than
Static test sentences. A main effect of Group was revealed by items but not by subjects
(Fl(I,17) = 1.21, ns; F2(1,11) = 13.51, p<.OI) such that Skilled comprehenders were
faster to respond overall than Less-Skilled comprehenders. A significant Group by
Inference interaction was found by items (F2(l,II) = 9.78, p=.OI) but not by subjects
(Fl(l,17) = 0.02, ns). Post hoc Tukeys HSD of the by-items data revealed that RA
Controls did not show the expected response time advantage for Causal over Static test
sentences while Less-Skilled comprehenders responses to Causal test sentences were
significantly faster than their responses to Static test sentences. RA Control's responses
to Causal and Static test sentences were faster than Less-Skilled Comprehenders
responses to Static sentences.
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Figure 7.1 Mean response time of Less-Skilled Comprehenders and RA Controls to
Causal and Static test sentences.
This pattern of results is surprising as it suggests that the time course of
inference generation in the Normal Reader group is the same for both Causal and Static
inferences. However, this pattern was only found in the by-items data suggesting that it
rests on the nature of the materials. The by-items data was examined for any anomalous
response times and it was found that for one item, RA Controls were responding 1.5
standard deviations from the mean response time in both the Causal and Static
condition. The mean response time for this item in both the Causal and Static condition
was replaced with the overall mean response time for items in each condition. The data
were then reanalysed using a series of t-tests which revealed that both groups of
children were faster when responding to Causal sentences than to Static sentences (RA
Controls t(22) = 2.06, p<.05; Less-Skilled Comprehenders t(22) = 2.64, p<.Ol)
reflecting the pattern of inference generation consistently found in this thesis. There
was no difference in response times to Causal test sentences between groups (t(22) =
1.58, ns). However, RA Controls were faster than Less-Skilled Comprehenders at
responding to Static test sentences (t(22) = 3.10, p<.Ol). The by-subjects data revealed
the same pattern of performance although the differences failed to reach significance.
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Analysis of the accuracy data revealed a main effect of Inference Type (F I(1,18)
= 16.27, p<.OI; F2(1,11) = 80.08, p<.OI) such that more correct responses were given to
Causal than to Static test sentences. A Group by Inference interaction was found in the
by items analysis (F2(1,11) = 16.33, p<.05) but not in the by subjects analysis (FI(l. 18)
= 3.32, ns). Post hoc Tukeys HSD revealed that the responses ofRA Controls to Causal
test sentences were significantly more accurate than to Static test sentences while the
responses of Less-Skilled Comprehenders to Causal test sentences were no more
accurate than to Static test sentences (HSO p<.O1). RA Controls responses to Causal
test sentences were also more accurate than Less-Skilled Comprehenders responses to
Static test sentences (HSO p<.OI). Less-Skilled Comprehenders responses to Causal
test sentences were more accurate than RA Controls responses to Static test sentences
(HSO p<.05). No other differences were significant. Thus, in line with the predictions
of this study, there was a tendency for Less-Skilled Comprehenders to be less accurate
in their responses to Causal test sentences than RA Controls indicating some difficulties
in on-line inference generation which is not reflected in response time. However, the
Less-Skilled group were more accurate in responding to Causal sentences than to Static
test sentences, although this difference was not significant. Similarly, they were
significantly more accurate in responding to Causal test sentences than the RA Controls
were in responding to Static test sentences. Although not significant, this pattern was
also found in the by-subjects data. Therefore, while they were slightly less accurate
than RA Controls when responding to Causal test sentences, they showed the same
pattern of performance as RA Controls.
The results of the response time and accuracy data were in contrast to our
predictions in that Less-Skilled comprehenders performed at a comparable level to
Skilled comprehenders on the on-line inference generation task. In order to confirm
these results, a second set of analyses were conducted comparing the less-skilled
comprehenders with a larger normative sample (N = 44) comprising children who had
been tested for study 4 and the RA controls from the present study. Analyses of both
the response time and accuracy data revealed the same pattern of results. Less-skilled
comprehenders performed at a comparable level to the normative control group when
responding to causal and static test sentences.
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b) Performance on experimental comprehension questions: Children's scores
on the comprehension questions asked after each passage are shown in Table 7.3. A t-
test was used to compare the comprehension scores of RA Controls and Less-Skilled
Comprehenders. Results revealed a significant difference such that RA Controls
achieved a higher score on the comprehension questions than Less-Skilled
Comprehenders (t(18) = 3.55, p<.OI).
RA Controls (N = 10)
Less-Skilled Comprehenders (N = 10)
Mean
19.1
13.1
Standard Deviation
3.00
4.43
Table 7.3 Mean performance of Less-Skilled Comprehenders and RA controls on
experimental comprehension questions.
c) Regression analyses: The results so far suggest that Less-Skilled
comprehenders perform in a similar manner to RA Controls when generating inferences
on-line during reading. In order to investigate this effect more thoroughly, multiple
regressions were run to assess the amount of variance the factor Group could account
for in response time to Causal test sentences when verbal skills and speed of responding
was controlled for. If the Less-Skilled Comprehender group are performing at a
comparable level to the RA Controls, there should be no group difference in
performance on the on-line task. Therefore, the factor Group should not account for
significant unique variance in response time to Causal test sentences after individual
differences in response time are accounted for by controlling for Static test sentence
response time.
Step
1
2
3
WISC III Vocabulary
Static Response Time
Group
Dependent Variable
Causal Sentence RT
R2Change P
0.27 <.05
0.37 <.001
0.00 0.92
Table 7.4 Multiple regressions with Causal Sentence RT as the dependent variable and
WISC vocabulary, Static Sentence RT and Group as the predictor variables (N=20).
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The results shown inTable 7.4 indicate that with Causal test sentence response
time as the dependent variable, WISC vocabulary accounts for 27% of the variance in
Causal test sentence response time. Static test sentence response time accounts for 37%
of the variance when entered on step 2 which is significant. When entered on step 3,
Group accounts for none of the variance in Causal test sentence response time. With
Static test sentence response time as the dependent variable, WISC vocabulary accounts
for 23% of the variance in Static test sentence response time when entered on step 1.
When entered on step 2, Causal response time accounts for a significant 39% of the
variance. The factor Group does not account for any variance in Causal sentence
response time when entered on step 3.
7.2.3 Discussion
The present study investigated the inference processing abilities of children with
specific comprehension difficulties. At the outset of the study it was intended that
Skilled and Less-Skilled comprehenders would be compared in terms of their ability to
generate inferences from stories based in real world knowledge and from fairy tales.
Indeed, specific predictions were made such that children with specific comprehension
difficulties would be less able to suspend disbelief in order to generate inferences based
on false premises. Initial analyses of the response time data failed to support this
assumption such that response times were not affected by passage type. The data were
therefore collapsed across passage type for inclusion in this thesis. However, while the
results suggested that Less-Skilled comprehenders were no more affected by
counterintuitive information than Skilled comprehenders, further investigation is needed
to clarify this issue. Participants were presented with 12 experimental stories in this
study, 6 of which were based in real world knowledge, and 6 of which were fairy tales.
Given the small number of participants in each group, it may be the case that analysis of
response times across 6 items was not a sensitive enough measure with which to assess
differences in inference generation across passage type. As such, the ability of Less-
Skilled comprehenders to generate inferences based on false premises is still an open
question. It would be desirable to investigate this issue with a larger pool of items of
each passage type.
As stated above, the results reported in this thesis were collapsed across passage
type. Analysis of the response time data revealed no significant difference between
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Less-Skilled comprehenders and RA Controls in response times to causal and static
inference test sentences. The paradigm was sensitive however, as shown by the finding
that both groups of children showed a pattern of inference generation consistent with
the other studies reported in this thesis, such that responses were faster to causal than to
static inferences. Furthermore, both RA Controls and less-skilled comprehenders were
more accurate when responding to causal test sentences than when responding to static
test sentences. Thus, it would appear that both RA Controls and less-skilled
comprehenders generated causal inferences on-line while static inferences were
generated at a later point in time. This pattern of results was replicated in a second set
of analyses conducted on the data from a cohort of 12 less-skilled comprehenders and a
larger control group selected from previous experiments reported in this thesis.
The present findings are surprising given the results of previous research into the
inference processing skills of less-skilled comprehenders (e.g. Cain & Oakhill, 1999;
Cain, Oakhill & Bames, 1999; Oakhill, 1982; 1983; 1984; Yuill & Oakhill, 1988a)
which suggest that children with comprehension difficulties have problems with
inference generation. However, earlier studies have used off-line tasks in which
children are required to read a passage and answer a series of questions following
completion of the passage as a whole. Conversely, the present study uses an on-line
paradigm inwhich the measure of inference generation is taken immediately after
presentation of the inference information, The difference in performance might
possibly lie in the inability of less-skilled comprehenders to retain information over a
period of time. Unfortunately, the children in this study were not assessed on a working
memory task and therefore, this interpretation of the results cannot be fully investigated.
However, this assumption is supported by previous research on the working memory of
less-skilled comprehenders that revealed deficits in verbal working memory (Nation,
Adams, Bowyer-Crane, & Snowling, 1999; Yuill, Oakhill, & Parkin, 1989). In support
of this hypothesis, the results of the present study also revealed that, despite the
comparable performance of both groups of children on the on-line inference task, the
less-skilled comprehenders performed significantly worse than both the large sample of
RA Controls and the chronological age-match group when answering the off-line
comprehension questions presented after completion of each on-line passage. One
problem with this interpretation is that, if less-skilled comprehenders have difficulties
with off-line tasks such as answering questions about the text they have just read, one
might expect them to have performed poorly in the Static test sentence condition
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relative to RA Controls since the inferences being tapped by static test sentences are
assumed to be generated off-line. However, the performance of less-skilled
comprehenders was comparable to that of RA Controls in both the Causal and Static
conditions. However, while static inferences are assumed to made off-line. the working
memory demands in responding to the static inference test sentences in this task are less
than would be required in a traditional question/answer paradigm. Thus, it may be that
reducing the working memory load enables less-skilled comprehenders to perform as
RA Controls in both on-line and off-line inference generation tasks.
An alternative explanation for these findings may be that the small number of
less-skilled comprehenders included in this study meant that there was insufficient
statistical power to detect group differences. Inclusion of a larger sample of less-skilled
comprehenders in further investigations may reveal differences in on-line inference
generation which were not apparent in this study. However, examination of the results
in terms of power indicated that the factor Group accounted for little variance in either
response time or accuracy of responding. Analysis of the response time data revealed
that the factor Group had a small effect size (Tl2= 0.067) and low statistical power
(Power = 0.179). In order to increase the statistical power of these results to a
satisfactory level, a sample of 60 participants in each group would be needed.
Similarly, analysis of the accuracy data revealed a small effect size (Tl2= 0.025) and low
statistical power (Power = 0.104). A sample of 400 participants in each group would be
needed to increase the statistical power of the accuracy data to a satisfactory level. In
contrast, analysis of the factor Inference Type revealed a strong effect size in the
response time data (112= 0.301) and statistical power close to the level 0.80 advised by
Cohen (1988) (Power = 0.72). Similarly, analysis of the accuracy data revealed a strong
effect size for Inference Type (112= 0.475) and sufficient statistical power (Power =
0.968). This suggests that the lack of any significant differences between groups could
not be attributed to the small sample size. A significant result could only be obtained if
the size of the sample used was in excess of that usually included in experimental
studies of this nature. The results of such a study might be deemed unreliable due to the
degree of individual variation inherent in such large samples. This fmding supports the
interpretation that less-skilled comprehenders perform in a similar manner to RA
Controls when generating inferences on-line.
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Further support for the notion that less-skilled comprehenders perform in a
similar manner to RA Controls during on-line tasks comes from a recent study by
Nation, Marshall and Altmann (2002). Nation et al. (2002) recorded children's eye
movements as they listened to a sentence describing one of four objects presented in a
visual scene. Each sentence contained the name of the target in the sentence-final
position. However, in the supportive sentence condition, the verb contained in the
sentence was highly predictive of the target object, while in the neutral condition, the
verb contained in the sentence was equally as predictive of all four objects in the visual
array. For example, the children were shown a visual array containing a picture of a
hat, a dog, a lipstick and a cake. The neutral sentence accompanying that array was
"Jane watched her mother choose the cake" were the verb 'choose' is equally as
predictive of 'cake' as it is of 'hat', 'dog' and 'lipstick'. In the supportive sentence, "Jane
watched her mother eat the cake", the verb 'eat' is highly related to the noun 'cake' but
not to the nouns 'dog', 'hat' or 'lipstick'. In line with previous research (Altmann &
Kamide, 1999), Nation et al. (2002) found that children made anticipatory eye
movements to the target object in the supportive sentence condition but not in the
neutral sentence condition. This pattern of eye movements was seen in both RA
Controls and poor comprehenders. Thus, it would appear that poor comprehenders are
sensitive to linguistic constraints during on-line processing.
The findings of Nation et al. (2002) add support to the findings of the current
study, and suggest that the language difficulties of poor comprehenders may be further
characterised by a distinction between on-line and off-line processing skills. However,
it should be noted that the poor comprehenders in Nation et al.'s study showed atypical
eye movement patterns following the initial anticipatory eye movements. Thus, while
poor comprehenders may have normal sensitivity to linguistic constraints during initial
language processing, subsequent processing may be atypical.
To summarise, the results discussed here suggest that, contrary to the predictions
made at the outset of this study, less-skilled comprehenders generate causal inferences
on-line during reading. These results are incongruent with previous research suggesting
that less-skilled comprehenders do not actively engage in constructive processing
during reading. However, the difference in research findings may be attributable to the
moderate working memory demands of this task compared to more traditional question
and answer paradigms.
167
Chapter 8
General Discussion
8.1 Summary of Findings
The aim of this thesis was to investigate inference generation during children's
reading. The point of departure was an exploratory investigation into the relationship
between reading comprehension and inference generation. A qualitative analysis was
conducted on a set of standardised tests in order to assess the degree to which inferential
ability was required to meet the task demands. Two measures of reading
comprehension and a test of mathematical reasoning were included in this analysis. It
was found that all three tests required some degree of inference generation although the
types of inferences required by each of the three tests varied. Both tests of reading
comprehension required the use of cohesive devices, the generation of knowledge-based
coherence inferences and the generation of elaborative inferences. However,
performance on the NARA II (Neale, 1989) reading comprehension test was more
reliant on inference generation than performance on the WORD (Wechsler, 1990)
reading comprehension sub-test, which in turn was heavily biased towards the retention
of literal information. The WOND (Wechsler, 1996) test of mathematical reasoning
also required the use of cohesive devices and the use of knowledge-based coherence
inferences, but did not require the generation of elaborative inferences.
These standardised tests were administered to a group of normal readers aged
between 6- and l l-years. The results of a zero-order correlation revealed that both
measures of reading comprehension correlated highly with each other and with the
WOND test of mathematical reasoning. When age and reading accuracy were
controlled for, the correlation between the measures of reading comprehension
remained significant. However, while the correlation between mathematical reasoning
and NARA II comprehension remained significant, the correlation between
mathematical reasoning and WORD reading comprehension did not. Nevertheless, a
series of multiple regression analyses suggested that mathematical reasoning was not a
unique predictor ofNARA II reading comprehension and similarly, that reading
comprehension was not a significant predictor of mathematical reasoning. A skilled and
less-skilled comprehension group were selected from the original sample of participants
and their performance on the tests of reading comprehension was compared. While the
skilled group performed better overall, the less-skilled group performed better on the
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WORD than on the NARA II test of comprehension, with scores on the WORD being in
the average range. Finally, a detailed analysis was performed on the children's
responses to the different question types identified in each test. The results showed that
less-skilled comprehenders performed at a comparable level to the skilled
comprehenders on literal and cohesive questions but were impaired relative to the
skilled group in their performance on knowledge-based coherence inference and
elaborative inference questions.
Experiment 2 was designed to investigate the effect of text format on inference
generation. Participants were given a computer-based passage reading and sentence
judgement task in which they had to read short passages and then respond true or false
to test sentences presented at the end of the passages. The passages were written in
either an expository text format or a narrative text format. The test sentences
represented information that was required to generate a causal link in the preceding
passage or a possible elaboration from the passage. Response time and accuracy of
responding to test sentences was recorded as a measure of inference generation. The
findings indicated that causal inferences were generated faster than elaborative
inferences, which were generated at a later point in time. These results are consistent
with previous studies of inference generation, which suggest that causal inferences are
made on-line and elaborative inferences are made off-line. Moreover, the results
showed that text format did not affect inference generation; the response time and
accuracy data were consistent across text formats. Finally, multiple regression analysis
suggested that the ability to generate inferences was a significant predictor of reading
comprehension ability.
Experiment 3 investigated the effect of content on inference generation in terms
of the ability to suspend disbelief in order to generate inferences from text. The
children were presented with a passage reading and sentence judgement task as in
Experiment 2. However, the passages and test sentences used in experiment 3 were
either based on real-world knowledge or on information that was inconsistent with real-
world knowledge i.e. fairy tales. Analysis of the response time and accuracy data
showed that, even when information was inconsistent with real-world knowledge,
children could generate inferences required to maintain causal coherence, although
information inconsistent with real-world knowledge did impede inference generation to
some extent.
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Experiment 4 extended the results of experiment 3 by looking at the inference
generation of children during reading from a developmental perspective using improved
materials. The results of experiment 4 replicated those of experiment 3 such that
children were faster and more accurate when responding to causal test sentences than to
static test sentences. These results indicated as in experiments 2 and 3, that children
generated causal inferences but not static inferences during reading. As was the case in
experiment 3, this pattern of results was the same for stories based in real-world
knowledge and for fairy stories. Moreover, while responses to causal test sentences
were faster than to static test sentences in both real and fairy story conditions, responses
were slightly slower to fairy story test sentences in the causal condition. This finding
suggests that even when the inference is necessary for comprehension, readers can still
be misled by the presence of counterintuitive information in stories. A developmental
trend was found, such that while both groups of children showed a tendency to draw
causal inferences faster than elaborative inferences, less-skilled readers were slower and
less accurate than skilled readers. Finally, less-skilled readers were less able to suspend
disbelief than skilled readers.
Experiment 5 investigated the inferential skills of children with specific
comprehension difficulties. A group of less-skilled comprehenders was compared with
both a small well-matched group of reading age-matched controls and a heterogeneous
group of 44 normal readers on the inference generation task used in experiment 4. It
was predicted that the less-skilled comprehenders would be slower and less accurate in
responding to causal inference test sentences than the reading age-matched controls and
the normal readers, given their previously reported difficulties with constructive
processing. In contrast to this prediction, there was no difference between groups in the
speed and accuracy of responding to causal or static inference test sentences. Like the
normal readers, the less-skilled comprehenders drew causal inferences but not
elaborative inferences on-line during reading and did so effectively, at least as measured
by the response times to causal and static test sentences. However, their performance
on the off-line comprehension questions was impaired relative to the reading-age
matched control group. Taken together these findings suggest that children with
specific comprehension difficulties have particular difficulties with off-line tasks, while
their on-line inference processing skills may be relatively intact.
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8.2 Discussion of Findings
8.2.1 The Effed of Text Genre, Content and Reading Skill on Inference
Generation during Reading.
Three factors thought to influence inference generation were investigated in this
thesis; text genre, content and reading skill. The results of experiment 2 suggest that
text genre does not have an influence on inference generation. Causal inferences were
drawn faster than elaborative inferences when reading both narrative and expository
text. Thus, it would seem that when reading both narrative and expository text, readers
strive for textual coherence.
These findings are in opposition to many previous investigations into the effect
of text format on inference generation (e.g. Britton & Gulgoz, 1991; Millis et al., 1990,
1994; Noordman et al., 1992; Narvaez et al., 1999; Olson et al., 1981) the results of
which suggest that inference generation does not take place during reading of
expository text. However, the materials used in the present study differ from those used
in previous investigations. For example, the passages used in the current study were
written for use with children and were designed to tap inference concepts which were
familiar to them. Thus, the passages were simple and accessible. The study attempted
to directly compare narrative and expository texts, and moreover, unlike previous
studies (e.g. Narvaez et al., 1999) the narrative and expository texts used in this study
were matched for content such that for each item, a narrative and expository version of
the same text was created. Other research has attempted to control the materials in this
way and has generated similar results to those found in the present study. For example,
Singer et al. (1997) and Perrig and Kintsch (1985) showed that when narrative and
expository texts are equated in terms of difficulty, the same pattern of inference
generation is witnessed in both text formats. Thus, by overcoming some of the
methodological confounds of previous research, the findings of the present study
provide a clear account of on-line inference generation during reading of narrative and
expository text.
The finding that text format has no influence on inference generation finds
further support in recent work by Duke (2002) investigating the impact of using diverse
genres in the classroom on subsequent reading comprehension. In short, Duke (2002)
found that providing children with a large range of text genres at the beginning of Grade
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One had no effect on either their overall reading comprehension ability or genre-
specific reading comprehension skills at the end of the school year. The results of the
present study suggest that inference generation is a reliable predictor of reading
comprehension. Therefore, if reading comprehension was affected by experience with
different text genres, one might expect that inference generation would also be affected.
Thus, the finding of Duke (2002) that experience with different text genres does not
affect reading comprehension implies in tum that text genre does not affect inference
generation.
There are a number of limitations of this study however. For example, as
previously stated the materials used in this study were written to be accessible to
children. As such, the inference concepts being tapped may have been accessible
without the need to engage in inference generation. Thus, the task may not have been a
sensitive enough measure of inference processing ability. Using more complex
inference concepts may have revealed differences in inference generation across text
formats that were not apparent in the results of this study. Furthermore, as a result of
matching the passages for content, the materials did not represent natural texts. The
language and structure of the passages was constrained and may have seem contrived
during reading. Thus, the results of the study may not represent the on-line inference
processes that occur during reading of natural as opposed to experimenter-generated
texts. Finally, the expository texts written for use in this study were simply adapted
from the narrative texts by removing references to characters, actions, and events,
rendering them passive versions of their more dynamic narrative counterparts. Many
types of expository text were not included in this study. Hence, whether the degree to
which inferences are drawn on-line varies as a function of type of expository text
remains an open question. A thorough investigation of inference generation from a
variety of expository texts is required to clarify this issue.
The findings of experiments 3 and 4 suggest that children are able to generate
inferences from information that is inconsistent with real-world knowledge. A belief
bias effect was present such that responses were slower to causal test sentences
following stories containing counterintuitive information than to those following stories
containing real-world knowledge. However, responses of children in both studies were
faster and more accurate to causal test sentences than to static test sentences,
irrespective of the content of the preceding passages. The difference in response time to
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causal test sentences across conditions may reflect a slight delay in the decision making
aspect of the sentence verification task in the fairy story condition. It may be the case
that children were less confident in responding to the counterfactual sentences, despite
having already generated the inference concept on-line, because the information
contained in the test sentences did not agree with the child's knowledge of the world. In
other words, it may be that they become vulnerable to a form of the belief bias effect for
a brief period at this stage in the task.
However, the fact that responses to fairy causal test sentences were still faster
than fairy static test sentences supports the assumption that, at the sentence verification
stage of the task, the inference concept is already active in the fairy causal condition due
to the generation of the inference concept during the reading phase of the task. This
prior activation facilitates the children's responses and enables them to quickly
overcome the difficulties they face when presented with counterintuitive information in
a narrative context. In the fairy static condition, as in the real static condition, no such
inference generation takes place during reading and therefore, the child has no active
inference concept in place to aid in the decision making process inherent in the sentence
verification task.
The findings of the present study are in line with the results from studies of
deductive reasoning suggesting that children as young as 2-years old can solve
counterfactual reasoning problems (e.g. Dias & Harris, 1988, 1990; Leevers & Harris,
2000; Richards & Sanderson, 1999). However, the findings contrast with those of
previous research investigating inference generation during reading where it has been
reported that children aged 9-10 years of age have difficulties reasoning from false
premises (e.g. Franks, 1996, 1997). A possible reason for the difference in findings is
that Franks (1996, 1997) embedded deductive reasoning problems in narrative contexts.
Thus, the materials may not have reflected the kinds of inferences commonly required
during reading. Rather, the artificial and unfamiliar structure of the passages may have
had a detrimental effect on children's ability to maintain coherence which was more
pronounced in the counterfactual passages. In contrast, it was intended that the
passages used in the present study should reflect the kinds of inferences commonly
found in children's stories. While some manipulation was required in order to meet the
experimental task demands, such that each story contained a coherence break, the
problems did not take on the formal structure of logical inference forms. Furthermore,
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the task used by Franks (1996, 1997) was an off-line question and answer task and
therefore, the findings may reflect difficulties in completion ofthe off-line task rather
than problems with the on-line inference generation process.
Experiment 4 also identified a developmental trend in the generation of
inferences which was reliant not on chronological age but on the development of
proficient reading skills. Whether the relationship between reading skill and reasoning
ability follows from the increased exposure to print experienced by skilled readers or a
higher-level cognitive process that is used in both reading and reasoning is an issue for
further investigation. An alternative explanation for the findings of this study and their
incongruence with those of Franks (1996, 1997) might be that the inductive inferences
used in the present study may have been easier for the children to solve than the
deductive inferences used by Franks (1996, 1997). However, this explanation seems
unlikely given the findings of Galotti et al. (1997) that children find inductive inference
problems more difficult to solve than deductive inference problems.
The ability of children to overcome the belief bias effect in order to generate
inferences is plausibly related to their willingness to engage in make-believe play.
Harris (2000) reports a series of studies which suggest that when children engage in
role-play, they do not maintain an objective viewpoint but rather, they actively enter
into an imaginary world and adopt the viewpoint of the character they have chosen to
portray. The process of reading can be seen as analogous to pretend play to the extent
that the reader is required to enter into the world created by the author. Evidence
suggests that adult readers place themselves in the same situation as the story
protagonist during reading. For example, Glenberg, Myer and Lindem (1987,
experiment 1) presented participants with short paragraphs in which a critical object
was either spatially associated or spatially dissociated from the story protagonist. For
example, in one story the protagonist either 'put the last flower in his buttonhole' or 'put
the last flower in the vase.' Participants were then presented with a recognition task in
which they had to state whether the target word (i.e. flower) had occurred in the story.
Responses to this recognition task were faster when the protagonist and the object were
spatially associated than when they were spatially dissociated. Similar results were
found using a lexical decision task such that responses were faster when the protagonist
was spatially associated with the object (Glenberg, Myer & Lindem, 1987; experiment
2).
174
Black, Turner and Bower (1979) also found that adult readers adopt the same
point of view as the story protagonist. They conducted a series of experiments in which
participants were presented with sentences designed such that the first half of the
sentence established the location of the protagonist (e.g. Terry finished working in the
yard) and the second half of the sentence described a movement (e.g. and then he went
inside) 1. The motion verb used in the second half of the sentence was either consistent
. with the protagonist's point of view (e.g. went) or inconsistent (e.g. came). Participants
read sentences consistent with the protagonist's point of view faster than sentences than
inconsistent sentences. Furthermore, they rated consistent sentences as more
comprehensible than inconsistent sentences. When asked to recall the sentences,
participants recalled sentences with a consistent point of view more accurately than
inconsistent sentences. Moreover, sentences that were originally contained verbs that
were inconsistent with the protagonist's point of view were recalled with consistent
verbs. Finally, when asked to rewrite the sentences to make them more
comprehensible, participants were more likely to rewrite sentences containing verbs that
were inconsistent with the protagonist's point view than consistent sentences.
Black et al. (1979) replicated the results from their recall and rewriting tasks
using a second set of materials in which participants were presented with groups of
three sentences describing the protagonist interacting with another character. The final
sentence of the group described a movement by one of the characters using the same
deictic motion verbs as used in the earlier tasks (come/go; bring/take). The results
showed that participants recalled sentences with a consistent point of view more
accurately than inconsistent sentences. Moreover, verbs that were inconsistent with the
protagonist's point of view were replaced by consistent verbs at recall. Finally,
sentences containing verbs inconsistent with the protagonist's point of view were more
likely to be rewritten than sentences containing consistent verbs. Taken together, the
findings of Black et al. (1979) suggest that adult readers adopt the narrative point of
view during reading.
Rall and Harris (2000) conducted a similar experiment with children aged 3 and
4 years of age. The children were read two stories each containing four test sentences.
Each test sentence contained a deictic verb of motion which was either consistent or
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inconsistent with the point of view of the protagonist e.g. 'Little Red Riding Hood was
sitting in her bedroom when her mother came/went in and asked her to go to
Grandmother's house'. The stories were read to the children and after each test sentence
they were given a cued recall task in which they had to recall what they had just heard.
The cue for recall was the spatial location of the protagonist (e.g. Now remember, Little
Red Riding Hood was sitting in her bedroom) followed by a general prompt (e.g. What
happened next?i. The results indicated that in cases where the verb was consistent with
the protagonist's point of view, children were more likely to recall the test sentence
verbatim. However, if the verb was inconsistent with the protagonist point of view,
children were more likely to make 'perspective-shift errors' such that they would recall
the form of the verb consistent with the protagonist's point of view (e.g. recalling came
when the verb used was went). These results suggest that children as young as 3- and 4-
years of age adopt the protagonist's point of view when listening to a story.
Thus, young children seem to engage with a story in the same way as they
engage in make-believe play. It seems plausible to suggest therefore, that young readers
would engage with a text in a similar manner. Interestingly, Harris (2000) suggests that
children are aware of the difference between fantasy and reality. They do not believe
that the fantasy worlds are real in the empirical sense but they are able to imagine they
exist. In contrast to Moshman's developmental theory of logic, this apparent
understanding suggests that children as young as 3 and 4 years old possess some degree
of meta cognitive ability. In terms of the findings of this thesis, this would imply that
children are aware of the lack of empirical truth in the inferences generated from fairy
stories. However they are able to make the sentence verification decision on the basis
of how true the inferences are in the context of the story. It may be the case that
metacognitive ability develops with reading experience and not with chronological age
as proposed by Moshman (1990). This hypothesis is consistent with the findings of the
present study that the generation of inferences during reading is more dependent on
reading age than chronological age.
Harris (2000) cites evidence to suggest that engaging in pretend play contributes
to the development of mental state understanding. In short, he suggests that children
who engage in role play become more proficient at viewing situations from a different
IExample taken from Black et al. (1979).
2 Example taken from Rail and Harris (2000).
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point of view. Interestingly, Harris (2000) cites evidence to suggest that pretend play is
rarely seen in children with autism. Moreover, children with autism have been
consistently shown to have difficulties with tasks requiring mental state understanding
(see Happe, 1994 for a review). If, as posited above, the ability to engage in pretend
play is related to children's ability to overcome the belief bias effect during reading, one
might expect that children with autism would perform poorly on such a task.
Interestingly in relation to this, it has been demonstrated that children with autism fail to
use context to guide their reading. Frith and Snowling (1983) presented autistic
children, dyslexic children and normal readers with a series of sentences to read aloud,
the sentence-final word taking the form of a homograph; a pair of words or set of words
which are spelt the same but which have different pronunciations and different
meanings (e.g. She had a tear in her eye; she had a tear in her dress). The correct
pronunciation of a homograph depends on the understanding of its use in the context of
the sentence. Frith and Snowling (1983) found that the autistic children tended to
produce the most frequent pronunciation of the homographs rather than using context to
guide their reading. They performed at a lower level on this task than both the dyslexic
children and normal readers indicating that autistic children do not engage in active
sentence integration during reading. It could therefore be argued that autistic children
would be unlikely to engage in inference generation during reading. With this in mind,
the performance of autistic children on an on-line inference generation task such as the
one used in this thesis would help to expand on current knowledge regarding the
cognitive abilities of children with autism.
8.2.2 The Time Course of Inference Generation
As outlined in section 1.2. of this thesis, the constructionist theory predicts that
causal inferences are drawn on-line during reading and elaborative inferences are drawn
at a later point in time. The results presented in this are interpreted as supporting this
prediction. This asswnption is based on the consistent finding that causal test sentences
were responded to faster and more accurately than static test sentences throughout the
experiments of this thesis. The interpretation of these results as evidence that causal
inferences are drawn on-line and elaborative inferences off-line agrees with the findings
of many previous studies comparing the time-course of coherence and elaborative
inferences (e.g. Fincher-Kiefer, 1996; Magliano, Baggett, Johnson & Graesser, 1993;
Millis & Graesser, 1994; Valencia-Laver & Light, 2000). Moreover, this research
extends the findings of previous studies by investigating elaborative inference
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generation using static property inferences. Most previous work comparing coherence
and elaborative inferences has used causal consequence, or predictive, inference as the
elaborative inference example (e.g. Fincher-Kiefer, 1996; Magliano, Baggett, Johnson
& Graesser, 1993; Millis & Graesser, 1994; Valencia-Laver & Light, 2000). However,
the constructionist theory predicts that there a number of elaborative inferences that will
not be drawn on-line including instantiation of a noun category, instrument inferences
and static properties (Graesser et al., 1994). By incorporating one of these alternative
forms of elaborative inference into the work presented here, the present thesis adds
further support to the constructionist theory of inference generation. It should be noted
that these findings are not inconsistent with the basic predictions of the minimalist
hypothesis which state that causal inferences will be drawn on-line when necessary for
local coherence, and elaborative inferences will be drawn off-line if required to meet
task demands. However, as discussed in Chapter 1, the minimalist hypothesis makes no
specific predictions regarding the types of inferences considered to be necessary for
coherence and those that are elaborative. As such, the present thesis provides no direct
evidence in support of the minimalist hypothesis.
It should be noted however, that the conclusions of this study are based on the
results of a sentence verification task. Measuring the time-course of inference
generation using this task does have its limitations. For example, as mentioned in
chapter 2, the response time to any given target statement in the sentence verification
task is comprised of the time it takes to produce the correct answer or make a judgement
and the time it takes to make the response. Separating the decision making process
involved in answering a question or making a true or false judgement from the actual
time taken to make the response is difficult. Itmay be that the required inference
concept is accessed off-line during the decision making process as opposed to being
generated during comprehension. However, if the response time to target sentences was
mediated solely by the decision making process, one might expect there to be no
difference between response times to causal inference test sentences and responses to
static inference test sentences. In contrast, the results presented throughout this thesis
show a consistent pattern whereby responses to causal test sentences are faster than to
static test sentences suggesting that the response times reported in this thesis are not
confounded by the decision making process. Nevertheless, the use of reaction time as a
measure of inference generation has its own limitations. Reaction time data tends to
incorporate a great deal of noise, particularly when recording the reaction times of
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children. For example, responses can be spoiled by the participant becoming distracted
or temporarily disengaged with the task. In the present thesis, spoiled responses were
recorded as outliers and removed from the final analysis in an effort to overcome this
difficulty. However, the use of reaction time data in this thesis is further limited by the
finding that the accuracy of responses to static test sentences was at chance. Thus, it
may be the case that the longer reaction times to static test sentences was not a result of
an on-line/off-line distinction between causal and static inferences. Instead it may be
the case that the static test sentences were simply more difficult to judge as they were
not as clearly related to the preceding passage as the causal test sentences, resulting in
children making slower, more random responses. One way of addressing this issue
would be to look at the response time data for only those passages where the additional
comprehension questions were answered correctly. In this way, one could ensure that
responses were not impeded by a lack of understanding of the passage.
The results presented in this thesis can be interpreted as demonstrating that
causal inferences are drawn on-line during reading, and elaborative inferences are
drawn off-line. However, given the limitations of the sentence verification task in
determining the time-course of inference generation outlined above, further
investigation is needed in order to clarify these results. Replication of these results
using alternative on-line measures of inference generation such as lexical decision or
naming speed would provide further evidence of an on-line/off-line distinction between
the generation of causal and elaborative inferences. Moreover, a more sophisticated
version of the paradigm used in this thesis could be created which incorporated the
measurement of eye-movements during reading. The use of such a paradigm would
allow one to track the eye-movements of the reader when reading a passage. In this
way, one could record what happened to those eye-movements when the reader
encountered a coherence break and, in principle, this might allow one to more
accurately assess whether inferences are generated on-line or off-line.
Finally, there are a number of issues relating to the materials used throughout
this thesis which warrant some consideration. Firstly, norming studies were not
conducted on the materials from the outset of this thesis. The materials used in studies
2 and 3 were not validated in a systematic way prior to their administration in the
experiments reported in this thesis. Thus, it may be the case that the materials used in
these studies were not representative of the types of inferences they were designed to
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measure. For example, as mentioned in Chapter 5, while the fairy stories presented in
study 3 contained premise information that was counterintuitive, the inferences
themselves were not necessarily in conflict with real world knowledge. Of particular
concern are the inferences represented by the static inference test sentences in the fairy
story condition. In some cases, these inferences reflected static properties which were
stereotypical of the characters described in the corresponding stories e.g. a king wearing
a gold crown. As such, while children were required to generate inferences from false
premises, the classification of these inferences as counterfactual is problematic. Thus,
the distinction between these inferences and those presented in the 'real world' stories is
not unequivocal. An additional concern is the finding that the response accuracy for
static inference test sentences was at chance. As stated above, it is possible that the
inferences represented by the static test sentences were not as clearly related to the
preceding passage as those inferences represented by causal test sentences. Certainly,
the very nature of elaborative inferences meant that the static inferences were less
constrained by the passage context than the causal inferences. Thus, the comparison
between response times to causal and static test sentences may not have reflected
differences in the generation of coherence and elaborative inferences. Rather, the
difference in response times may have been a reflection of the fact that the static
inferences presented in this study were simply more difficult to judge than the causal
inferences.
It is possible that these difficulties would have been overcome had a norming
study been conducted on the materials from the outset. The materials used in study 4
were subject to such a study. However, the design of this study may not have provided
a rigorous enough test of the materials since the participants were asked to validate
inferences that had already been generated by the experimenter. Itmay be the case that
the inferences generated by the experimenter would not have been generated by other
readers. In order to improve the materials used in this thesis, a more rigorous norming
study could be conducted using a think-aloud protocol. In principle, participants could
be presented with the passages used in this thesis and would be asked to 'think-aloud'
while reading each passage, expressing aloud any inferences generated from the
passage. The inferences most commonly generated could then be identified, and it is
these inferences which would be incorporated into the materials as test sentences. Thus,
one could be confident that the inference concepts used to measure inference generation
were concepts which could be reliably generated from the experimental passages.
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Improving the materials in this way would allow for a more comprehensive assessment
of the time-course of inference generation.
8.2.3 The Relationship between Inference Generation and Reading
Comprehension.
The findings from experiment 1 suggest that children with comprehension
difficulties have problems generating knowledge-based coherence and elaborative
inferences during reading. Less-skilled comprehenders were impaired relative to skilled
comprehenders on the knowledge-based coherence and elaborative inference questions
but performed at a comparable level on the literal information and cohesive inference
questions. These findings support the results of Oakhill and colleagues (e.g. Cain &
Oakhill, 1999; Oakhill, 1982, 1983, 1984; Oakhill & Yuill, 1986; Yuill & Oakhill,
1988) which suggest that children with comprehension difficulties do not use inference
generation to actively construct a mental representation of a text during reading.
Furthermore, the results presented in chapters 4 and 6 of this thesis identify causal
inference generation as a significant predictor of reading comprehension. Taken
together these findings suggest that the generation of coherence inferences during
reading is a fundamental component of reading comprehension and moreover that the
relationship between the two skills may be causal in nature such that inference
generation underlies successful reading comprehension. Given these findings, it was
predicted that children with specific comprehension difficulties would perform poorly
given the on-line inference generation task used in this thesis. However, the findings
presented in chapter 7 suggest that less-skilled comprehenders perform at a comparable
level to skilled comprehenders on this task, drawing causal inference on-line during
reading. This finding is clearly in contrast to previous research and undermines the
assumption that inference generation is deficient in children with poor reading
comprehension skills.
One way of explaining these findings is to consider the nature of the task used
here in comparison to previous research. The research conducted by Oakhill and
colleagues has mainly employed off-line measures of inference generation such as
question and answer paradigms. These kinds of measures have a significant working
memory load as the children have to retain the information they read (or infer) until they
have finished reading the entire passage and then use that information to answer a series
of questions about the text. Since less-skilled comprehenders have deficits in the area
181
of verbal working memory (e.g. Nation, Adams, Bowyer-Crane & Snowling, 1999;
Palladino et aI., 2001; De Beni & Palladino, 2000; Swanson & Berninger, 1995), their
impaired performance on off-line measures of inference generation could be attributed
to difficulties with the working memory demands of the task. In contrast, the paradigm
used in the work presented here is an on-line task, which makes no such working
memory demands. The test sentences are presented immediately after presentation of
the critical, inference-inducing sentences. With this in mind, the results presented in
chapter 7 suggest that less-skilled comprehenders do not have difficulties with inference
generation per se and suggest that previous research may have confounded their
difficulties on measures of inference generation with their verbal working memory
difficulties.
An alternative explanation may be that verbal working memory underlies both
inference generation and reading comprehension. Recent work by Calvo (2000)
supports this assumption. Calvo (2000) investigated the relationship between working
memory capacity and the time-course of predictive inferences. The results of a naming
speed task showed that participants with a high working memory span, as measured by
a reading span task, made predictive inferences faster than participants with a low
working memory span. However, it should be noted that this study did not look at the
influence of working memory span on inferences thought to be generated automatically
during reading i.e. coherence inferences, and focused instead on those inferences that
are thought to be processed strategically. Thus, the results presented by Calvo (2000)
may simply suggest that a high level of working memory capacity facilitates strategic
processing.
Radvansky and Copeland (2001) investigated the influence of working memory
capacity on situation model updating. As discussed in chapter 1.2, the situation model
is part of the mental representation of a text constructed during reading. The situation
model represents the actions, events, characters and overall meaning of the text.
Furthermore, because the situation model is constructed during reading it requires
updating whenever new information is encountered. Updating the situation model
requires the integration of explicit information in the text with information left implicit
or inferred. Therefore, the construction and updating of the situation model requires the
generation of inferences. Radvansky and Copeland (2001) looked at the relationship
between performance on a test of situation model updating and a test of working
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memory capacity. While the participants in the study clearly showed evidence of
situation model updating, there was no relationship between performance on this task
and working memory capacity suggesting that working memory capacity is not related
to inference generation.
It should be noted that the situation model updating task used here was not a
direct measure of inference generation and as such the results do not directly undermine
the claim that working memory has a causal influence on inference generation.
However, a situation identification test was also given in this study in which readers
were given a series of sentences e.g. 'the man lost a hand of poker at the card shark's'
followed by a recognition test in which they were given six alternative versions of each
of the original sentences and they were asked to select the version that most closely
resembled the situation described by the sentence read earlier. For example, of the six
versions of the sentence 'the man lost a hand of poker at the card shark's' given below,
sentence 'b' is the correct response.
a) The man lost a hand of poker like the card shark.
b) The man lost some money at the card shark's.
c) The man won a hand of poker at the card shark's.
d) The man lost some money like the card shark.
e) The man won a hand of poker like the card shark.
f) The man won some money at the card shark's.
Arguably, in order to choose sentence 'b' as the sentence most closely
resembling the original item, the reader would have to infer that losing a hand of poker
at a card shark's would in all likelihood involve losing some money and that therefore
this situation is the most similar to that described in the original sentence. Thus, the
situation identification task can be seen as a measure of inference generation.
Interestingly, while performance on the situation identification task was related to
performance on the situation updating task, it was not related to working memory
capacity.
Taken together, the results presented by Radvansky and Copeland (2001)
suggest that inference generation is not reliant on working memory capacity. Clearly,
the relationship between working memory and inference generation requires further
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investigation. However, the findings of Radvansky and Copeland (2001) supports the
assumption made earlier that previous research has confounded the performance of less-
skilled comprehenders on inference generation tasks with their verbal working memory
difficulties. When these difficulties are controlled for by using an on-line measure of
inference generation, children with comprehension difficulties perform at a comparable
level to reading-age matched peers.
An alternative explanation for these findings is that normal readers have more
efficient strategic processing skills than less-skilled comprehenders but that the two
groups are comparable in terms of automatic processing. It could be argued that the on-
line task used in this thesis requires less strategic processing than the off-line tasks used
by Oakhill and colleagues. For example, the question and answer task used by Oakhill
(1984) and Cain and Oakhill (1999) required the reader to consciously locate the
information contained in the text, or in their mental representation of the text, that was
relevant to answering the comprehension questions presented after reading the text.
Similarly, Cataldo and Oakhill (2000) gave children a passage to read followed by a
series of comprehension questions. However, in this study they explicitly asked
children to locate the point in a text where the answer to each question could be found.
Their results showed that less-skilled comprehenders were slower to locate the relevant
information in the text and moreover that less-skilled comprehenders engaged in less
efficient search strategies than skilled comprehenders. Finally, Yuill & Oakhill (1988a)
explicitly asked children to specify the referent of each anaphor they encountered
during the reading of a passage.
Tasks such as those described above clearly require a high level of strategic
processing. Therefore, the difference in performance between the less-skilled
comprehenders included in the studies by Oakhill and colleagues and the less-skilled
sample used in the experiment described in chapter 7 might be due to the fact that the
task used in the present study did not require the same degree of strategic processing as
required in previous research. This assumption is supported by the finding that the less-
skilled comprehender's performance was impaired relative to the normal readers on the
off-line comprehension questions presented in experiment 5, despite comparable
performance on the on-line task. However, one might also expect there to be a
difference in the performance of normal readers and less-skilled comprehenders in the
generation of static inferences during completion of the on-line task, since static
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inferences are thought to require strategic off-line processing. In contrast, the
performance of normal readers and less-skilled comprehenders was comparable for both
causal and static inference generation. Arguably, although it seems unlikely, it could be
due to a lack of sensitivity in the materials such that the static inferences were too
simple to require a great deal of strategic processing. Further research using more
complex inference concepts is needed to clarify this issue.
Finally, it should be noted that the less-skilled comprehenders chosen for
participation in this study were selected using criteria that differed from those used in
previous research. As in the current thesis, the less-skilled comprehenders included in
the work of Oakhill and colleagues (Cain & Oakhill, 1996; Cain & Oakhill, 1999; Cain,
Oakhill, Barnes & Bryant, 2001; Oakhill, 1982, 1983, 1984; Oakhill & Yuill, 1986;
Oakhill, Yuill & Donaldson, 1990; Yuill & Oakhill, 1988a, 1988b; Yuill, Oakhill &
Parkin, 1990) were matched to a chronological-age match group on the basis ofNARA
II accuracy age. However, the control group was also matched to the less-skilled
comprehender group on the basis of vocabulary knowledge. In contrast, the children
who participated in experiment 5 of this thesis showed significant differences in
vocabulary such that the less-skilled comprehenders had lower vocabulary scores than
the control group. Moreover, the inclusion of a comprehension-age match control
group has been advocated as a rigorous method for investigating comprehension
difficulties in children (Cain, Oakhill, & Bryant, 1998). However, such a group was not
possible for use in this study since children with a comprehension-age comparable to
the less-skilled comprehender group would have been too young to read the stories
presented.
It may be the case, therefore, that the disagreement between the findings
presented in this thesis and those presented previously may in part be due to the
different selection criteria used. However, this explanation seems unlikely since one
might expect that the weaker vocabulary knowledge possessed by the less-skilled
comprehenders included in the present study would have adversely affected their
performance on the inference generation task. Instead, the children included in this
sample performed at a comparable level to the control group on the inference generation
task, irrespective of vocabulary level. Moreover, Nation et al. (Nation, Clarke, &
Snowling, in press) emphasise that there is a great deal of heterogeneity in the
population of children commonly identified as poor or less-skilled comprehenders.
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Thus, there may be individual differences within the samples used by Oakhill and
colleagues and the sample included in the current study which have not been identified
by the selection procedures. The use of a wider range of cognitive ability tests when
identifying poor comprehenders would be an advantage in future research.
8.3 Conclusions
In conclusion, the findings presented in this thesis suggest that children generate
inferences on-line during reading when necessary for coherence but unnecessary
inferences are generated off-line. These findings agree with previous research into
inference generation and provide support for the predictions of the constructionist
theory. Moreover, text genre and content have been demonstrated to have little
influence on inference generation in children aged between 7 and 10 years, and it is
reading skill rather than chronological age that aids in the development of good
inferential skills. Finally, data from skilled and less-skilled comprehenders suggests
that, while inference generation is an important component of reading comprehension,
the relationship between these two variables has yet to be clarified. The plausibility of a
causal relationship between inference generation and reading comprehension is
undermined by the finding that less-skilled comprehenders performed at a comparable
level to reading-age controls on the inference generation task used in this study. If
inference generation is indeed a causal factor in the development of reading
comprehension skills, the less-skilled comprehenders should have shown impaired
performance relative to the control group. An alternative explanation is that a third
variable underlies both of these skills and a possible candidate for this role is working
memory. This explanation seems highly likely in light of the reported verbal working
memory difficulties of less-skilled comprehenders (Nation, Adams, Bowyer-Crane &
Snowling, 1999; Palladino et al., 2001; De Beni & Palladino, 2000; Swanson &
Berninger, 1995). However, the findings of Radvansky and Copeland (2001) that
working memory capacity is not related to inference generation serve to cast some
doubt on this hypothesis. Further investigation into the relationship between working
memory, inference generation and reading comprehension is warranted in order to
clarify this issue.
8.4 Educational Implications
From an educational perspective, the results presented in this thesis have
implications for reading comprehension assessment, instruction and intervention. For
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example, the results from experiment 1 clearly showed that different measures of
reading comprehension assessment may tap different aspects of reading comprehension.
Children who performed poorly on the NARA II test of reading comprehension,
performed in the normal range on the WORD reading comprehension test. Similarly,
although the data is not reported here, the children included in experiment 5 were given
the Tests of Reading Comprehension (TORCH; Mossenson, Hill, & Masters, 1987).
The TORCH is a story-based test in which children are presented with one story that
they read silently. They are then presented with an alternative version of the same
story, in which the structure of the text has been altered and key information has been
replaced by blank spaces. The task of the child is to locate the key information in the
original text and use it to fill in the blank spaces in the alternate version of the story. A
key feature of the TORCH is that the child is required to use a number of different
strategies when completing one story. For example, in order to fill in one of the blanks
the child might need to locate information in the original text and copy it verbatim into
the alternative version. However, later in the passage, the child may need to infer
information from the original text in order to fill in the blank in the alternative version.
Thus, the TORCH assesses a wide range of reading comprehension skills, which are not
directly assessed by more traditional comprehension assessments. While the skilled and
less-skilled comprehenders in experiment 5 could be clearly differentiated in terms of
their performance on the NARA II, there was a great deal of overlap between the two
groups in performance on the TORCH. Thus, children have individual profiles of
strengths and weaknesses in reading comprehension, which emphasises its complex
nature. With this in mind, the assessment of reading comprehension is clearly
problematic and the findings presented in this thesis advocate the use of two or more
different measures of reading comprehension to give a full and comprehensive
assessment.
The finding that reading skill and not chronological age is directly implicated in
the development of inferential skills suggests the rather obvious conclusion that it is
clearly important to encourage reading in children to support the development of
proficient reading skills. However, the lack of a significant influence of text genre and
content on inference generation suggests that, while it is clearly important that children
read regularly, presenting children with a diverse range of text types will not have a
significant impact on their later reading comprehension.
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The results presented in this thesis suggest that the generation of causal
inferences is more important for comprehension than inferring static properties. Thus,
intervention strategies that seek to incorporate inference skill training can be designed
to enhance those aspects of inference generation that might effectively improve reading
comprehension rather than training in generic inference skills. Furthermore, the results
presented in chapter 7 emphasise the multi-faceted nature of reading comprehension.
While inference generation is clearly important to reading comprehension, its
importance relative to other skills is unclear. Thus, construction of reading
comprehension instruction and intervention programmes should aim to include training
in other skills such as strategic processing and working memory in order to encompass
the wide range of skills of which reading comprehension is comprised.
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List One
1. Builders build houses for people that are
made to last a long time. They use bricks to
make the walls solid. Some people used to
build houses from wood. They used to do
all their cooking on big open fires. Many of
the wooden houses were totally destroyed.
Bricks are a very useful invention.
Test Sentence 1: Fire will burn wood.
Test Sentence 2: Fire keeps you warm.
Question: Why did people start to build
houses with bricks?
2. Peter didn't like going to bed very much.
Often he would read until very late. But
Peter did not want anyone to know about it.
So Peter tried to read in the dark but this
hurt his eyes. Soon he found that he needed
to wear glasses. He did not really mind
wearing glasses but decided to read with the
light on in future.
Test Sentence 1: If you have bad eyes you
need glasses.
Test Sentence 2: Reading can help you to
learn new things.
Question: Why did Peter decide to read with
the light on?
3. You should never play with matches.
Playing with matches can be very
dangerous. You can start a fire by accident.
You must never go near a fire. You should
find a phone and call the fire brigade. They
usually arrive quickly and know what to do.
Test Sentence 1: Firemen put out fires
Test Sentence 2: Firemen wear yellow
helmets
Question: Why should you call the fire
brigade when there is a fire?
4. Sam was a little dog who lived in a box
He liked living there when the sun was
shining brightly. But he didn't like it in bad
weather. He wished for an umbrella when it
rained. Itwas not very nice to get wet. One
day, Sam found an umbrella by the dustbins
and was very happy.
Test Sentence 1: Umbrellas protect you
from the rain.
Test Sentence 2: when it rains rivers can
flood.
Question: Why do people carry umbrellas?
5. Windows allow the light to come in. You
can also look through a window. You can
watch what is happening outside. Windows
can break if they are hit hard. Glass
smashes all over the ground. You should
always take care not to cut yourself.
Test Sentence I: Windows are made from
glass
Test Sentence 2: Glass is sharp when
broken
Question: What should you be careful of if
you hit a window?
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6. Mr Jones liked to drive his car to work
every day. He did not enjoy walking to
work at all. One morning Mr Jones looked
out of the window. It had been snowing all
night and the snow had made the roads icy.
He decided to leave his car at home and
walk to work that day. On the way he saw
an accident and was glad his car was safe at
home.
Test Sentence 1: Icy roads are dangerous for
cars.
Test Sentence 2: You can slip on icy roads
Question: Why did Mr Jones leave his car at
home?
7. Making your own cards is more fun than
buying them. You can cut shapes out of
coloured paper to decorate them. When you
cut out the shapes you should use a pair of
scissors. Scissors can be very sharp. You
should always get an adult to help you cut
with the scissors. When you have finished
your card you can write a message inside.
Test Sentence 1: Sharp scissors can be very
dangerous.
Test Sentence 2: You can use glue for
sticking
Question: Why should you get an adult to
help you cut with scissors?
8. One summer day, Jack and Sarah were
walking in the park. Jack saw an ice-cream
van. He wanted to buy an ice-cream. He
did not want it to melt. Itwas very hot and
he ate his ice-cream very quickly. But he
shared some of it with Sarah.
Test Sentence 1: Ice-cream melts when it is
hot.
Test Sentence 2: Ice-cream comes in many
different flavours.
Question: Why did Jack eat his ice-cream
quickly?
9. Some people live in the country where it
is very quiet. They often live on farms
where there is a lot of space. But other
people live in busy towns and cities where
there is a lot of traffic. The traffic on the
roads can be noisy all through the night.
People often find it difficult to sleep. Some
people use earplugs to help them sleep.
Test Sentence 1: Noise can stop you from
sleeping.
Test Sentence 2: Driving can be dangerous
at night.
Question: Why do people who live on busy
roads find it difficult to sleep?
10. Lucy woke up one day to find she had a
sore tooth. It made her whole mouth very
sore. She was very unhappy because her
mouth hurt so much. So Lucy told her mum
that she had a toothache. Lucy had to go to
the Dentist. She was very good and
afterwards her tooth did not hurt anymore.
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Test Sentence 1: Dentists look after your
teeth.
Test Sentence 2: You should brush your
teeth.
Question: Why did Lucy have to go to the
Dentist?
11. When you are sick you can feel hot.
You might have a sore throat or a runny
nose. You might even come out in red
spots. When you are ill you cannot go to
school. There are lots of other children at
your school. You might have to go to the
Doctor to get some medicine.
Test Sentence 1: sometimes other people
can catch your illness.
Test Sentence 2: you might sneeze with a
runny nose.
Question: Why can you not go to school
when you are ill?
12. John was exploring the huge jungle. It
was very hot and he wanted to take his
shoes off. But John thought that there
might be snakes in the jungle. Sometimes
snakes can bite you. Some snakes can make
you very ill. So John drank water from his
water bottle instead.
Test Sentence 1: Some snakes are
poisonous
Test Sentence 2: Snakes shed their skin.
Question: How can some snakes make you
ill?
13. People like to go on holiday each year
to many different places. Some people stay
in England and others go abroad.
Sometimes you need to catch a plane or a
boat. But it can be more fun to catch the
train. Railway stations are busy. exciting
places. You can go anywhere in the country
by train.
Test Sentence 1: Trains leave from stations.
Test Sentence 2: Aeroplanes leave from
airports.
Question: Why might you need to go to the
railway station?
14. Timmy wanted some fish to keep in his
bedroom. He caught a big fish and lifted it
out of the water. Itwas a big silver fish and
Timmy was very pleased. But all fish need
water to breathe. The fish could not live out
of the water. Timmy put the fish straight
back in the river.
Test Sentence 1: Breathing keeps you alive.
Test Sentence 2: People often keep goldfish.
Question: Why could the fish not live out of
the water?
15. Some people like to spend a lot of time
in their garden. They work very hard to
keep them tidy. They do a lot of digging
and planting. They like to grow different
flowers and plants in their gardens. They
have to water their plants every day. In the
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summer the flowers bloom and the gardens
look very colourful.
Test Sentence 1: Plants need water to grow
Test Sentence 2: Gardens usually have
some grass.
Question: Why do plants need water every
day?
16. Mrs Jones was making some tea for her
friends. She put some biscuits on a plate.
She filled the kettle with some water and
started it boiling. The boiled water was
very hot. Mrs Jones carefully poured tea
into some cups. Then she took her friends
the biscuits and sat down with them to
enjoy her tea.
Test Sentence 1: Boiling water will burn
you.
Test Sentence 2: People also drink coffee.
Question: Why was Mrs Jones careful when
pouring the tea?
17. Cooking is a very popular hobby.
People often like to make cakes or cook
meals. They like to share them with
friends. Bakers are people who cook for a
living. Bakers have to spend a lot of time in
the kitchen. Cooking can be fun but it can
also be messy.
Test Sentence 1: A kitchen is for sleeping
m,
Test Sentence 2: Bakers can make trees and
flowers.
Question: Why do Bakers spend a lot of
time in the kitchen?
18. Peter was walking home with his mum.
He was not looking where he was going.
He fell over a big stone. He hurt his arm
and started to cry. His mum took him
straight to the hospital. The doctor had to
put a plaster on his arm and Peter was very
brave.
Test Sentence 1: Hospitals are where you go
when you are hungry.
Test Sentence 2: Sometimes doctors are
men and sometimes they are cats.
Question: Why did Peter go to hospital?
19. When it is good weather, it is common
for families to go on day trips. There are
many places to go. Sometimes they go to
the Zoo or maybe the seaside. Often they
decide to pack up a picnic lunch. They sit
in the sunshine and eat sandwiches, cakes
and fruit. It is nice for families to spend this
time together having fun.
Test Sentence 1: Picnics are meant to be
eaten indoors.
Test Sentence 2: Picnics are often packed in
milk bottles.
Question: What can people have in their
picnics?
20. Mr Allan had taken a day off work. He
did not know what to do. He decided to
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spend the day relaxing. Mr Allan liked to
take photographs. He put his camera in his
bag and went for walk. Mr Allan had a
lovely day taking pictures of rare birds.
Test Sentence 1:You take photographs with
a radio.
Test Sentence 2: People hang pictures on
the floor.
Question: Why did Mr Allan take a camera
out walking?
Test Sentence 2: Saturday is a school day.
Question: Why did John write seven
different names on his list?
23. Time helps to organise the day. You
might have to start school at a certain time,
or have lunch at a certain time. It is always
better not to be late. Many people buy
watches to wear on their arm. They usually
arrive at their appointments on time. Some
people tell the time by looking at the sun.
Test Sentence 1: You can tell the time by
wearing a hat.
Test Sentence 2: People can use clocks to
eat their dinner with.
Question: Why are people who were
watches usually on time?
21. In the Winter it is important to dress
very warmly. It can very cold outside. You
should wear both a shirt and a jumper. You
need to keep your feet nice and warm. A
pair of warm socks are a good idea in
Winter. You should also wear gloves to
keep your hands warm.
Test Sentence 1:You wear socks on your 24. Mrs Jackson was having a party for her
head. friends. She had made a big cake covered
Test Sentence 2: Shorts are worn in the in fresh strawberries. She put lots of cream
winter. on top. But the cake needed to be kept cold.
Question: Why are socks a good idea in Mrs Jackson put it in the refrigerator. When
winter? her friends arrived they were all pleased
with the cake.
22. John was feeling very happy. He was Test Sentence 1: Refrigerators keep food
excited because he only had one week to go warm.
until his birthday. John made a list of the Test Sentence 2: Food is cooked in a car
names of the week. Each day of the week park.
has a different name. John had seven Question: Why did Mrs Jackson put the
different names written very carefully on cake in the refrigerator?
his list. He put the list on his wall.
Test Sentence 1: a week has nine days.
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25. Healthy eating is very important. It
helps to stop you feeling ill. You shouldn't
eat too many cakes and biscuits. Apples
make a very healthy pudding. Fresh fruit is
very good for you. But you can still eat
cakes and biscuits as a special treat.
Test Sentence 1:Apples are a type of nut.
Test Sentence 2: Fruit is used for washing
cars.
Question: Why are apples a healthy
pudding?
26. Tom was writing a thank you letter to
his Aunt Betty. He wanted to thank her for
his birthday present. He took out his pad
and pencil. When he had finished he looked
in his address book. On the back of the
envelope he had to write down where his
Aunt lived. Then he put a stamp on the
letter and put it in the post box.
Test Sentence 1: An address tells you how
old someone is.
Test Sentence 2: Letters and parcels are
delivered by the milkman.
Question: Why did Tom look in his address
book?
27. People like to grow different things in
their gardens. It can be very hard work.
Flowers make a garden look very pretty.
Red roses are a popular choice. But there
are many flowers to choose from.
Test Sentence 1: Roses are a type of
vegetable.
Test Sentence 2: Flowers grow well on the
ceiling.
Question: Why do some people plant roses?
28. Beth was on holiday at the seaside. She
was bored with sitting on the beach. So she
decided to go for a walk. Beth saw an
island that she had never seen before. She
decided to hire a boat. She spent the day
exploring and resting on the warm sand.
Test Sentence 1: Islands are surrounded by
jelly.
Test Sentence 2: Boats float on red custard.
Question: Why did Beth decide to hire a
boat?
29. People often like to go on summer
holidays. But hotels can be very expensive.
Some people look for different places to
stay. It is often more fun to camp as you
can sleep outdoors. Some people even pack
tents in their luggage. They sleep in special
beds called sleeping bags.
Test Sentence 1: When you go camping you
sleep in a cupboard.
Test Sentence 2: Summer holidays are
usually taken during the winter months.
Question: Why might you pack a tent to go
on holiday?
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30. Peter was having a party for his
birthday. He was sitting at the tea table.
His friends had come for tea. When he had
blown out all the candles he made a wish.
Then he shared his cake with all his friends.
After tea they played some games.
Test Sentence 1: You usually have candles
on a sandwich.
Test Sentence 2: Every year you become
one year younger.
Question: Why did Peter not share his cake
before he blew out his candles?
31. The police try to make sure that people
don't break the law. But some people do
still commit crimes. The police have to
work very hard. They catch people who
commit the crimes. They help to send them
to prison. They work very hard to keep us
safe.
Test Sentence 1: people who commit crimes
are sent to school
Test Sentence 2: the police wear red spotty
trousers and shirts.
Question: Why do the police send you to
prison?
32. Billy Bat did not like the daytime. He
liked to stay in bed. His friends always
asked him to play. But Billy was nocturnal
and only went out at night. He could find
his way in the dark quite well. Billy liked
to fly by the light of the moon.
Test Sentence 1: At night it is very light.
Test Sentence 2: At night most animals play
football.
Question: Why did Billy Bat need to be able
to find his way in the dark?
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List Two
1. Once there was a woman who lived with
her family in the forest. She decided to
bake her children some cakes. She lived in
a pretty little wooden house. To bake the
cakes she lit a fire in her kitchen. The
woman's little wooden house was totally
destroyed. The lady was very cross with
herself.
Test Sentence 1: Fire will burn wood.
Test Sentence 2: Fire keeps you warm.
Question: Why was the woman's house
destroyed?
2. Some people find it very difficult to
sleep. They need to find ways to relax.
Some people like to read before they go to
sleep. But some people try reading in the
dark and this hurts their eyes. They often
find that they need to wear glasses. It is
always a good idea to keep a light on when
you are reading at bedtime.
Test Sentence 1: If you have bad eyes you
need glasses.
Test Sentence 2: Reading can help you to
learn new things.
Question: Why should you read with a light
on?
3. Tom was riding his bike. He thought he
could smell smoke nearby. He carefully
went to take a look. He could see a house
on fire. Tom ran to a phone and called the
fire brigade. They arrived very quickly and
knew what to do.
Test Sentence 1: Firemen put out fires
Test Sentence 2: Firemen wear yellow
helmets.
Question: Why did Tom call the fire brigade
when he saw the fire?
4. In Britain we do not always have nice
warm weather. Often it is cold and
sometimes it rains quite heavily. When it
rains people often wear big raincoats.
Many people carry large umbrellas in the
rain. It is not very nice to get wet. Ifyou
wear wellington boots, you can jump in
puddles without getting wet feet.
Test Sentence 1: Umbrellas protect you
from the rain.
Test Sentence 2: When it rains rivers can
flood.
Question: Why did Sam want an umbrella?
5. Jack and Jill were in the garden. They
were playing catch with a ball. Jack threw
the ball but Jill missed. The ball hit a
window and it broke. The glass smashed all
over the ground. They had to take care not
to cut themselves.
Test Sentence 1: Glass is used to make
windows
Test Sentence 2: Glass is made from sand
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Question: What should you be careful of if
you hit a window?
6. Britain is often very cold and sometimes
it snows in Winter. Police warn drivers not
to drive in bad conditions. They should
only use the roads in an emergency. Often
it is so cold that the snow freezes and the
roads become icy. People often leave their
cars at home and walk to work in the snow.
Other people share a car so that the traffic
on the roads is a lot lighter.
Test Sentence 1: Icy roads are dangerous for
cars.
Test Sentence 2: you can slip on icy roads
Question: Why do people leave their cars at
home?
7. John had started to make his mum a
birthday card. He wanted to decorate it
with lots of different coloured shapes. But
the shapes had to be cut out of coloured
paper with scissors. Scissors can be very
sharp. John knew he should get an adult to
help him with the scissors. With the help of
his dad John finished the card on time.
Test Sentence 1: Sharp scissors can be
dangerous
Test Sentence 2: You can use glue for
sticking.
Question: Why did John ask his dad to help
him cut with scissors?
8. In the summer it is common for people to
eat ice-cream. Ice-cream vans are very
busy. Ice-cream is very tasty and
refreshing. When it melts it makes a mess.
When it is very hot you have to eat ice-
cream quickly. Ice-cream is very nice with
chocolate sauce.
Test Sentence 1: Ice-cream melts when it is
hot.
Test Sentence 2: Ice-cream comes in many
different flavours.
Question: Why should you eat ice-cream
quickly?
9. Mrs Brown lived in a house on a very
busy road. One day Mrs Brown found a big
woolly hat in her drawer. At night she
pulled the hat right down over her ears
before she went to bed. The traffic on the
road would be noisy all through the night.
Mrs Brown found it difficult to sleep. But
with her hat she slept till morning.
Test Sentence 1:Noise keeps you awake.
Test Sentence 2: Driving can be dangerous
at night.
Question: Why did Mrs Brown find it
difficult to sleep?
10. Your teeth are important because they
help you to chew your food. They also help
you to speak properly. It is very important
to look after your teeth carefully. If you
don't look after them you get a toothache.
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You have to go to the Dentist. The Dentist
tries to make sure that everyone has a lovely
smile.
Test Sentence 1: Dentists look after your
teeth.
Test Sentence 2: You should brush your
teeth.
Question: Why do you have to go to the
dentist if you have a toothache?
11. Jack had to go to see the Doctor. He
was covered in red spots and felt very hot.
The doctor told Jack he had the measles.
Jack couldn't go to school because he was
ill. There were lots of other children in his
school. He had to stay in bed all day and
take some medicine.
Test Sentence 1: Sometimes other people
can catch your illness.
Test Sentence 2: You might sneeze with a
runny nose.
Question: Why could Jack not go to school
when he was ill?
12. Many people are frightened of snakes.
But snakes are really very shy animals who
don't mean any harm. They don't like
humans and run away whenever they see
one. Sometimes snakes might bite you.
Some snakes can make you very ill. But
snakes will only bite if they cannot escape.
Test Sentence 1: Some snakes are
poisonous
Test Sentence 2: Snakes shed their skin.
Question: How can some snakes make you
ill?
13. Mr and Mrs Smith were going to visit
their friends in London.
They had not seen them for a long time.
They packed their bags and left very early
one morning. They were going to travel to
London on the train. The railway station
was very busy. When the train arrived they
both hopped aboard excitedly.
Test Sentence 1: Trains leave from stations.
Test Sentence 2: Aeroplanes leave from
airports.
Question: Why did Mr and Mrs Smith go to
the railway station?
14. Fish can live in rivers, streams, lakes
and oceans. Some people like to keep fish
in big tanks in their houses. Fish can be lots
of different colours and look very pretty.
But all fish need water to breathe. Fish
cannot live for long out of the water. Fish
breathe through slits in their sides called
gills. Test Sentence 1: Breathing keeps you
alive.
Test Sentence 2: People often keep goldfish.
Question: Why can fish not live long out of
the water?
15. Mr Green enjoyed spending a lot of time
working in his garden. He worked very
212
hard to keep it tidy. When the summer Test Sentence 1:A kitchen is for sleeping
came his garden looked beautiful. He liked In.
to grow different flowers and plants in his Test Sentence 2: Bakers can make trees and
garden. He watered his plants very flowers.
carefully every day. Mr Green was very Question: Why was Mr Smith in the
pleased with himself and his garden looked kitchen?
beautiful.
Test Sentence 1: Plants need water to grow
Test Sentence 2: Gardens usually have
some grass.
Question: Why did Mr Green water his
plants every day?
16. Lots of people in England like to drink
tea. They drink it in the afternoons. To
make tea you need to boil water in a kettle.
Boiling water is always very hot. You
should always be careful when pouring tea.
You can add milk and sugar to tea but some
people drink it with lemon slices.
Test Sentence 1: Boiling water will burn
you.
Test Sentence 2: People also drink coffee.
Question: Why should you be careful when
pouring tea?
18. Doctors and nurses are very skilled
people. They work with lots of people
every day. They help people who are sick.
They also help people who are hurt. You
can find doctors and nurses in hospitals.
Doctors and nurses have to train very hard
to learn how to do their jobs.
Test Sentence 1:Hospitals are where you go
when you are hungry.
Test Sentence 2: Sometimes doctors are
men and sometimes they are cats.
Question: Why do Doctors and Nurses work
in hospitals?
19. Itwas a nice day and Jack and Kate
were bored with being at home. They didn't
want to be inside. So they rode their bikes
down to the duck pond. They had decided
to pack up a picnic lunch. They sat in the
I7.1t was very late one evening. Mr Smith sunshine and ate their sandwiches and
had just had a very large dinner. But he was cakes. They were glad they had decided to
still feeling very hungry. So he decided to go out for the day.
cook himself a snack. He went into the Test Sentence 1: Picnics are meant to be
kitchen but the cupboards were all empty. eaten indoors.
So poor Mr Smith went to bed feeling very Test Sentence 2: Picnics are often packed in
miserable. milk bottles.
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Question: What did Jack and Kate have in
their picnic?
20. People often do things in their spare
time. Some people play sports or watch
films. Other people have more relaxing
hobbies. Many people like to take
photographs. They pack up their camera
and go out walking for the day. It can be a
very rewarding way to spend your time.
Test Sentence 1: You take photographs with
a radio.
Test Sentence 2: People hang pictures on
the floor.
Question: Why might people take a camera
out walking?
21. It was winter and the ground was
covered in snow. Tom wanted to build a
snowman. He wrapped up warm and went
outside to play. The snow was cold but
Tom's feet were warm. He was wearing
some warm socks that he bought for Winter.
He built a tall snowman with a long carrot
nose.
Test Sentence 1: You wear socks on your
head.
Test Sentence 2: Shorts are worn in the
winter.
Question: Why did Tom wear warm socks?
22. A month has four weeks. Most people
think that Monday is the first day of the
week. But the first day of the week is
actually Sunday. Each day of the week has
a different name. Seven different names are
used for the days of the week. The days of
the week are named after Greek and Roman
Gods and Goddesses.
Test Sentence 1: A week has nine days.
Test Sentence 2: Saturday is a school day.
Question: Why are seven different names
used for the days of the week?
23. Sam was usually late for school. He
seemed to take a long time to get ready.
But Sam did not like being late. One
morning Sam was given a watch to wear.
That morning, Sam was on time for school.
Sam would not be late for school ever
again.
Test Sentence 1: You can tell the time by
wearing a hat.
Test Sentence 2: People can use clocks to
eat their dinner with.
Question: Why was Sam on time for school
when he wore a watch?
24. You can buy all your food at the
supermarket. Some food comes in cans and
will last a long time. It can be kept in a
cupboard. But other food needs to be kept
cold. Many people have refrigerators in
their kitchens. Fruit and vegetables need to
eaten quickly or they become rotten.
Test Sentence 1: Refrigerators are used to
keep food warm.
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Test Sentence 2: Food is cooked in a car
park.
Question: Why do people have refrigerators
in their kitchens?
25. Beth had finished her dinner. But she
still felt a bit hungry. She didn't know what
to have for pudding. She decided to have
an apple. So she went to the fruit bowl.
She found a lovely red apple and sat down
to eat it.
Test Sentence 1: Apples are a type of nut.
Test Sentence 2: Fruit is used for washing
cars.
Question: Why did Beth go to the fruit bowl
for her apple?
26. You can write a letter for a lot of
different reasons. But you will always need
to post it properly. A finished letter goes in
an envelope. Then you might need to look
in your address book. On the back of the
envelope you need to write down where the
person lives. Then you put a stamp on the
letter and put it in the post box.
Test Sentence 1: An address tells you how
old someone is.
Test Sentence 2: Letters and parcels are
delivered by the milkman.
Question: Why do you need your address
book when writing a letter?
27. Mrs Jones was feeling very tired and fed
up. She had been working very hard. So
Mr Jones decided to cheer her up. Mrs
Jones liked colourful flowers Mr Jones
bought some red roses. Mrs Jones was
thrilled and felt much happier.
Test Sentence 1: Roses are a type of
vegetable.
Test Sentence 2: Flowers grow well on the
ceiling.
Question: Why did Mr Jones buy red roses
to cheer up Mrs Jones?
28. England is a very small, cold country.
But it attracts many different visitors every
year England is part of the British Isles.
The British Isles is made up of two small
islands. You can reach England by boat.
But you can also fly or travel through the
Channel tunnel.
Test Sentence 1: Islands are surrounded by
jelly.
Test Sentence 2: Boats float on red custard.
Question: Why might you need a boat to
reach England?
29. Kim was getting ready to go on holiday.
She was busy packing her things. She
wanted to make sure she remembered
everything. She was going camping with
her friends and she was very excited. She
packed her tent carefully in her luggage.
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She loved camping and was looking Test Sentence 2: The police wear red spotty
forward to it. trousers and shirts.
Test Sentence 1: When you go camping you Who did the police send to prison?
sleep in a cupboard.
Test Sentence 2: Summer holidays are
usually taken during the winter months.
Question: Why did Kim pack her tent?
30. Your birthday is the day you were born.
You can enjoy your birthday every year.
You might have a birthday party. When
you blowout the candles you can make a
wish. Then you can share your cake with
your friends. You might even get some
presents.
Test Sentence 1: You usually have candles
on a sandwich.
Test Sentence 2: Every year you become
one year younger.
Question: Why must you wait until after
you blowout the candles before sharing
your cake?
31. The thief had tried to hide the stolen
diamonds in his pocket. Then he climbed
out of the window. The police saw the thief
running away. They caught the thief
committing the crime. They helped to send
him to prison. The thief had to give back
the diamonds.
Test Sentence 1: People who commit crimes
are sent to school
32. Many animals come out during the day.
That is when they go hunting. But not all
animals like the daytime. Some animals are
nocturnal and only go out at night. They
are able to find their way in the dark. They
use the light of the moon to guide them.
Test Sentence 1: At night it is very light.
Test Sentence 2: At night most animals play
football.
Question: Why do some animals need to be
able to find their way in the dark?
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Filler Passages Test Sentence 2: Blackberries grow on
bushes.
1. Sam wanted a bike for Christmas. On Question: Why did Jack save blackberries
Christmas morning he looked everywhere in for his mum?
the house. But he could not see a bike
anywhere. Then his mum opened the front
door. In the front garden was a shiny new
mountain bike. Sam was so pleased that he
gave his mum a big kiss.
Test Sentence 1: Christmas is in March.
Test Sentence 2: Bikes have a saddle and
pedals.
Question: Why was Sam so pleased?
2. Polly the cat was very thirsty. But her
owners were in bed. So Polly slipped into
the kitchen. She opened the fridge with her
paw. Then she pushed the milk bottle over.
The milk went all over the floor and Polly
licked it up happily.
Test Sentence I: Cats have four legs.
Test Sentence 2: Milk comes from pigs.
Question: Where did Polly find the milk?
3. In the Autumn Jack liked to go
blackberry picking. He would go out with
an empty basket and try to fill it with juicy
blackberries. Sometimes he would eat some
on his way home. But he saved most of
them for his mum. She would make his
favourite blackberry pie. He liked to eat it
with fresh cream.
Test Sentence 1: Blackberries are yellow.
4. Susan and Peter went to the circus. They
sat at the front and watched the elephants in
the ring. Suddenly the clowns came on and
threw water at the crowd. Susan got very
wet. Peter laughed out loud. Then the
clowns threw water over him too.
Test Sentence 1: You can see clowns at the
supermarket.
Test Sentence 2: There are lots of animals
in the circus.
Question: How did Susan get wet?
5. The cowboy was riding his horse very
fast. The Indians were chasing him through
the mountains. The cowboy rode into a
cave. He stayed very still and quiet. He
watched the Indians ride straight past him.
Then he rode out to safety.
Test Sentence 1: Cowboys ride bicycles.
Test Sentence 2: Horses wear saddles when
you ride them.
Question: Why did the indians ride past the
cowboy?
6. The fisherman was lost in a storm. His
boat was being thrown from side to side.
Suddenly, he saw a light in the distance. It
was the lighthouse telling him which way to
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go. The fisherman sailed with all his might
towards the light. Soon he was safely on
dry land with the lighthouse keeper.
Test Sentence 1: Fishermen catch wild cats.
Test Sentence 2: A lighthouse tells boats
which way to go.
Question: How did the fisherman know
which way to go?
7. John and Pam were playing football.
John ran down the pitch with the ball. He
passed the ball to Pam. Pam kicked it
towards the goal. The goalkeeper jumped
for the ball but he missed it. The ball hit the
back of the net.
Test Sentence 1: A ball is shaped like a
square.
Test Sentence 2: The goalkeeper tries to
save the ball.
Question: Were John and Pam on the same
team?
8. The spy crept into the room through the
window. He walked over to the wall. He
found the safe behind a picture. He cracked
the code and opened the safe. He had
found the secret plans. Now the spy could
rescue the prisoners.
Test Sentence 1: A spy is someone who
plays the guitar.
Test Sentence 2: A safe is where you keep
valuable things.
Question: How did the spy open the safe?
9. Computer games have become very
popular. There are many different types of
games. Some games let you play sports.
But in other games you have to solve
puzzles. It is not just boys who play
computer games. Girls like computer
games too.
Test Sentence 1: You can play computer
games with other people.
Test Sentence 2: You can play computer
games with your nose.
Question: Name two different types of
computer games.
10. Lots of people like to go to dancing
lessons. Some people like to learn ballet or
tap dancing. Other people like more
modem sorts of dancing. You can even
learn how people dance in other countries.
You can start dancing at a very young age.
Many people like to watch dancing shows.
Test Sentence 1: Boys and girls can learn to
dance.
Test Sentence 2: To learn to dance you need
huge feet.
Question: Name two different sorts of
dancing.
11. A carnival is a special sort of party. It is
usually held in the street so anyone can go.
People dress up and decorate trucks. Then
the trucks parade through the streets. There
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is usually some music and dancing.
Families can enjoy carnivals together.
Test Sentence I: Carnivals are a lot of fun.
Test Sentence 2: You have a party when
you are naughty.
Question: Where are carnivals usually held?
12. A flute is a musical instrument. It is
usually made from metal or wood. It is
shaped like a long tube with holes in it.
You play it by blowing through a hole in
one end. If you cover different holes with
your fingers you can play different notes. A
flute has a very soft sound.
Test Sentence 1: A guitar is a musical
instrument.
Test Sentence 2: You use musical
instruments to make a cake.
Question: What shape is a flute?
13. A hippopotamus is a very large animal.
It has very short legs and thick wrinkled
skin. But it can move very fast. A
hippopotamus is often called a hippo for
short. Hippos live in Africa on the banks of
the rivers. They are usually grey in colour.
Test Sentence 1: Hippos are very large.
Test Sentence 2: Hippos are red in colour.
Question: Is a hippopotamus fast?
14. A helmet is a kind of hat. You wear a
helmet to protect your head. Soldiers wear
helmets. But you also need helmet if you
ride a motorbike. Knights used to wear big
heavy metal helmets. But they are much
lighter to wear now.
Test Sentence I:You wear a helmet on your
head.
Test Sentence 2: Helmets are very soft.
Question: Name two people who might
wear a helmet.
15. Breakfast is the most important meal of
the day. You need to eat breakfast so that
you have lots of energy. Some people have
big cooked breakfasts. Others have cereal
or toast. Orange juice is nice with
breakfast. You should have breakfast every
day.
Test Sentence I:Breakfast is eaten before
lunch.
Test Sentence 2: You usually have fish and
chips for breakfast.
Question: Name two things you might have
for breakfast?
16. The capital city of England is London.
There are lots of important buildings in
London. London is where the Queen and
the Prime Minister live. London is a big
city and is always very busy. The
Millennium Dome is in London. It is an
exciting place to live.
Test Sentence 1: London is in England.
Test Sentence 2: The Queen is called
Henry.
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Question: What city does the Queen live in?
17. Harry had got his kite stuck in a tree.
He was very upset because it was too high
for him to reach. He started to cry. Then
his dad came along with a ladder. He
climbed the ladder and set the kite free.
Then Harry and his dad flew the kite
together for the rest of the day.
Test Sentence 1: Kites fly in the sky.
Test Sentence 2: You can skip up ladders.
Question: Why did Harry's dad need a
ladder?
18. Mr Walker's dog liked to chase cats. Mr
Walker couldn't keep up with his dog. So
Mr Walker used to wear roller skates when
they went for a walk. Then he could hold
his dog's lead and be pulled along on his
skates. All the people used to stop and
stare. But Mr Walker just waved happily as
he rolled along.
Test Sentence 1: Roller skates are worn on
the feet.
Test Sentence 2: Dogs like to chase
elephants.
Question: Why did Mr Walker need roller
skates?
19. Mr White the Milkman used to get up
very early. He would climb into his float
while it was still dark. Then he would
deliver bottles of milk to all the people in
his town. He climbed back into bed just as
everyone else was getting up. Every
morning they would find fresh milk on the
doorstep. And it was all thanks to Mr
White.
Test Sentence 1: You can put milk in tea.
Test Sentence 2: Milkmen deliver fresh
books.
Question: Why was it still dark when Mr
White delivered the milk?
20. The sailor stood on the deck of his boat.
He could see the pirate ship sailing towards
him. He loaded his cannons. Then he fired
his cannons at the pirates. The pirate ship
sank and the pirates were floating in the sea.
The sailor sailed over and rescued the
pirates.
Test Sentence 1: Boats sail on water.
Test Sentence 2: Sailors wear ball dresses.
Question: Why did the pirate ship sink?
21. Mr Smith wanted a new car. He saw a
lovely red sports car in the garage. So he
went to the bank and drew out some money.
Then he went back to the garage. Soon he
was driving his red sports car out into the
country. Mr Smith was very pleased with
himself.
Test Sentence 1: You can keep your money
in a bank.
Test Sentence 2: You can buy cars at a zoo.
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Question: Why did Mr Smith go to the bank walked towards the groom. They new they
for some money? would be very happy. All the people in the
church were crying withjoy.
22. The little girl was playing in the sand.
She was building a castle with her bucket
and spade. She did not notice the big wave
coming towards her. The wave washed the
castle away. The little girl was very upset.
She started to cry.
Test Sentence 1: You can build sandcastles
on a beach.
Test Sentence 2: Buckets are used for
making milkshakes.
Question: What sort of castle did the little
girl build?
23. Tom and Sue paddled their boat in the
warm water. The sea was warm and the
beach was in sight. Suddenly, a big wave
came and swept the boat further out to sea.
The paddles were lost overboard. Tom told
Sue to use her hands to steer the dinghy.
Together they guided it to safety.
Test Sentence 1: Paddles help steer a boat.
Test Sentence 2: A beach is usually made of
paper.
Question: Why did Sue use her hands to
steer the boat?
24. The bride looked beautiful as she
walked into the church. Her bridesmaids
followed her carrying flowers. Itwas the
best day of her life. She smiled as she
Test Sentence 1: You can get married in a
church.
Test Sentence 2: A bride wears pyjamas on
her wedding day.
Question: Were the people in the church
sad?
25. There are many different kinds of
aeroplanes. Some aeroplanes are used to
take people on holiday. But other
aeroplanes are used to carry animals and
other goods. Some people have their own
aeroplanes. These are usually quite small.
The biggest aeroplane is called a Jumbo Jet.
Test Sentence 1: Aeroplanes fly underwater.
Test Sentence 2: Aeroplanes have wings.
Question: Name two things aeroplanes are
used for.
26. When you are young you have to go to
school. Many children do not like school.
But going to school is very important. You
learn lots of new things every day. Going
to school will help you to get a good job.
You could even go to college.
Test Sentence 1: Teachers work in shops.
Test Sentence 2: You can play sports at
school.
Question: Name two reasons why going to
school is important.
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27. Elephants live in Africa and India.
Elephants are very large animals. They
have long noses called trunks. They are
usually grey in colour. Male elephants are
called bulls. They have horns on the sides
of their face called tusks.
Test Sentence 1: Elephants are very good
dancers.
Test Sentence 2: Elephants have big ears.
Question: Do all elephants have tusks?
28. Dolphins are a kind of whale. They
usually grow to about two or three metres
long. Dolphins are very friendly animals.
They live in groups in the sea. They are
also very clever. Many people like to swim
with dolphins.
Test Sentence 1: Whales live in the forest.
Test Sentence 2: Dolphins are very clever.
Question: Do dolphins live alone?
29. A banana is a popular fruit. It is shaped
like a crescent moon. When ripe it is
yellow in colour. Bananas have soft creamy
flesh. They are sweet and tasty. Bananas
are very good for you.
Test Sentence 1: Bananas are orange.
Test Sentence 2: Bananas are a favourite
food of monkeys.
Question: Tell me three things about
bananas?
30. A library is a building full of books.
There are all different sorts of books there.
If you join a library you can borrow the
books. You can take them home to read.
But you have to take them back on time. Or
you might have to pay a fine.
Test Sentence I: Books are made of bread.
Test Sentence 2: You can join a library.
Question: Why might you have to pay a
fine?
31. Every day people buy newspapers.
Newspapers are a good way of finding out
all the world news. Good newspapers
usually have news from this country and
lots of other countries. You can find out
what the weather is going to be like from a
newspaper. You can also read about films
and television. Sometimes there is a
crossword to do as well.
Test Sentence I: Newspapers are written in
felt-tip pen.
Test Sentence 2: Newspapers are sold at the
newsagents.
Question: What can you read about in the
newspapers?
32. Mount Everest is the highest mountain
in the world. It is in a mountain range
called the Himalayas. The Himalayas are in
south east Asia. Mount Everest is nearly
nine thousand metres above sea level.
Many people have tried to climb the
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mountain. But not very many of them have
made it right to the top.
Test Sentence 1: Mount Everest is a river.
Test Sentence 2: Mount Everest is the
highest mountain in the world.
Question: Where in the world is Mount
Everest?
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Appendix II
Experiment 2b
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Experiment 2b was conducted in order to assess the relative difficulty of the test
sentences included in the materials used in experiment 2. Response times to test
sentences 1 and 2 were compared when the sentences were presented without the
preceding passage content.
Al.1 Method
a) Participants: Eighteen of the children who participated in Experiment 2
completed this follow-up task (Mean age 115.44 months, standard deviation 4.08 mths;
Mean SRS standard score 101.39, standard deviation 7.01).
b) Design: This was a one-way repeated measures design with the within-subjects
factor of Test Sentence (TSI and TS2). The factor Content was not included in this
analysis since it was not directly related to the objective of the study. All participants
completed 32 trials in each condition.
c) Materials: The test sentences used in the original experiment were compiled
into one list for use in this study.
d) Procedure. Each child was seen individually for one session lasting
approximately 20 minutes. The child was told that they would be presented with
sentences on a computer screen which they had to judge as being true or false. The
sentences were presented in a random order. They were presented in the middle of the
screen and each was preceded by a centrally located asterix which appeared for
500msecs. The children were told to read each sentence to themselves and then to press
the button on the keyboard labelled T if the sentence was true or the button labelled F if
they thought it was false. As soon as they had made a response to an item the asterix
would reappear followed by the next item. They were told to work their way through all
the sentences and to answer as quickly and as accurately as possible.
Al.2 Results: The mean response times and error rates for each test sentence are
shown in Table A2.1. A t-test was conducted on the response time and accuracy data.
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No significant difference was found between response times to TS 1 and TS2 (t(17) =
0.06, ns), nor between the number of correct responses to TSI and TS2 (t(17) = 1.43, ns).
Mean response time
Mean No Correct
Responses (max 32)
TSI
4081.41 (1274.20)
31.05 (0.99)
TS2
4075.03 (1065.71)
30.78 (0.65)
Table A2.1. Mean response time and mean number of correct responses to each test
sentence (standard deviations shown in parentheses).
A2.3 Summary: The data of 18 children who took part in both the original and
the follow-up experiment were compared. As predicted the response times to test
sentence 1 and 2 were comparable when the preceding passage context was not available.
Thus, the data suggest that the test sentences were matched in terms of difficulty level.
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Appendix III
Experiment 3 Test Materials
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List One
1. John looked behind the wagon and saw
the Red Indians approaching. He called for
his father. Henry grabbed his rifle and
pulled himself up to the front of the wagon.
As the Red Indians rode closer, John could
see they were carrying weapons. He raised
his own weapon and aimed at the enemy.
But Henry held up his hand. John took his
finger off the trigger and carefully lowered
his gun.
Test Sentence 1: Henry wanted John to wait
(causal).
The Indians were so close that John could
see their brightly coloured faces. John's
hand was firmly on his rifle as he waited in
the wagon. Then Henry gave the signal and
John and Henry opened fire. The battle
lasted only a few minutes but seemed a lot
longer. Finally, the Indians had weakened.
They turned and disappeared into the
mountain range.
the wind. Many of their belongings had
been lost overboard and a huge wave had
crashed across the deck, smashing the mast.
The men struggled to keep control of the
wheel. They used all their strength to fight
the wind and rain.
Test Sentence 1: The men were soaking
wet. (static)
The men knew they were running out of
time. The boat was being forced towards the
rocks. The Captain knew they could not
save the ship and he ordered the men into
the life boat. The ship crashed into the
rocks. A huge hole appeared in the side of
the hull. The men watched as the boat sank
beneath the waves.
Test Sentence 2: The ship filled with water.
(causal)
Question: What did the Captain order the
men to do?
3. The spy dropped from the wall
surrounding the large house. He pulled out
Test Sentence 2: The Indians rode horses. his torch and made his way over to the open
(static) window. As quietly as possible, he pulled
Question: What was John holding as he himself over the window ledge and crept
waited in the wagon? into the office. He found the safe hidden
2. The fishermen were lost in a storm. Their under the desk. The spy entered the code
boat was being thrown from side to side by into the panel on the safe door. He found
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the secret plans in the safe.
Test Sentence 1: The code opened the safe
Carefully, the spy photographed the plans.
Then he slipped them back into the safe
where he had found them. With the camera
film safely in the bottom of his backpack,
the spy slipped out of the office the way he
came in. In the darkness, he scaled the wall
once more. His mission complete, he
disappeared into the dark night.
Test Sentence 2: The spy was dressed in
black. (static)
Question: What did the spy find in the safe?
4. Emily sat happily in the sand at the edge
of the sea. She was building a castle with
her bucket and spade. Carefully she filled
her bucket to the top with sand. Then she
turned the bucket over in the sand. Emily
tapped it gently with her spade. Then she
lifted the bucket to reveal a perfect sand
castle.
Test Sentence 1: The sand in the bucket was
wet. (static)
Emily was very pleased with herself. She
loved building castles on the beach. Emily
set about filling her bucket again. She
wanted to build more castles. But Emily had
not noticed that a wind had begun to blow
in from the sea. She did not see the huge
wave coming towards her. The wave
crashed heavily onto the sand. When the
wave finally rolled away, Emily began to
cry.
Test Sentence 2: The wave washed the
castle away. (causal)
Question: What was Emily building?
5. The cowboy was riding his horse at great
speed through the mountains. He could hear
the bandits drawing closer. The cowboy
could feel his horse was tiring. He knew he
had to stop but he had to evade capture.
Taking a risk, the cowboy rode into a cave
hidden behind a rock and waited. Soon he
heard the bandits ride past the cave.
Test Sentence 1: The bandits could not see
the cowboy. (causal)
From the safety of the cave, the cowboy
watched as the bandits searched for him in
the valley below. They remained there,
circling on their horses for some time. They
were clearly disappointed to have lost their
prey. When darkness fell, the leader ordered
the men back to the hideout. They would
have to think of another way to capture the
cowboy.
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Test Sentence 2: The bandits were carrying
rifles. (static)
Question: What was wrong with the
cowboy's horse?
6. The thief looked cautiously around as he
lifted the money from the safe. He wanted
to be sure nobody had seen him break into
the bank. He put the money into his hold all
and left by the back door. He had almost
reached his car when he saw the two
policemen. They were waiting for him in
the shadows.
Test Sentence 1: The policemen wore blue
uniforms. (static)
The thief threw the hold all into the bushes
and fumbled with the key for his car. But it
was too late. The policemen caught him
before he could make his escape. At the
police station the villain denied the robbery.
But he was convicted because of his own
foolishness. He had forgotten to wear
gloves. The police were able to place the
thief at the scene of the crime.
Test Sentence 2: The thief left fingerprints
at the bank. (causal)
Question: What did the thief do with his
hold-all?
7. The football match was coming to an
end. Neither team had scored a goal and the
crowd was tense with excitement. Tom was
racing towards the goal with the ball. He
took a shot but it was too wide. The crowd
groaned as the ball went back into play. It
looked as though no one was going to win.
Suddenly, Jan scored from the edge of the
pitch. Tom cheered loudly and ran over to
hug Jan.
Test Sentence 1: Tom and Jan were on the
same team. (causal)
The whistle blew signalling the end of the
match. The crowd was cheering loudly for
Jan. Her team-mates gathered round her,
lifted her on to their shoulders and carried
her off the pitch. Jan was treated like a hero.
She was declared man of the match for
scoring the winning goal.
Test Sentence 2: Jan was a good football
player. (static)
Question: How did everyone know that the
match was over?
8. John and Francis watched as the bear
approached the girls. The bear was growling
and showing its teeth. The girls were
terrified but were frozen with fear. Francis
fired his pistols one after the other. A bullet
struck the bear's ear and it reared up on its
hind legs. It let out a terrifying howl.
230
Test Sentence 1: The bear had huge paws.
(static)
Cathie began to scream. The bear was
moving slowly, getting closer and closer.
Now that it was in pain it was even more
dangerous. Snarling, the bear swiped at the
girls. John knew he had to act fast. He
quickly raised his rifle to his shoulder and
fired once. The bear fell to the ground and
did not move.
Test Sentence 2: John shot the bear dead.
(causal)
Question: Where did the bullet hit the bear?
9. The Duchess flung the baby at Alice and
hurried out of the room. Alice caught the
baby with some difficulty for it was a queer
shaped creature and held out its arms and
legs in all directions. The baby had been
crying but now it started grunting. When
Alice looked down the baby's nose had
turned up and his eyes had become very
small. Alice was holding a pig.
Test Sentence 1: The baby had become a
pig. (causal)
Alice felt that she could not carry the baby
any further. She thought it was quite an ugly
child, but was quite handsome as a pig. She
was sure the tiny child would be happier in
the wood with the other animals. So Alice
set the little baby down. She felt quite
relieved to see it trot away quietly into the
wood.
Test Sentence 2: The baby walked on pigs
trotters. (static)
Question: What did Alice think of the baby?
10. The Witch was very cruel to Dorothy
and Toto. She made Dorothy work very
hard all day and threatened to hit her. Once
the Witch struck Toto so hard with her
umbrella that he flew at her and bit her hard
on the leg. But the Witch could not feel pain
because she was too wicked. Instead the old
woman just laughed.
Test Sentence 1: The old woman flew on a
broomstick. (static)
Dorothy was very angry. She shouted at the
Witch to stop being so cruel. But the Witch
just sneered and ordered her to get back to
work. The little girl was so mad, she picked
up a bucket of water and threw it at the
Witch. The Witch was soaked with water
from head to foot. Dorothy watched as the
Witch melted away.
Test Sentence 2: The water made the
wicked witch melt. (causal)
Question: What did the Queen use to hit
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Toto?
11. When the battle was over, Lucy found
Edmund a little way back from the fighting
line. He was covered with blood, and his
face was a nasty green colour. Lucy
remembered the precious red liquid she had
been given for a Christmas present. She
poured a few drops of red liquid into
Edmund's mouth. Edmund leapt to his feet
in perfect health.
Test Sentence 1: The red liquid healed
Edmund's wounds. (causal)
the wind blowing and the water splashing
the side of the boat. The boat was bobbing
up and down in the waves. The sea was
crashing against the rocks. The picture
seemed to be moving violently.
Test Sentence I: The sea was moving in the
picture. (static)
Eustace rushed to pull the picture off the
wall. Edmund and Lucy tried to stop him.
But the children found themselves standing
on the picture frame. There was no glass in
front of them, just real sea. A gust of wind
blew them off the frame. They struggled to
stay afloat in the stormy sea.Edmund fought well in the battle. He had
beaten the giants and broken the Witch's
wand. Without him the battle may have Test Sentence 2: The children fell into the
been lost. AsIan the lion walked slowly picture. (causal)
towards the boy. He was proud of Edmund. Question: What did Eustace try to do?
The lion told Edmund he was to become a
13. One night Sam woke up with a start. He
heard a strange sound coming from outside
his window. Sam crept out of bed, hid
behind the curtain and looked outside. He
let out a small scream. An enormous
spaceship appeared to have landed in his
garden. The ship filled his garden
completely. The roses in the flower-bed
12. Lucy, Edmund and Eustace were staring were completely crushed.
at a picture on the wall. It was a picture of a
knight. Then the lion let Edmund ride on his
back
Test Sentence 2: The lion was able to talk.
(static)
Question: What had happened to the
Witch's wand?
ship sailing on an ocean. But it was no Test Sentence: The spaceship landed on the
ordinary picture. The children could hear roses. (causal)
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A door opened in the side of the ship and a
strange figure appeared. It looked almost
like a man but had long arms, short legs and
a huge head with haunting black eyes. Sam
cried out and the creature looked up in
surprise. Then the door closed and the ship
rose slowly off the ground. Quick as a flash
it was gone.
Test Sentence 2: The ship was covered in
flashing lights. (static)
Question: What did Sam see in his garden?
14. The mermen lived far out to sea, where
the water is blue as the bluest cornflower.
The merman king had six beautiful
daughters and the youngest was the prettiest
of them all. Her skin was soft and delicate
as a rose leaf and her eyes were as blue as
the deepest sea. But the young daughter
could only swim in the sea. She longed to
walk on the land and feel the sand between
her toes.
Test Sentence 1: The girl had a fish tail.
(static)
One night, the mermaid rescued a prince
from the stormy sea. They fell in love, but
the mermaid could not live out of the water.
So the mermaid sang sadly to the prince
every night. The merman king could not
bear to see his daughter so sad. He cast a
spell over the mermaid and her tail
disappeared. She ran happily to meet the
prince on the shore.
Test Sentence 2: The spell gave the girl
legs. (causal)
Question: Who was the prettiest mermaid?
15. There once was a king who had eleven
sons and one daughter. The king married a
wicked queen who was jealous of the
children. She sent the little girl away and
made the king banish his sons from the
kingdom. On the day the boys left the
palace, the queen cast a spell over them.
Instead of eleven boys, eleven wild swans
flew from the palace gates.
Test Sentence 1: The queen turned the boys
into wild swans. (causal)
The swan princes searched for their sister.
When they found her she promised to break
the spell. She made eleven magic shirts for
her brothers. When she threw the shirts over
the swans, they were transformed into
eleven handsome princes. But the girl did
not have enough magic cloth to finish all
the shirts. The youngest prince would
forever have a swan's wing in the place of
an arm.
Test Sentence 2: His arm was covered in
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white feathers. (static)
Question: How many sons did the king
have?
16. Long ago there lived a young girl named
Brave Heart who had learned to hunt. One
winter, when the young men were out
hunting, the women of the village saw some
warriors heading towards them. They were
filled with fear. With the men out hunting
they did not know who would protect them.
The young girl vowed to defend the women.
She took up her bow and arrow and circled
the villagers.
Test Sentence 1: The girl was an indian
List 2
1. John looked behind the wagon and saw
the Red Indians approaching. He called for
his father. Henry grabbed his rifle and
pulled himself up to the front of the wagon.
As the Red Indians rode closer, John could
see they were carrying weapons. He raised
his own weapon and aimed at the enemy.
But Henry held up his hand. John took his
finger off the trigger and carefully lowered
his gun.
Test Sentence 1: John wore a cowboy hat.
(static)
brave. (static)
The women watched in wonder as Brave
Heart transformed herself into a rainbow.
The beautiful rainbow arched over the
village. The warriors too saw the mighty
rainbow arch above them. Brave Heart
stood in the midst of the rainbow. The
young girl raised her bow and started to
shoot. Lightening fell as the warriors fled
from the village.
Test Sentence 2: The arrows were made of
lightening. (causal)
Question: Why were the women frightened.
The Indians were so close that John could
see their brightly coloured faces. John's
hand was firmly on his rifle as he waited in
the wagon. Then Henry gave the signal and
John and Henry opened fire. The battle
lasted only a few minutes but seemed a lot
longer. Finally, the Indians had weakened.
They turned and disappeared into the
mountain range.
Test Sentence 2: The Indians were beaten.
(causal)
Question: What was John holding as he
waited in the wagon?
2. The fishermen were lost in a storm. Their
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boat was being thrown from side to side by
the wind. Many of their belongings had
been lost overboard and a huge wave had
crashed across the deck, smashing the mast.
The men struggled to keep control of the
wheel. They used all their strength to fight
the wind and rain.
Test Sentence 1: The boat was hard to steer
(causal)
The men knew they were running out of
time. The boat was being forced towards the
rocks. The Captain knew they could not
save the ship and he ordered the men into
the life boat. The ship crashed into the
rocks. A huge hole appeared in the side of
the hull. The men watched as the boat sank
beneath the waves.
Test Sentence 2: The men wore lifejackets.
(static)
Question: What did the Captain order the
men to do?
3. The spy dropped from the wall
surrounding the large house. He pulled out
his torch and made his way over to the open
window. As quietly as possible, he pulled
himself over the window ledge and crept
into the office. He found the safe hidden
under the desk. The spy entered the code
into the panel on the safe door. He found
the secret plans in the safe.
Test Sentence 1: The spy carried a gun.
(static)
Carefully, the spy photographed the plans.
Then he slipped them back into the safe
where he had found them. With the camera
film safely in the bottom of his backpack,
the spy slipped out ofthe office the way he
came in. In the darkness, he scaled the wall
once more. Without a sound, the spy
disappeared into the dark night.
Test Sentence 2: The spy escaped safely.
(causal)
Question: What did the spy find in the safe?
4. Emily sat happily in the sand at the edge
of the sea. She was building a castle with
her bucket and spade. Carefully she filled
her bucket to the top with sand. Then she
turned the bucket over in the sand. Emily
tapped the bucket gently with her spade.
Then she lifted the bucket and looked
underneath.
Test Sentence 1: Emily built a sandcastle.
(causal)
Emily was very pleased with herself. She
loved building castles on the beach. Emily
set about filling her bucket again. She
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wanted to build more castles. But Emily had Test Sentence 2: The bandits could not hunt
not noticed that a wind had begun to blow in the dark. (causal)
in from the sea. She did not see the huge Question: What was wrong with the
wave coming towards her. The wave cowboys horse?
crashed heavily onto the sand. When the
wave finally rolled away, Emily began to 6. The thief looked cautiously around as he
cry. lifted the money from the safe. He wanted
to be sure nobody had seen him break into
Test Sentence 2: Emily wore a swimming
suit. (static)
Question: What was Emily building?
5. The cowboy was riding his horse at great
speed through the mountains. He could hear
the bandits drawing closer. The cowboy
could feel his horse was tiring. He knew he
had to stop but he had to evade capture.
Taking a risk, the cowboy rode into a cave
hidden behind a rock and waited. Soon he
heard the bandits ride past the cave.
Test Sentence I: The cowboy had a gun and
holster. (static)
the bank. He put the money into his hold all
and left by the back door. He had almost
reached his car when he saw the two
policemen. They were waiting for him in
the shadows.
Test Sentence I: The police wanted to catch
the thief. (causal)
The thief threw the hold all into the bushes
and fumbled with the key for his car. But it
was too late. The policemen caught him
before he could make his escape. At the
police station the villain denied the robbery.
But he was convicted because of his own
From the safety of the cave, the cowboy foolishness. He had forgotten to wear
watched as the bandits searched for him in gloves. The police were able to place the
the valley below. They remained there, thief at the scene of the crime.
circling on their horses for some time. They
were clearly disappointed to have lost their Test Sentence 2: The policemen wore blue
prey. When darkness fell, the leader ordered uniforms. (static)
the men back to the hideout. They would Question: What did the thief do with his
have to think of another way to capture the hold-all?
cowboy.
7. The football match was coming to an
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end. Neither team had scored a goal and the
crowd was tense with excitement. Tom was Test Sentence I: The bear was in pain.
racing towards the goal with the ball. He (causal)
took a shot but it was too wide. The crowd
groaned as the ball went back into play. It
looked as though no one was going to win.
Suddenly, Jan scored from the edge of the
pitch. Tom cheered loudly and ran over to
hug Jan.
Test Sentence 1: Tom and Jan played in
football boots. (static)
The whistle blew signalling the end of the
match. The crowd was cheering loudly for
Jan. Her team-mates gathered round her,
lifted her on to their shoulders and carried
her off the pitch. Jan was declared man of
the match for scoring the final goal. She
was treated like a hero.
Test Sentence 2: Jan's goal had won the
football match. (causal)
Question: How did everyone know that the
match was over?
8. John and Francis watched as the bear
approached the girls. The bear was growling
and showing its teeth. The girls were
terrified but were frozen with fear. Francis
fired his pistols one after the other. A bullet
struck the bear's ear and it reared up on its
hind legs. It let out a terrifying howl.
Cathie began to scream. The bear was
moving slowly, getting closer and closer.
Now that it was in pain it was even more
dangerous. Snarling, the bear swiped at the
girls. John knew he had to act fast. He
quickly raised his rifle to his shoulder and
fired once. The bear fell to the ground and
did not move.
Test Sentence 2: The bear had huge paws.
(static)
Question: Where did the bullet hit the bear?
9. The Duchess flung the baby at Alice and
hurried out of the room. Alice caught the
baby with some difficulty for it was a queer
shaped creature and held out its arms and
legs in all directions. Alice was holding on
tightly to the crying baby. When Alice
looked down the baby's nose had turned up
and his eyes had become very small. The
baby started to grunt.
Test Sentence 1: The baby sounded like a
pig. (static)
Alice felt that she could not carry the baby
any further. She thought it was quite an ugly
child, but was quite handsome as a pig. She
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was sure the tiny child would be happier in
the wood with the other animals. So Alice
set the baby down. She felt quite relieved to
see the pig trot away into the wood.
Test Sentence 2: The baby had become a
pig. (causal)
Question: What did Alice think of the baby?
10. The Witch was very cruel to Dorothy
and Toto. She made Dorothy work very
hard all day and threatened to hit her. Once
the Witch struck Toto so hard with her
umbrella that he flew at her and bit her hard
on the leg. But the Witch was too wicked to
feel anything at all. Instead the old woman
just laughed.
Test Sentence 1: The old woman did not
feel the pain. (causal)
Dorothy was very angry. She shouted at the
Witch to stop being so cruel. But the Witch
just sneered and ordered her to get back to
work. The little girl was so mad, she picked
up a bucket of water and threw it at the
Witch. The Witch was soaked with water
from head to foot. Dorothy watched as the
Witch melted away.
Test Sentence 2: The wicked witch flew on
a broom stick. (static)
Question: What did the Witch use to hit
Toto?
11. When the battle was over, Lucy found
Edmund a little way back from the fighting
line. He was covered with blood, and his
face was a nasty green colour. Lucy
remembered the precious red liquid she had
been given for a Christmas present. AsIan
the lion told her to give some liquid to
Edmund. Edmund leapt to his feet in perfect
health.
Test Sentence 1: The lion was able to talk.
(static)
Edmund fought well in the battle. He had
beaten the giants and broken the Witch's
wand. Without him the battle may have
been lost. AsIan the lion walked slowly
towards the boy. He was proud of Edmund.
The lion touched Edmund on the shoulder
with his sword. Then he gave the boy a fine
suit of armour.
Test Sentence 2: The boy had just become a
knight. (causal)
Question: What had happened to the
Witch's wand?
12. Lucy, Edmund and Eustace were staring
at a picture on the wall. It was a picture of a
ship sailing on an ocean. But it was no
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ordinary picture. The children could hear
the wind blowing and the water splashing
the side of the boat. The boat was bobbing
up and down in the waves. The picture
looked like it was moving. The sea was
crashing violently against the rocks.
Test Sentence 1: The picture become real.
(causal)
in flashing lights. (static)
A door opened in the side of the ship and a
strange figure appeared. It looked almost
like a man but had long arms, short legs and
a huge head with haunting black eyes. Sam
saw the funny looking man and cried out
The creature looked up in surprise. Then the
door closed and the ship rose slowly off the
ground.
Eustace rushed to pull the picture off the
wall. Edmund and Lucy tried to stop him. Test Sentence 2: Sam had given the creature
But the children found themselves standing quite a fright. (causal)
on the picture frame. There was no glass in Question: What did Sam see in his garden?
front of them, just real sea. A gust of wind
blew them off the frame. They struggled to 14. The mermen lived far out to sea, where
stay afloat in the stormy sea. the water is blue as the bluest cornflower.
The merman king had six beautiful
Test Sentence 2: The children were soaking
wet. (static)
Question: What did Eustace try to do?
13. One night Sam woke up with a start. He
heard a strange sound coming from outside
his window. Sam crept out of bed, hid
behind the curtain and looked outside. He
let out a small scream. An enormous
spaceship appeared to have landed in his
garden. The ship filled his garden
completely. The roses in the flower-bed
were completely crushed.
Test Sentence 1: The spaceship was covered
daughters and the youngest was the prettiest
of them all. Her skin was soft and delicate
as a rose leaf and her eyes were as blue as
the deepest sea. The young girl had a
beautiful shiny tail. She could swim as fast
as any other creature in the ocean
Test Sentence 1: The girl was a mermaid.
(causal)
One night, the mermaid rescued a prince
from the stormy sea. They fell in love, but
the mermaid could not live out of the water.
So the mermaid sang sadly to the prince
every night. The merman king could not
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bear to see his daughter so sad. He cast a
spell over the mermaid and her tail
disappeared. She ran happily to meet the
prince on the shore.
Test Sentence 2: The Prince wore a gold
crown. (static)
Question: Who was the prettiest mermaid?
15. There once was a king who had eleven
sons and one daughter. The king married a
wicked queen who was jealous of the
children. She sent the little girl away and
made the king banish his sons from the
kingdom. On the day the boys left the
palace, the queen cast a spell over them.
Instead of eleven boys, eleven wild swans
flew from the palace gates.
Test Sentence 1:The boys were covered in
white feathers. (static)
The swan princes searched for their sister.
When they found her she promised to break
the spell. She made eleven magic shirts for
her brothers. When she threw the shirts over
the swans, they were transformed into
eleven handsome princes. But the girl did
not have enough magic cloth to finish all
the shirts. The youngest prince would
forever have a swan's wing in the place of
an arm.
Test Sentence 2: The magic shirt was
missing a sleeve. (causal)
Question: How many sons did the king
have?
16. Long ago there lived a young girl named
Brave Heart who had learned to hunt. One
winter, when the young men were out
hunting, the women of the village saw some
warriors heading towards them. They were
filled with fear. With the men out hunting
they did not know who would protect them ..
Brave Heart took up her bow and arrow and
started to sing. A lovely rainbow appeared
in the sky
Test Sentence I:Brave Heart had conjured
a rainbow. (causal)
The women watched in wonder as Brave
Heart transformed herself into a rainbow.
The beautiful rainbow arched over the
village. The warriors too saw the mighty
rainbow arch above them. Brave Heart
stood in the midst of the rainbow. The
young girl raised her bow high and started
to shoot. The lightening arrows fell as the
warriors fled.
Test Sentence 2: The bow and arrow were
magic.( static)
Question: Why were the women frightened?
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Filler Passages with brick wall on one side and sloping roof
on the other. There was no floor in this
tunnel: you had to step from rafter to rafter.
Otherwise you would find yourself falling
through the ceiling of the room below.
17. In ancient times Noah was collecting
together two of every animal to put in his
ark. But the she-cat refused to go in before
she had caught a mouse. After all, she
thought, there might be no mice where she Test Sentence I: The tunnel had no floor.
was going, and she loved meat. So while all
the other animals were lining up two by Polly had used a bit of the tunnel as a
two, she was nowhere to be seen. smugglers cave. She had made a floor out of
broken boxes. In her cave she kept a box
Test Sentence 1: All the animals lined up.
When all the other beasts were aboard,
Noah could not wait any longer. He began
to close the door, when up ran the she-cat.
She made a great leap and squeezed
through, but the closing door sliced her tail
clean off. No-one bothered to mend the tail,
so to this day the descendants of the she-cat
go tail-less.
Test Sentence 2: Noah fixed the she-eat's
tail.
Question: What did the she-cat do before
she went into the arc?
18. Polly had discovered that if you opened
a little door in the box-room attic of her
house you would find a dark place behind it
which you could get to by a little careful
climbing. The dark place was a long tunnel
containing various treasures, and a story she
was writing and usually a few apples. Polly
had placed empty bottles in the cave to
make it look more like smugglers cavern.
Test Sentence 2: Polly kept full bottles.
Question: What did Polly use to make the
floor?
19. A beautiful princess was walking along
a country road when she saw a large pig
sitting on the grass verge. Being of a kindly
nature she stopped to speak to it. She
greeted the pig with a smile. But the pig did
not smile. He told the princess that he was
really a handsome prince. He had upset the
local witch who had changed him into a pig.
Test Sentence 1: The pig upset the witch.
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The pig explained that only a kiss from a
beautiful princess could break the witch's
spell. The princess was a little doubtful. She
did not know whether to trust the pig. But
being a kind-hearted princess, she bent
down, shut her eyes and planted a kiss on
the end of the pig's rubbery snout.
Immediately the princess also turned into a
pig.
Test Sentence 2: The princess kicked the
pig.
Question: Why had the prince been turned
into a pig?
20. Eric longed to be a policeman. He loved
snooping around and was always getting
into trouble for listening at doors. But when
Eric's grandma was burgled, his curiosity
paid off. Eric raced over to his gran's house
to search for clues. In the flower-bed below
the kitchen window Eric found a large
footprint.
Test Sentence 1: Eric searched for clues in
the house
Eric traced the footprint onto a piece of
paper. Then he ran down to the local shoe
shop and showed it to the shopkeeper. The
shopkeeper explained that the footprint was
unusual as the markings on the sole
belonged to a rare make of shoe. In fact
only one person had ever bought a shoe like
that from the shop. Excitedly, Eric took this
information to the local police who used it
to catch the villain. Eric had single-
handedly solved the crime.
Test Sentence 2: Eric went to the fire
station.
Question: What did Eric want to be?
21. Once a dog stole a juicy bone from a
butcher's shop and ran off with it in his
mouth. He stopped by a calm river to catch
his breath. When the dog looked down, he
was surprised to see another dog staring up
at him. The other dog also had a bone in his
mouth. But his bone looked far more meaty
and juicy than the stolen bone.
Test Sentence 1: The other dog had a meaty
bone.
The first dog growled at the dog in the river.
He bared his teeth and demanded the other
dog's bone. Then he lunged for the meaty
juicy bone in the other dog's mouth. But as
he did so his own bone fell into the river.
The dog realised he had been growling at
his own reflection. But it was too late and
the dog watched his bone being swept
away.
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He made the scarecrow's head first and as
soon as he painted on the ears, the
scarecrow could hear the farmer talking.
Then the farmer painted on an eye and the
22. Harry had been given a new kite for his scarecrow began looking around. Itwas his
birthday. Itwas a magnificent kite, the first look at the world and he was very
Test Sentence 2: The dog was growling at a
rabbit.
Question: Where did the dog get the bone?
biggest Harry had ever seen. It was shaped CUrIOus.
like a diamond, painted in lots of different
colours and had two long silver streamers
that would trail behind it when it flew.
Harry and his dad took the kite out for it's
first flight.
Test Sentence 1:The farmer painted on an
eye.
The farmer painted the second eye a little
bigger than the first, so the scarecrow could
Test Sentence 1: The kite had two long see much better than before. The scarecrow
silver streamers. watched as the farmer painted his nose and
mouth. Then he saw the farmer make his
Harry held on to the string as the wind body and attach his arms and legs. Finally
picked up the kite and it soared into the air. the farmer fixed the scarecrow's head onto
The streamers looked like lightening as they the body. The scarecrow was complete, and
twisted in the wind. Suddenly, a gust of was quite disappointed when he was put on
wind blew the kite into a tree. Harry could a pole in the farmer's field.
not reach it but Harry's dad had an idea. He Test Sentence 2: The scarecrow was not
raced home and fetched his painting ladder. completed.
Itwas just tall enough to reach the kite. Question: What part of the scarecrow did
Harry soon had the kite soaring up into the the farmer make first?
clouds once more.
Test Sentence 2: The ladder was not quite
tall enough.
Question: What shape was Harry's kite?
23. Once a farmer decided to build a
scarecrow to stop the birds eating his crops.
24. John and Sam paddled their dinghy in
the warm rock pool. The water was calm
and the beach was just the other side of the
rocks. The children lazily basked in the
warm sun, their bare feet trailing in the sea.
Suddenly, without warning, a huge wave
crashed into the rock pool and pushed the
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boat over the rocks and into the sea. anymore, the Sun took up the challenge.
And he began to shine with warm, soft,
golden rays. Soon the man began loosening
his coat. The sun continued to shine,
sending bright light everywhere. The man
John and Sam clung tightly to the sides of gasped with the heat, took off his coat and
Test Sentence 1: A wave pushed the boat.
the boat. Sam looked around for the paddles slung it over his shoulder. The Sun had
but the wave had washed them away. The shown that the strongest do not always win.
little boat bobbed uncontrollably on the
waves. Finally, the wind dropped and the
sea was calm again. The boys used their
hands to steer the dinghy. Together they
managed to guide it to the safety of the
beach.
Test Sentence 2: The boys used their feet.
Question: What happened to the paddles?
25. The North Wind was very conceited and
believed himself to be much stronger than
the Sun. One day the Sun challenged him to
prove his strength by blowing the coat off a
man who was walking below. The North
Wind began to blow with all his might
around the man, trying to tear off his coat.
But the man just pulled the coat more firmly
around him and shivered in the cold.
Test Sentence 2: The man gasped and took
off his coat.
Question: How did the Sun want the North
Wind to prove his strength?
26. William had a favourite teacher at
school. Certain members of his class always
put pretty little posies of flowers on her
desk every morning. William was
determined to outshine his classmates. The
next morning before he set out for school,
he went out into the garden carrying a large
basket and a pair scissors. He headed
straight for the greenhouse.
Test Sentence 1: William carried a shopping
bag.
The greenhouse was a riot of colour.
William worked very hard and finally
staggered out of the greenhouse beneath a
piled-up basket of blooms. The greenhouse
When the North Wind was too tired to blow looked barren and deserted. Then William
Test Sentence 1: The North Wind blew
around the trees.
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set off for school. On entering the
classroom, his teacher was amazed to see
her desk and chair covered in withering
blooms.
Test Sentence 2: Then William set off for
his school.
Question: Why did William want the
flowers in the greenhouse?
27. Mr Twit was a very hairy-faced man.
The whole of his face except for his eyes,
his nose and his forehead, was covered in
thick hair. The stuff even sprouted in
revolting tufts out of his ear-holes. Mr Twit
felt that his hairiness made him look
terrifically clever and grand. But in truth he
was neither of these things.
Test Sentence 1: Mr Twit thought he looked
clever.
Mr Twit was a twit. He was born a twit.
And now at the age of sixty he was a bigger
twit than ever. The hair on Mr Twit's face
grew in spikes that stuck out straight like
the bristles of a nailbrush. And how often
did Mr Twit wash this bristly nail brushy
face of his? The answer is never, he hadn't
washed it for years.
Question: What was sticking out of Mr
Twit's ears?
28. The sailor stood on the deck of his ship
and held up his telescope. He could see the
pirate ship sailing towards him. The Jolly
Roger was blowing in the wind. The sailor
wanted to protect his cargo from the
thieves. The maps he was carrying would
enable his navy to win the battle against the
pirates.
Test Sentence 1: The sailor did not want his
cargo.
The sailor loaded his canon. He aimed the
barrel directly at the enemy vessel and fired.
The first shot missed the pirates and they
carried on advancing. The sailor fired again.
This time the missile found its target. The
sailor watched as the pirates jumped into the
sea to escape the blast. He and his crew
picked up the pirates and threw them below
decks.
Test Sentence 2: The pirates jumped into
the sea.
Question: What did the sailor fire at the
pirates?
29. Owl was at home warming himself by
Test Sentence 2: Mr Twit never washed his the fire. He was eating hot buttered toast
face. and pea soup for supper. Owl heard a loud
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sound at the front door. He wondered who
could possibly be banging and pounding on
his door on such a cold night. But when
Owl opened the door wide, only the snow
and the cold of Winter were outside.
Test Sentence 1: Owl did not pull the door
open wide.
Owl invited Winter inside to warm himself
by the fire. But Winter came in very fast
and a cold wind pushed Owl against the
wall. Winter ran around the room and blew
out the fire. The snow whooshed up the
staircase and into all the rooms in Owl's
house. Owl was most annoyed. He opened
his door and angrily told Winter to leave.
Winter rushed wildly out of the house and
Owl gladly slammed the door behind him.
Test Sentence 2: Winter rushed wildly out
of the house.
Question: What was owl having for supper?
30. The fox crept up the dark tunnel to the
mouth of his hole. He poked his long
handsome face out into the night and sniffed
the air once. He moved an inch or two
forward and stopped. He sniffed again. He
was always very careful coming out of his
hole. The fox inched forward a little more.
The front half of his body was now out in
the open.
Test Sentence 1: The fox inched out a lot.
His black nose twitched from side to side,
sniffing for the scent of danger. He found
none and was just about to go trotting off
into the wood when he heard a rustling in
the bushes. Then a loud bang rang out and
the smoke from a gun floated into the air.
The fox darted back into his hole and lay
very still and quiet.
Test Sentence 2: The smoke floated up.
Question: What was the fox sniffing for?
There once was a little girl who had a magic
finger. Whenever she got cross she would
get very hot allover. Then the tip of the
forefinger of her right hand would tingle
terribly. Suddenly a flash would come out
of the tip of her finger and touch the person
who had made her cross. Afterwards, all
sorts of strange things would start to
happen.
Test Sentence 1: A flash would come right
out of her toes.
One day, at school, the little girl's teacher
made her very cross. The little girl put the
magic finger on her teacher. All of a sudden
cat whiskers began growing out of the
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teacher's face. They grew so fast that soon
they were out of her ears. When she turned
around she had grown a huge bushy tail as
well. The teacher was never quite the same
again.
Test Sentence 2: The teacher had grown a
bushy tail.
Question: What happened to the little girl's
teacher?
32. Robert and Miss Cannon were enjoying
a quiet picnic on the riverbank. Robert was
just offering Miss Cannon a plate of
sandwiches when his eyes spotted
something on the road leading from the
village to the riverside. He froze with
horror. A curious figure was cycling
towards them with a blackened face, a few
drooping feathers on its head and a door-
mat flying like a cape in the wind.
Test Sentence 1: A figure was skating
towards them.
Robert could see it was William. William
came to the end of the road. He did not stop
or turn on to the other roads by the
riverside. Instead, with a set face he rode
onto the riverbank and straight towards
them. William rode over the sandwiches,
rolls and cakes and straight into the river.
Test Sentence 2: William rode straight
towards them.
Question: What was Robert offering to Miss
Canon when he first saw William?
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Appendix IV
Experiment 4 and Experiment 5 Test Materials
248
List One
1. John looked behind the wagon and saw
the Red Indians approaching. He called for
his father. Henry grabbed his rifle and
pulled himself up to the front of the wagon.
As the Red Indians rode closer, John could
see they were carrying weapons. He raised
his own weapon and aimed at the enemy.
But Henry held up his hand. John took his
finger off the trigger and carefully lowered
his gun.
Test Sentence 1: Henry wanted John to
wait. (causal)
The Indians were so close that John could
see their brightly coloured faces. John's
hand was firmly on his rifle as he waited in
the wagon. Then Henry gave the signal and
John and Henry opened fire. The battle
lasted only a few minutes but seemed a lot
longer. Finally, the Indians had weakened.
They turned and disappeared into the
mountain range.
Test Sentence 2: The Indians rode
horses. (static )
Question 1: What was John holding as he
waited in the wagon?
Question 2: Who was attacking John and
Henry?
2. The fishermen were lost in a storm. Their
boat was being thrown from side to side by
the wind. Many of their belongings had
been lost overboard and a huge wave had
crashed across the deck, smashing the mast.
The men struggled to keep control of the
wheel. They used all their strength to fight
the wind and rain.
Test Sentence 1: The men were soaking
wet. (static)
The men knew they were running out of
time. The boat was being forced towards the
rocks. The Captain knew they could not
save the ship and he ordered the men into
the life boat. The ship crashed into the
rocks. A huge hole appeared in the side of
the hull. The men watched as the boat sank
beneath the waves.
Test Sentence 2: The ship filled with water.
(causal)
Question 1: What happened to the mast?
Question 2: What did the Captain order the
men to do?
3. The spy dropped from the wall
surrounding the large house. He pulled out
his torch and made his way over to the open
window. As quietly as possible, he pulled
himself over the window ledge and crept
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into the office. He found the safe hidden
under the desk. The spy entered the code
into the panel on the safe door. He found
the secret plans in the safe.
Test Sentence 1: The code opened the safe
door. (causal)
Carefully, the spy photographed the plans.
Then he slipped them back into the safe
where he had found them. With the camera
film safely in the bottom of his backpack,
the spy slipped out of the office the way he
came in. In the darkness, he scaled the wall
once more. His mission complete, he
disappeared into the dark night.
Test Sentence 2: The spy was dressed all in
black. (static)
Question 1: What did the spy find in the
safe?
Question 2: What did the spy do when he
found the plans?
4. Emily sat happily in the sand at the edge
of the sea. She was building a castle with
her bucket and spade. Carefully she filled
her bucket to the top with sand. Then she
turned the bucket over in the sand. Emily
tapped it gently with her spade. Then she
lifted the bucket to reveal a perfect sand
castle.
Test Sentence 1: The sand in the bucket was
wet. (static)
Emily was very pleased with herself. She
loved building castles on the beach. Emily
set about filling her bucket again. She
wanted to build more castles. But Emily had
not noticed that a wind had begun to blow
in from the sea. She did not see the huge
wave coming towards her. The wave
crashed heavily onto the sand. When the
wave finally rolled away, Emily began to
cry.
Test Sentence 2: The wave washed the
castle away . (causal)
Question 1: What was Emily building?
Question 2: How was Emily feeling?
5. The cowboy was riding his horse at great
speed through the mountains. He could hear
the bandits drawing closer. The cowboy
could feel his horse was tiring. He knew he
had to stop but he had to evade capture.
Taking a risk, the cowboy rode into a cave
hidden behind a rock and waited. Soon he
heard the bandits ride past the cave.
Test Sentence 1: The bandits could not see
the cowboy. (causal)
From the safety of the cave, the cowboy
watched as the bandits searched for him in
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the valley below. They remained there,
circling on their horses for some time. They
were clearly disappointed to have lost their
prey. When darkness fell, the leader ordered
the men back to the hideout. They would
have to think of another way to capture the
cowboy.
Test Sentence 2: The bandits were carrying
rifles. (static)
Question 1: What was wrong with the
cowboy's horse?
Question 2: Where were the bandits looking
for the cowboy?
6. John and Francis watched as the bear
approached the girls. The bear was growling
and showing its teeth. The girls were
terrified but were frozen with fear. Francis
fired his pistols one after the other. A bullet
struck the bear's ear and it reared up on its
hind legs. It let out a terrifying howl.
Test Sentence 1: The bear had huge paws.
(static)
Cathie began to scream. The bear was
moving slowly, getting closer and closer.
Now that it was in pain it was even more
dangerous. Snarling, the bear swiped at the
girls. John knew he had to act fast. He
quickly raised his rifle to his shoulder and
fired once. The bear fell to the ground and
did not move.
Test Sentence 2. John shot the bear dead.
(causal)
Question 1: Where did the bullet hit the
bear?
Question 2: What did John do?
7. The Witch was very cruel to Dorothy and
Toto. She made Dorothy work very hard all
day and threatened to hit her. Once the
Witch struck Toto so hard with her umbrella
that he flew at her and bit her hard on the
leg. But the Witch was too wicked to feel
any pain. So Toto had not hurt the cruel old
woman.
Test Sentence 1: The old woman flew on a
broomstick. (static)
Dorothy was very angry. She shouted at the
Witch to stop being so cruel. But the Witch
just sneered and ordered her to get back to
work. The little girl was so mad, she picked
up a bucket of water and threw it at the
Witch. The Witch was soaked with water
from head to foot. Dorothy watched as the
Witch melted away.
Test Sentence 2: The water made the
wicked witch melt. (causal)
Question 1: What did the Witch use to hit
Toto?
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Question 2: Why was Dorothy angry with
the Witch?
8. When the battle was over, Lucy found
Edmund a little way back from the fighting
line. He was covered with blood, and his
face was a nasty green colour. Lucy
remembered the precious red liquid she had
been given for a Christmas present. She
poured a few drops of red liquid into
Edmund's mouth. Edmund leapt to his feet
in perfect health.
Test Sentence 1: The red liquid healed
Edmund's wounds. (causal)
Edmund fought well in the battle. He had
beaten the giants and broken the Witch's
wand. Without him the battle may have
been lost. Asian the lion walked slowly
towards the boy. He was proud of Edmund.
The lion pinned a gold medal to Edmund's
jacket. Then the lion let Edmund ride on his
back.
Test Sentence 2: The lion was able to talk.
(static)
Question 1: What had happened to the
Witch's wand?
Question 2: Who was proud of Edmund?
9. One night Sam woke up with a start. He
heard a strange sound coming from outside
his window. Sam crept out of bed, hid
behind the curtain and looked outside. He
let out a small scream. An enormous
spaceship appeared to have landed in his
garden. The ship filled his garden
completely. The roses in the flower-bed
were completely crushed.
Test Sentence 1: The spaceship landed on
the roses. (causal)
A door opened in the side of the ship and a
strange figure appeared. It looked almost
like a man but had long arms, short legs and
a huge head with haunting black eyes. Sam
cried out and the creature looked up in
surprise. Then the door closed and the ship
rose slowly off the ground. Quick as a flash
it was gone.
Test Sentence 2: The ship was covered in
flashing lights. (static)
Question 1: What did Sam see in his
garden?
Question 2: What colour were the alien's
eyes?
10. The mermen lived far out to sea, where
the water is blue as the bluest cornflower.
The merman king had six beautiful
daughters and the youngest was the prettiest
of them all. Her skin was soft and delicate
as a rose leaf and her eyes were as blue as
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the deepest sea. But the young daughter
could only swim in the sea. She longed to
walk on the land and feel the sand between
her toes.
Test Sentence 1: The girl had a fish tail.
(static)
One night, the mermaid rescued a prince
from the stormy sea. They fell in love, but
the mermaid could not live out of the water.
So the mermaid sang sadly to the prince
every night. The merman king could not
bear to see his daughter so sad. He cast a
spell over the mermaid and her tail
disappeared. She ran happily to meet the
prince on the shore.
Test Sentence 2: The spell gave the girl
legs. (causal)
Question I: Who was the prettiest
mermaid?
Question 2: Who did the mermaid rescue?
11. There once was a king who had eleven
sons and one daughter. The king married a
wicked queen who was jealous of the
children. She sent the little girl away and
made the king banish his sons from the
kingdom. On the day the boys left the
palace, the queen cast a spell over them.
Instead of eleven boys, eleven wild swans
flew from the palace gates.
Test Sentence I: The queen turned the boys
into wild swans. (causal)
The swan princes searched for their sister.
When they found her she promised to break
the spell. She made eleven magic shirts for
her brothers. When she threw the shirts over
the swans, they were transformed into
eleven handsome princes. But the girl did
not have enough magic cloth to finish all
the shirts. The youngest prince would
forever have a swan's wing in the place of
an arm.
Test Sentence 2: His arm was covered in
white feathers. (static)
Question 1: How many sons did the king
have?
Question 2: What did the girl make for her
brothers?
12. Long ago there lived a young girl named
Brave Heart who had learned to hunt. One
winter, when the young men were out
hunting, the women of the village saw some
warriors heading towards them. They were
filled with fear. With the men out hunting
they did not know who would protect them.
The young girl vowed to defend the women.
She took up her bow and arrow and circled
the villagers.
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Test Sentence 1: The young girl was an
indian brave. (static)
The women watched in wonder as Brave
Heart transformed herself into a rainbow.
The beautiful rainbow arched over the
village. The warriors too saw the mighty
rainbow arch above them. Brave Heart
stood in the midst of the rainbow. The
young girl raised her bow and started to
shoot. Lightning fell as the warriors fled
from the village.
Test Sentence 2: The arrows were made of
lightening. (causal)
Question 1: Why were the women
frightened?
Question 2: What did Brave Heart use to
protect the village?
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List Two
1. John looked behind the wagon and saw
the Red Indians approaching. He called for
his father. Henry grabbed his rifle and
pulled himself up to the front of the wagon.
As the Red Indians rode closer, John could
see they were carrying weapons. He raised
his own weapon and aimed at the enemy.
But Henry told John to wait so John took
his finger off the trigger and slowly lowered
his gun.
Test Sentence 1: John wore a cowboy hat.
(static)
The Indians were so close that John could
see their brightly coloured faces. John's
hand was firmly on his rifle as he waited in
the wagon. Then Henry gave the signal and
John and Henry opened fire. The battle
lasted only a few minutes but seemed a lot
longer. Finally, the Indians had weakened.
They turned and disappeared into the
mountain range.
Test Sentence 2: The Indians were beaten.
(causal)
Question 1: What was John holding as he
waited in the wagon?
Question 2: Who was attacking John and
Henry?
2. The fishermen were lost in a storm.
Their boat was being thrown from side to
side by the wind. Many of their belongings
had been lost overboard and a huge wave
had crashed across the deck, smashing the
mast. The men struggled to keep control of
the wheel. They used all their strength to
fight the wind and rain.
Test Sentence 1: The boat was hard to
steer. (causal)
The men knew they were running out of
time. The boat was being forced towards
the rocks. The Captain knew they could not
save the ship and he ordered the men into
the life boat. The ship crashed into the
rocks. A huge hole appeared in the side of
the hull. The ship filled with water and
began to sink.
Test Sentence 2: The men wore lifejackets.
(static)
Question 1: What happened to the mast?
Question 2: What did the Captain order the
men to do?
3. The spy dropped from the wall
surrounding the large house. He pulled out
his torch and made his way over to the open
window. As quietly as possible, he pulled
himself over the window ledge and crept
into the office. He found the safe hidden
under the desk. The spy entered the code
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into the panel and the door opened. He
found the plans in the safe.
Test Sentence 1: The spy carried a gun.
(static)
Carefully, the spy photographed the plans.
Then he slipped them back into the safe
where he had found them. With the camera
film safely in the bottom of his backpack,
the spy slipped out of the office the way he
came in. In the darkness, he found the wall
once more. He jumped safely to the ground
and ran into the dark night.
Test Sentence 2: He climbed over the wall.
(causal)
Question 1: What did the spy find in the
safe?
Question 2: What did the spy do when he
found the plans?
4. Emily sat happily in the sand at the edge
of the sea. She was building a castle with
her bucket and spade. Carefully she filled
her bucket to the top with sand. Then she
turned the bucket over in the sand. Emily
tapped the bucket gently with her spade.
Then she lifted the bucket and looked
underneath.
Test Sentence 1: Emily built a sandcastle.
(causal)
Emily was very pleased with herself. She
loved building castles on the beach. Emily
set about filling her bucket again. She
wanted to build more castles. But Emily
had not noticed that a wind had begun to
blow in from the sea. She did not see the
huge wave coming towards her. The wave
crashed heavily onto the sand and washed
away Emily's sandcastle. Emily began to
cry.
Test Sentence 2: Emily wore a swimming
suit. (static)
Question 1: What was Emily building?
Question 2: How was Emily feeling?
5. The cowboy was riding his horse at great
speed through the mountains. He could
hear the bandits drawing closer. The
cowboy could feel his horse was tiring. He
knew he had to stop but he had to evade
capture. Taking a risk, the cowboy rode
into a cave hidden behind a rock and
waited. The bandits could not see him in
the cave.
Test Sentence 1: The cowboy had a gun and
holster. (static)
From the safety of the cave, the cowboy
watched as the bandits searched for him in
the valley below. They remained there,
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circling on their horses for some time. They
were clearly disappointed to have lost their
prey. When darkness fell, the leader
ordered the men back to the hideout. They
would have to think of another way to
capture the cowboy.
Test Sentence 2: The bandits could not hunt
in the dark. (causal)
Question I: What was wrong with the
cowboy's horse?
Question 2: Where were the bandits looking
for the cowboy?
6. John and Francis watched as the bear
approached the girls. The bear was
growling and showing its teeth. The girls
were terrified but were frozen with fear.
Francis fired his pistols one after the other.
A bullet struck the bear's ear and it reared
up on its hind legs. It let out a terrifying
howl.
Test Sentence I: The bear was in pain.
(causal)
Cathie began to scream. The bear was
moving slowly, getting closer and closer.
Now that it was in pain it was even more
dangerous. Snarling, the bear swiped at the
girls. John knew he had to act fast. He
quickly raised his rifle to his shoulder and
fired once. The bear was badly hurt by
John's bullet.
Test Sentence 2: The bear had huge paws.
(static)
Question 1: Where did the bullet hit the
bear?
Question 2: What did John do?
7. The Witch was very cruel to Dorothy and
Toto. She made Dorothy work very hard all
day and threatened to hit her. Once the
Witch struck Toto so hard with her umbrella
that he flew at her and bit her hard on the
leg. But the Witch was too wicked to feel
anything at all. The old womanjust
laughed out loud.
Test Sentence I: The old woman did not
feel the pain. (causal)
Dorothy was very angry. She shouted at the
Witch to stop being so cruel. But the Witch
just sneered and ordered her to get back to
work. The little girl was so mad, she picked
up a bucket of water and threw it at the
Witch. The Witch was soaked with water
from head to foot. Dorothy watched as the
water melted the witch away.
Test Sentence 2: The wicked witch flew on
a broomstick. (static)
Question 1: What did the Witch use to hit
Toto?
Question 2: Why was Dorothy angry with
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the Witch?
8. When the battle was over, Lucy found
Edmund a little way back from the fighting
line. He was covered with blood, and his
face was a nasty green colour. Lucy
remembered the precious red liquid she had
been given for a Christmas present. AsIan
the lion told her to give some liquid to
Edmund. The liquid helped to heal
Edmund's wounds.
Test Sentence 1: The lion was able to talk.
(static)
Edmund fought well in the battle. He had
beaten the giants and broken the Witch's
wand. Without him the battle may have
been lost. AsIan the lion walked slowly
towards the boy. He was proud of Edmund.
AsIan put something on Edmund's jacket.
Edmund stared proudly at the shiny gold
medal pinned there.
Test Sentence 2: AsIan gave Edmund a
medal. (causal)
Question 1: What happened to the Witch's
wand?
Question 2: Who was proud of Edmund?
9. One night Sam woke up with a start. He
heard a strange sound coming from outside
his window. Sam crept out of bed, hid
behind the curtain and looked outside. He
let out a small scream. An enormous
spaceship appeared to have landed in his
garden. The huge spaceship filled his
garden completely and the flower-beds were
all completely ruined.
Test Sentence 1: The spaceship was covered
in flashing lights. (static)
A door opened in the side of the ship and a
strange figure appeared. It looked almost
like a man but had long arms, short legs and
a huge head with haunting black eyes. Sam
saw the funny looking man and cried out.
The creature looked up in surprise. Then the
door closed and the ship rose slowly off the
ground.
Test Sentence 2: Sam had given the creature
quite a fright. (causal)
Question 1: What did Sam see in his
garden?
Question 2: What colour were the alien's
eyes?
10. The mermen lived far out to sea, where
the water is blue as the bluest cornflower.
The merman king had six beautiful
daughters and the youngest was the prettiest
of them all. Her skin was soft and delicate
as a rose leaf and her eyes were as blue as
the deepest sea. The young girl had a
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beautiful shiny tail. She could swim as fast white feathers. (static)
as any other creature in the ocean
Test Sentence 1: The girl was a mermaid.
(causal)
One night, the mermaid rescued a prince
from the stormy sea. They fell in love, but
the mermaid could not live out of the water.
So the mermaid sang sadly to the prince
every night. The merman king could not
bear to see his daughter so sad. The king
cast a spell over the mermaid and her tail
disappeared. Two perfect legs appeared in
the place of her tail.
Test Sentence 2: The King wore a gold
crown. (static)
Question 1: Who was the prettiest
mermaid?
Question 2: Who did the mermaid rescue?
11. There once was a king who had eleven
sons and one daughter. The king married a
wicked queen who was jealous of the
children. She sent the little girl away and
made the king banish his sons from the
kingdom. On the day the boys left the
palace, the queen turned the boys into
swans. Instead of eleven boys, eleven wild
swans flew from the palace gates.
Test Sentence 1: The boys were covered in
The swan princes searched for their sister.
When they found her she promised to break
the spell. She made eleven magic shirts for
her brothers. When she threw the shirts
over the swans, they were transformed into
eleven handsome princes. But the girl did
not have enough magic cloth to finish all
the shirts. The youngest prince would
forever have a swan's wing in the place of
an arm.
Test Sentence 2: The magic shirt was
missing a sleeve. (causal)
Question 1: How many sons did the king
have?
Question 2: What did the girl make for her
brothers?
12. Long ago there lived a young girl named
Brave Heart who had learned to hunt. One
winter, when the young men were out
hunting, the women of the village saw some
warriors heading towards them. They were
filled with fear. With the men out hunting
they did not know who would protect them ..
Brave Heart took up her weapon and started
to sing. Soon a lovely rainbow appeared in
the sky.
Test Sentence 1: Brave Heart had conjured
up a rainbow. (causal)
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The women watched in wonder as Brave
Heart transformed herself into a rainbow.
The beautiful rainbow arched over the
village. The warriors too saw the mighty
rainbow arch above them. Brave Heart
stood in the midst of the rainbow. The
young girl raised her bow high and started
to shoot lightning arrows. The warriors ran Test Sentence 2: The princess kicked the
away in fear. pig,
Test Sentence 2: The bow and arrow were
enchanted. (static)
Question 1: Why were the women
frightened?
Question 2: What did Brave Heart use to
protect the village?
Filler Passages.
13. A beautiful princess was walking along
a country road when she saw a large pig
sitting on the grass verge. Being of a kindly
nature she stopped to speak to it. She
greeted the pig with a smile. But the pig did
not smile. He told the princess that he was
really a handsome prince. He had upset the
local witch who had changed him into a pig.
Test Sentence 1: The pig upset the witch.
The pig explained that only a kiss from a
beautiful princess could break the witch's
spell. The princess was a little doubtful.
She did not know whether to trust the pig.
But being a kind-hearted princess, she bent
down, shut her eyes and planted a kiss on
the end of the pig's rubbery snout.
Immediately the princess also turned into a
plg.
Question 1: Why had the prince been turned
into a pig?
Question 2: Where did the princess kiss the
pig?
14. Harry had been given a new kite for his
birthday. It was a magnificent kite, the
biggest Harry had ever seen. It was shaped
like a diamond, painted in lots of different
colours and had two long silver streamers
that would trail behind it when it flew.
Harry and his dad took the kite out for it's
first flight.
Test Sentence 1: The kite had two long
silver streamers.
Harry held on to the string as the wind
picked up the kite and it soared into the air.
The streamers looked like lightening as they
twisted in the wind. Suddenly, a gust of
wind blew the kite into a tree. Harry could
not reach it but Harry's dad had an idea. He
raced home and fetched his painting ladder.
260
Itwas just tall enough to reach the kite.
Harry soon had the kite soaring up into the
clouds once more.
Test Sentence 2: The ladder was not quite
tall enough.
Question 1:What shape was Harry's kite?
Question 2: How did Harry's dad get the
kite down?
Question 1: What was sticking out of Mr
Twit's ears?
Question 2: How old was Mr Twit?
16. The sailor stood on the deck of his ship
and held up his telescope. He could see the
pirate ship sailing towards him. The Jolly
Roger was blowing in the wind. The sailor
wanted to protect his cargo from the
thieves. The maps he was carrying would
enable his navy to win the battle against the
pirates.
15.Mr Twit was a very hairy-faced man.
The whole of his face except for his eyes,
his nose and his forehead, was covered in
thick hair. The stuff even sprouted in Test Sentence 1: The sailor did not want his
revolting tufts out of his ear-holes. Mr Twit cargo.
felt that his hairiness made him look
terrifically clever and grand. But in truth he The sailor loaded his canon. He aimed the
was neither of these things. barrel directly at the enemy vessel and fired.
The first shot missed the pirates and they
Test Sentence 1:Mr Twit thought he looked carried on advancing. The sailor fired
clever. again. This time the missile found its
target. The sailor watched as the pirates
Mr Twit was a twit. He was born a twit. jumped into the sea to escape the blast. He
And now at the age of sixty he was a bigger and his crew picked up the pirates and
twit than ever. The hair on Mr Twit's face threw them below decks.
grew in spikes that stuck out straight like
the bristles of a nailbrush. And how often Test Sentence 2: The pirates jumped into
did Mr Twit wash this bristly nailbrushy the sea.
face of his? The answer is never, he hadn't Question 1:What did the sailor fire at the
washed it for years. pirates?
Question 2: What did the pirates do when
Test Sentence 2:
his face.
Mr Twit never washed their ship was hit?
261
17. Owl was at home warming himself by
the fire. He was eating hot buttered toast
and pea soup for supper. Owl heard a loud
sound at the front door. He wondered who
could possibly be banging and pounding on
his door on such a cold night. But when
Owl opened the door wide, only the snow
and the cold of Winter were outside.
Test Sentence 1: Owl did not pull the door
open wide.
Owl invited Winter inside to warm himself
by the fire. But Winter came in very fast
and a cold wind pushed Owl against the
wall. Winter ran around the room and blew
out the fire. The snow whooshed up the
staircase and into all the rooms in Owl's
house. Owl was most annoyed. He opened
his door and angrily told Winter to leave.
Winter rushed wildly out of the house and
Owl gladly slammed the door behind him.
Test Sentence 2: Winter rushed wildly out
of the house.
Question 1: What was Owl having for
supper?
Question 2: What happened to Owl's fire?
18. The fox crept up the dark tunnel to the
mouth of his hole. He poked his long
handsome face out into the night and sniffed
the air once. He moved an inch or two
forward and stopped. He sniffed again. He
was always very careful coming out of his
hole. The fox inched forward a little more.
The front half of his body was now out in
the open.
Test Sentence 1: The fox inched out a lot.
His black nose twitched from side to side,
sniffing for the scent of danger. He found
none and was just about to go trotting off
into the wood when he heard a rustling in
the bushes. Then a loud bang rang out and
the smoke from a gun floated into the air.
The fox darted back into his hole and lay
very still and quiet.
Test Sentence 2: The smoke floated up.
Question 1: What was the fox sniffing for?
Question 2: What did the fox hear?
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Appendix V
Experiment 4 Off-Line Validation Materials
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List One
Story 1
John looked behind the wagon and saw the Red Indians approaching. He called for his
father. Henry grabbed his rifle and pulled himself up to the front of the wagon. As the
Red Indians rode closer, John could see they were carrying weapons. He raised his own
weapon and aimed at the enemy. But Henry held up his hand. John took his finger off
the trigger and carefully lowered his gun.
What did Henry want John to do?
a Henry wanted John to fire his gun
b Henry wanted John to wait
c Henry wanted John to read a book
The Indians were so close that John could see their brightly coloured faces. John's hand
was firmly on his rifle as he waited in the wagon. Then Henry gave the signal and John
and Henry opened fire. The battle lasted only a few minutes but seemed a lot longer.
Finally, the Indians had weakened. They turned and disappeared into the mountain
range.
What did the indians ride?
a the indians rode camels
b the indians rode horses
c the indians rode bicycles
Story 2
The fishermen were lost in a storm. Their boat was being thrown from side to side by
the wind. Many of their belongings had been lost overboard and a huge wave had
crashed across the deck, smashing the mast. The men struggled to keep control of the
wheel. They used all their strength to fight the wind and rain.
Which of the following best describes the men?
a the men were freezing cold
b the men were soaking wet
c the men were boiling hot
The men knew they were running out of time. The boat was being forced towards the
rocks. The Captain knew they could not save the ship and he ordered the men into the
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life boat. The ship crashed into the rocks. A huge hole appeared in the side of the hull.
The men watched as the boat sank beneath the waves.
Why did the ship sink?
a the ship filled with water
b the ship filled rocks
c the ship filled with seaweed
Story 3
The spy dropped from the wall surrounding the large house. He pulled out his torch and
made his way over to the open window. As quietly as possible, he pulled himself over
the window ledge and crept into the office. He found the safe hidden under the desk.
The spy entered the code into the panel on the safe door. He found the secret plans in
the safe.
What did the code do?
a the code blew up the safe
b the code opened the safe
c the code locked the safe
Carefully, the spy photographed the plans. Then he slipped them back into the safe
where he had found them. With the camera film safely in the bottom of his backpack,
the spy slipped out of the office the way he came in. In the darkness, he scaled the wall
once more. His mission complete, he disappeared into the dark night.
How was the spy dressed?
a the spy was dressed in black
b the spy was dressed in bright green
c the spy was dressed in red
Story 4
Emily sat happily in the sand at the edge of the sea. She was building a castle with her
bucket and spade. Carefully she filled her bucket to the top with sand. Then she turned
the bucket over in the sand. Emily tapped it gently with her spade. Then she lifted the
bucket to reveal a perfect sand castle.
What was in the bucket?
a the bucket was filled with sand
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b the bucket was filled with salt
c the bucket was filled with shells
Emily was very pleased with herself. She loved building castles on the beach. Emily set
about filling her bucket again. She wanted to build more castles. But Emily had not
noticed that a wind had begun to blow in from the sea. She did not see the huge wave
coming towards her. The wave crashed heavily onto the sand. When the wave finally
rolled away, Emily began to cry.
Why was Emily crying?
a the wave washed Emily away
b the wave washed the bucket away
c the wave washed the sandcastle away
Story 5
The cowboy was riding his horse at great speed through the mountains. He could hear
the bandits drawing closer. The cowboy could feel his horse was tiring. He knew he had
to stop but he had to evade capture. Taking a risk, the cowboy rode into a cave hidden
behind a rock and waited. Soon he heard the bandits ride past the cave.
Why did the bandits ride past the cave?
a the bandits could not hear the cowboy
b the bandits could not see the cowboy
c the bandits were hungry
From the safety of the cave, the cowboy watched as the bandits searched for him in the
valley below. They remained there, circling on their horses for some time. They were
clearly disappointed to have lost their prey. When darkness fell, the leader ordered the
men back to the hideout. They would have to think of another way to capture the
cowboy.
What were the bandits carrying?
a the bandits were carrying rifles
b the bandits were carrying handbags
c the bandits were carrying water pouches
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Story 6
John and Francis watched as the bear approached the girls. The bear was growling and
showing its teeth. The girls were terrified but were frozen with fear. Francis fired his
pistols one after the other. A bullet struck the bear's ear and it reared up on its hind legs.
It let out a terrifying howl.
What sort of paws did the bear have?
a the bear had yellow paws
b the bear had huge paws
c the bear had small paws
Cathie began to scream. The bear was moving slowly, getting closer and closer. Now
that it was in pain it was even more dangerous. Snarling, the bear swiped at the girls.
John knew he had to act fast. He quickly raised his rifle to his shoulder and fired once.
The bear fell to the ground and did not move.
Why did the bear fall to the ground?
a John shot the bear
b John hit the bear
c John kissed the bear
Story 7
The Witch was very cruel to Dorothy and Toto. She made Dorothy work very hard all
day and threatened to hit her. Once the Witch struck Toto so hard with her umbrella that
he flew at her and bit her hard on the leg. But the Witch was too wicked to feel any
pain. So Toto had not hurt the cruel old woman.
Which of the following best describes the old woman?
a the old woman flew on a broomstick
b the old woman flew on an umbrella
c the old woman had a black cat
Dorothy was very angry. She shouted at the Witch to stop being so cruel. But the Witch
just sneered and ordered her to get back to work. The little girl was so mad, she picked
up a bucket of water and threw it at the Witch. The Witch was soaked with water from
head to foot. Dorothy watched as the Witch melted away.
What happened to the witch?
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a the water made the witch melt
b the water made the witch explode
c the water made the witch grow
Story 8
When the battle was over, Lucy found Edmund a little way back from the fighting line.
He was covered with blood, and his face was a nasty green colour. Lucy remembered
the precious red liquid she had been given for a Christmas present. She poured a few
drops of red liquid into Edmund's mouth. Edmund leapt to his feet in perfect health.
How did Edmund recover so quickly?
a the lion helped to heal Edmund's wounds
b the red liquid helped to heal Edmunds wounds
c the doctor helped to heal Edmunds wounds
Edmund fought well in the battle. He had beaten the giants and broken the Witch's
wand. Without him the battle may have been lost. AsIan the lion walked slowly towards
the boy. He was proud of Edmund. The lion pinned a gold medal to Edmund's jacket.
Then the lion let Edmund ride on his back
What was special about the lion?
a The lion was able to talk
b the lion was very gentle
c the lion was small as a mouse
Story 9
One night Sam woke up with a start. He heard a strange sound coming from outside his
window. Sam crept out of bed, hid behind the curtain and looked outside. He let out a
small scream. An enormous spaceship appeared to have landed in his garden. The ship
filled his garden completely. The roses in the flower-bed were completely crushed.
What happened to the roses?
a the spaceship landed on the roses
b Sam landed on the roses
c a car drove over the roses
A door opened in the side of the ship and a strange figure appeared. It looked almost
like a man but had long arms, short legs and a huge head with haunting black eyes. Sam
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cried out and the creature looked up in surprise. Then the door closed and the ship rose
slowly off the ground. Quick as a flash it was gone.
What did the ship look like?
a the ship was shaped like a saucer
b the ship was covered in flashing
lights
c the ship had curtains at the window
Story 10
The mermen lived far out to sea, where the water is blue as the bluest cornflower. The
merman king had six beautiful daughters and the youngest was the prettiest of them all.
Her skin was soft and delicate as a rose leaf and her eyes were as blue as the deepest
sea. But the young daughter could only swim in the sea. She longed to walk on the land
and feel the sand between her toes.
What did the girl look like?
a the girl had a fish tail
b the girl had long golden hair
c the girl had very big ears
One night, the mermaid rescued a prince from the stormy sea. They fell in love, but the
mermaid could not live out of the water. So the mermaid sang sadly to the prince every
night. The merman king could not bear to see his daughter so sad. He cast a spell over
the mermaid and her tail disappeared. She ran happily to meet the prince on the shore.
What happened to the girl?
a the spell gave the girl legs
b the spell gave the girl shoes
c the spell gave the girl measles
Story 11
There once was a king who had eleven sons and one daughter. The king married a
wicked queen who was jealous of the children. She sent the little girl away and made
the king banish his sons from the kingdom. On the day the boys left the palace, the
queen cast a spell over them. Instead of eleven boys, eleven wild swans flew from the
palace gates.
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What happened to the boys?
a the queen turned them all into frogs
b the queen told them all to leave
c the queen turned them into wild swans
The swan princes searched for their sister. When they found her she promised to break
the spell. She made eleven magic shirts for her brothers. When she threw the shirts over
the swans, they were transformed into eleven handsome princes. But the girl did not
have enough magic cloth to finish all the shirts. The youngest prince would forever have
a swan's wing in the place of an arm.
What happened to the prince's arm?
a his arm was very sore
b his arm was covered in white feathers
c his arm was covered in bandages
Story 12
Long ago there lived a young girl named Brave Heart who had learned to hunt. One
winter, when the young men were out hunting, the women of the village saw some
warriors heading towards them. They were filled with fear. With the men out hunting
they did not know who would protect them. The young girl vowed to defend the
women. She took up her bow and arrow and circled the villagers.
Which of the following best describes Brave Heart?
a the young girl was a good hunter
b the young girl was a good seamstress
c the young girl was an indian brave
The women watched in wonder as Brave Heart transformed herself into a rainbow. The
beautiful rainbow arched over the village. The warriors too saw the mighty rainbow
arch above them. Brave Heart stood in the midst of the rainbow. The young girl raised
her bow and started to shoot. Lightening fell as the warriors fled from the village.
Why did lightening start to fall?
a there was a storm
b the arrows were made of lightening
c there was a fireworks display
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List Two
Story 1
John looked behind the wagon and saw the Red Indians approaching. He called for his
father. Henry grabbed his rifle and pulled himself up to the front of the wagon. As the
Red Indians rode closer, John could see they were carrying weapons. He raised his own
weapon and aimed at the enemy. But Henry told John to wait so John took his finger off
the trigger and slowly lowered his gun.
What was John wearing?
a John wore a three piece suit
b John wore a cowboy hat
c John wore a gun and holster
The Indians were so close that John could see their brightly coloured faces. John's hand
was firmly on his rifle as he waited in the wagon. Then Henry gave the signal and John
and Henry opened fire. The battle lasted only a few minutes but seemed a lot longer.
Finally, the Indians had weakened. They turned and disappeared into the mountain
range.
Why did the Indians disappear?
a the indians were beaten
b the indians were hungry
c the indians were frightened
Story 2
The fishermen were lost in a storm. Their boat was being thrown from side to side by
the wind. Many of their belongings had been lost overboard and a huge wave had
crashed across the deck, smashing the mast. The men struggled to keep control of the
wheel. They used all their strength to fight the wind and rain.
Why did the men need all their strength to fight the wind and
rain?
a the boat was hard to steer
b the wheel was hard to turn
c the boat was easy to steer
The men knew they were running out of time. The boat was being forced towards the
rocks. The Captain knew they could not save the ship and he ordered the men into the
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life boat. The ship crashed into the rocks. A huge hole appeared in the side of the hull.
The ship filled with water and began to sink.
Which of the following best describes the men?
a the men were boiling hot
b the men were freezing cold
c the men were soaking wet
Story 3
The spy dropped from the wall surrounding the large house. He pulled out his torch and
made his way over to the open window. As quietly as possible, he pulled himself over
the window ledge and crept into the office. He found the safe hidden under the desk.
The spy entered the code into the panel and the door opened. He found the plans in the
safe.
What did the spy carry?
a the spy carried a handbag
b the spy carried a gun
c the spy carried a torch
Carefully, the spy photographed the plans. Then he slipped them back into the safe
where he had found them. With the camera film safely in the bottom of his backpack,
the spy slipped out of the office the way he came in. In the darkness, he found the wall
once more. He jumped safely to the ground and ran into the dark night.
How did the spy escape?
a he climbed over the wall
b he climbed over a gate
c he climbed up a tree
Story 4
Emily sat happily in the sand at the edge of the sea. She was building a castle with her
bucket and spade. Carefully she filled her bucket to the top with sand. Then she turned
the bucket over in the sand. Emily tapped the bucket gently with her spade. Then she
lifted the bucket and looked underneath.
What did Emily see under the bucket?
a Emily had made a cake
b Emily had built a sandcastle
c Emily had captured some crabs
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Emily was very pleased with herself. She loved building castles on the beach. Emily set
about filling her bucket again. She wanted to build more castles. But Emily had not
noticed that a wind had begun to blow in from the sea. She did not see the huge wave
coming towards her. The wave crashed heavily onto the sand and washed away Emily's
sandcastle. Emily began to cry.
What was Emily wearing?
a Emily wore a swimming suit
b Emily wore a party dress
c Emily wore flip flops
Story 5
The cowboy was riding his horse at great speed through the mountains. He could hear
the bandits drawing closer. The cowboy could feel his horse was tiring. He knew he had
to stop but he had to evade capture. Taking a risk, the cowboy rode into a cave hidden
behind a rock and waited. The bandits could not see him in the cave.
What was the cowboy wearing
a the cowboy wore a gun and holster
b the cowboy wore a tie
c the cowboy wore blue jeans
From the safety of the cave, the cowboy watched as the bandits searched for him in the
valley below. They remained there, circling on their horses for some time. They were
clearly disappointed to have lost their prey. When darkness fell, the leader ordered the
men back to the hideout. They would have to think of another way to capture the
cowboy.
Why could the bandits not capture the cowboy?
a the bandits were tired
b the bandits were scared of the dark
c the bandits could not hunt in the dark
Story 6
John and Francis watched as the bear approached the girls. The bear was growling and
showing its teeth. The girls were terrified but were frozen with fear. Francis fired his
pistols one after the other. A bullet struck the bear's ear and it reared up on its hind legs.
It let out a terrifying howl.
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Why did the bear howl?
a the bear was frightened
b the bear was singing
c the bear was in pain
Cathie began to scream. The bear was moving slowly, getting closer and closer. Now
that it was in pain it was even more dangerous. Snarling, the bear swiped at the girls.
John knew he had to act fast. He quickly raised his rifle to his shoulder and fired once.
The bear was badly hurt by John's bullet.
What sort of paws did the bear have?
a the bear had huge paws
b the bear had small paws
c the bear had yellow paws
Story 7
The Witch was very cruel to Dorothy and Toto. She made Dorothy work very hard all
day and threatened to hit her. Once the Witch struck Toto so hard with her umbrella that
he flew at her and bit her hard on the leg. But the Witch was too wicked to feel anything
at all. The old woman just laughed out loud.
Why did the old woman laugh?
a the old woman thought Toto was funny
b the old woman did not mind the pain
c the old woman did not feel the pain
Dorothy was very angry. She shouted at the Witch to stop being so cruel. But the Witch
just sneered and ordered her to get back to work. The little girl was so mad, she picked
up a bucket of water and threw it at the Witch. The Witch was soaked with water from
head to foot. Dorothy watched as the water melted the witch away.
Which of the following best describes the witch?
a the witch had a black cat
b the witch flew on a broomstick
c the witch flew on an umbrella
Story 8
When the battle was over, Lucy found Edmund a little way back from the fighting line.
He was covered with blood, and his face was a nasty green colour. Lucy remembered
the precious red liquid she had been given for a Christmas present. AsIan the lion told
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her to give some liquid to Edmund. The liquid helped to heal Edmund's wounds.
What was special about the lion?
a the lion was very gentle
b The lion was able to talk
c the lion was small as a mouse
Edmund fought well in the battle. He had beaten the giants and broken the Witch's
wand. Without him the battle may have been lost. Aslan the lion walked slowly towards
the boy. He was proud of Edmund. Aslan put something on Edmund's jacket. Edmund
stared proudly at the shiny gold medal pinned there.
Where did Edmund get his medal?
a Aslan gave Edmund the medal
b the PE teacher gave Edmund the medal
c the Witch gave Edmund the medal
Story 9
One night Sam woke up with a start. He heard a strange sound coming from outside his
window. Sam crept out of bed, hid behind the curtain and looked outside. He let out a
small scream. An enormous spaceship appeared to have landed in his garden. The huge
spaceship filled his garden completely and the flower-beds were all completely ruined.
What did the ship look like?
a the ship had curtains at the window
b the ship was shaped like a saucer
c the ship was covered in flashing
lights
A door opened in the side of the ship and a strange figure appeared. It looked almost
like a man but had long arms, short legs and a huge head with haunting black eyes. Sam
saw the funny looking man and cried out. The creature looked up in surprise. Then the
door closed and the ship rose slowly off the ground.
Why did the ship start to flyaway?
a Sam had given the creature a fright
b Sam had made the creature happy
c Sam had made the creature angry
Story 10
The mermen lived far out to sea, where the water is blue as the bluest cornflower. The
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merman king had six beautiful daughters and the youngest was the prettiest of them all.
Her skin was soft and delicate as a rose leaf and her eyes were as blue as the deepest
sea. The young girl had a beautiful shiny tail. She could swim as fast as any other
creature in the ocean
Why was the girl able to swim as fast as the other sea creatures?
a the girl was a diver
b the girl was a mermaid
c the girl was a fish
One night, the mermaid rescued a prince from the stormy sea. They fell in love, but the
mermaid could not live out of the water. So the mermaid sang sadly to the prince every
night. The merman king could not bear to see his daughter so sad. The king cast a spell
over the mermaid and her tail disappeared. Two perfect legs appeared in the place of her
tail.
Which of the following best describes the king?
a the king wore high heels
b the king wore an luxurious robe
c the king wore a gold crown
Story 11
There once was a king who had eleven sons and one daughter. The king married a
wicked queen who was jealous of the children. She sent the little girl away and made
the king banish his sons from the kingdom. On the day the boys left the palace, the
queen turned the boys into swans. Instead of eleven boys, eleven wild swans flew from
the palace gates.
What did the boys look like?
a the boys had big noses
b the boys were covered in white feathers
c the boys had webbed feet
The swan princes searched for their sister. When they found her she promised to break
the spell. She made eleven magic shirts for her brothers. When she threw the shirts over
the swans, they were transformed into eleven handsome princes. But the girl did not
have enough magic cloth to finish all the shirts. The youngest prince would forever have
a swan's wing in the place of an arm.
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Why did the prince have a swan's wing in the place of an
arm?
a the magic shirt was too small
b the magic shirt was missing a button
c the magic shirt was missing a sleeve
Story 12
Long ago there lived a young girl named Brave Heart who had learned to hunt. One
winter, when the young men were out hunting, the women of the village saw some
warriors heading towards them. They were filled with fear. With the men out hunting
they did not know who would protect them. Brave Heart took up her weapon and
started to sing. Soon a lovely rainbow appeared in the sky.
How did the rainbow appear?
a the women made the rainbow appear
b Brave Heart made the rainbow appear
c the hunters made the rainbow appear
The women watched in wonder as Brave Heart transformed herself into a rainbow. The
beautiful rainbow arched over the village. The warriors too saw the mighty rainbow
arch above them. Brave Heart stood in the midst of the rainbow. The young girl raised
her bow high and started to shoot lightening arrows. The warriors ran away in fear.
What was special about the bow and arrow?
a the bow and arrow were magical
b the bow and arrow were ancient
c the bow and arrow were expensive
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